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The Author is indebted to the following publishers and authors 
for kind permission to make quotations from copyright matter : 
to Mr. Edward Arnold for Colonial Nationalism, by Richard Jebb ; 
to Mr. B. H. Black well for Imperial Architects, by A. L. Burt ; to 
the Delegates of the Clarendon Press for Federations and Unions, 
by H. E. Egerton ; to Messrs. Constable & Co. for Alexander 
Hamilton, by F. S. Oliver, and The Nation and the Empire, edited 
by Lord Milner ; to the publishers of the Encyclopaedia Britan- 
nica ; to Messrs. Macmillan & Co. for Seeley's Expansion of 
England, and G. L. Parkin's Imperial Federation ; to Admiral 
Mahan ; to Mr. John Murray for English Colonization and Empire, 
by A. Caldecott ; to Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd. for The Union 
of South Africa, by W. B. Worsfold ; to the Executors of the late 
W. T. Stead for the Last Will and Testament of C. J. Rhodes ; to 
Messrs. H. Stevens, Son & Stiles for Thomas Pownall, by C. A. W. 
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G. P. Putnam's Sons for The Works of Benjamin Franklin, 
edited by John Bigelow ; to the Yale University Press for 
Popular Government, by W. H. Taft ; and also to The Times ; 
The Round Table ; The Outlook ; and The Springfield Weekly 


The English-speaking, self-governing white people 
of the world in 1914 number upwards of one 
hundred and forty-one millions. Since December 
24, 1814, there has been unbroken peace between 
the two independent groups of this race — a fact 
that contravenes the usual historical experiences 
of peoples between whom there has been uninter- 
rupted communication during so long an epoch. 
The last few decades have seen increasingly close 
understandings between both the governments and 
the peoples of this civilization. 

In 1900 the British navy controlled the seas — all 
seas. From 1910 to 1914 the British navy has 
controlled the North Sea only. 1 Some doubt 
whether this control can long be maintained. If 
it is lost, the British Empire is finished. 2 The 
adhesion of the dependencies to their various 
governments and also the voluntary cohesion of 
the self-governing units would be at an end. " The 
disorders which followed the fall of Rome would 
be insignificant compared with those which would 

1 Cf. Round Table, London, May 1911, p. 247. 

2 Round Table, London, November 1.910, p. 27 : " Directly the 
British Empire is doubtful of its supremacy by sea its full liberty 
will disappear, even if there has been no war." 


ensue were the British Empire to break in pieces." 1 
Such a splitting up would place each English- 
speaking nation in an exposed position, and would 
strengthen its rivals, Germany, Japan, Russia, and 
China. It would compel America to protect with 
arms, or to abandon to its enemies, not only the 
countries to which the Monroe Doctrine has been 
considered as applicable, but those lands still more 
important to the future of our race, New Zealand 
and Australia. If this catastrophe is to be averted, 
the English-speaking peoples must regain control 
of the seas. 

These pages are concerned with the English- 
speaking people of 1914. Here will be found no 
jingoism, if this be defined as a desire to flaunt 
power for its own sake ; no altruism, if this means 
placing the welfare of others before one's own ; and 
no sentiment except that which leads to self-pre- 
servation. No technical discussion of military or 
naval power is here attempted. The purpose of 
these pages is to indicate some of the common 
heritages of these English-speaking peoples, their 
need of land and their desire for the sole privilege 
of taxing themselves for their own purposes and in 
their own way. 

Federation is here recognized as the method by 
which English-speaking people ensure the freedom 
of the individual. It utilizes ideals and methods 
common to them all. Where it has been applied, 
it fulfils its dual purpose of protecting the group 
and leaving the individual unhampered. 

This consideration may appear to the political 

1 United Empire, London, January 1914, J. G. Lockhart, 
"The Meaning of British Imperialism," p. 53. 


economist to be merely a few comments on one 
instance of the relationship of the food supply to 
the excess of births over deaths ; to the international 
politician, as notes on the struggles of the English- 
speaking race ; and to the business man, as hints 
on present and future markets and the maintenance 
of routes thereto. Books could be written on each 
of these and kindred topics. This is not any one 
of such treatises, but a statement of only a few 
aspects of a huge question. 

To Benjamin Franklin may be given the credit 
of initiating the thesis of these pages, for he fore- 
saw in 1754 the need of a single government based 
on the representation of both the American and 
British groups of self-governing English-speaking 
people. Possibly there were others before him. 
Certainly there have been many since. Some 
have been obscured by time. Others, like Cecil 
John Rhodes, stand out brilliantly. These men 
visioned the whole race without losing sight of 
their own local fragment. They saw the need of 
blocking intra-race frictions in order to maintain 
our inter-race supremacy. They spoke the English 
language, and held by the ideals of English-speak- 
ing men — proud of their race. 

To such as these, wherever they are found, 
owing affection to the British and American flags 
which they protect, and which protect them from 
others, this discussion is addressed. It is a family 
appeal in terms familiar to the family here called — 
the Pan- Angles. 


Boston, Massachusetts, 
January \1, 1914. 


























MAP .... 


the end oj 

r the volume 




A great civilization has spread over the earth. 
Many millions of people believe it the best that 
has yet appeared. In it the faiths and strivings of 
a strong race are expressed. History teaches that 
it will be assailed by rival civilizations. Must it 
fall and its people be led into the bondage of alien 

The date at which a civilization begins must 
always be unknown, so slowly and steadily do the 
contributing forces operate. The birth of even so 
definite an organization as a nation is a matter 
of opinion. The United States of America, for 
example, may be regarded as having come into 
being on July 4, 1776, or at the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1789, or at the end of the French 
War in 1763, or on any one of various other dates, 
according to the historical bias of the chronicler. 
But before records now legible to us were made, the 
Pan- Angles were long past their beginning stages. 

Thousands of years ago Europe emerged from the 



glacial ice. Off its western coast lay islands. The 
largest was close to the continent, and whatever 
peoples made their way into Europe had no great 
difficulty in crossing the narrow water. Migration 
must have followed migration, as continental tribes, 
more progressive that the islanders, came with 
superior weapons and skill to conquer and colonize. 
Bronze drove out flint and iron overcame bronze. 
Settlements of invaders assimilated with the sub- 
ject natives and themselves became natives to the 
next foreign exploiter. The resulting people became 
known to the Romans as Britons. Rome's traders 
saw that the land was worth possessing. 

In the middle of the first century a.d., Imperial 
Rome was in a mood for further expansion. It 
became necessary to intervene in the affairs of the 
northern island, touched already by Roman in- 
fluence, but as yet independent of that power. In 
the island there were many princes and many 
governments adequate to the local demands, but 
no organization for concerted action against a 
powerful intruder. Within fifty years the task 
of pacification was largely accomplished. The 
southern two-thirds of the land then enjoyed the 
beneficent rule of Roman administrators. They 
governed Britain for its own good — as they saw it. 
They made it as much as possible like Rome. 
Baths and temples, roads and bridges, and a firm 
law brought Roman enlightenment to uncultured 
Britain. The Latin tongue was the official language. 
Many Romans of the military and civil services 
married native women. For more than two 
centuries Britain was thus a dependency of Rome, 
and many Britons were proud to belong to the 


great empire. The rest of the island, to which 
this boon was never extended, was inhabited by bar- 
barous hill tribes, who, even when Rome was strong, 
could protect themselves, and who at favourable 
opportunities made raids against the loyal Britons. 
The Romans had come to Britain to rule it, but 
had remained Romans, had taken their orders from 
colonial secretaries in Rome, had left their Roman 
wives and children at home — presumably because 
of the severity of Britain's climate, — and after an 
honourable term of service had retired on half-pay, 
or something as good. Just how Rome profited 
by holding Britain is immaterial now, whether 
by tribute levied and collected directly, whether 
through extended opportunities for trade, or 
whether in the employment ("outdoor relief," a 
Canadian might put it 1 ) of a large military and 
civil force, paid, if Britain were self-supporting, by 
Britain's taxes. Perhaps the knowledge of having 
discharged a duty, shirking not the burden of the 
strong, was the reward Rome really prized. 

A change of rulers was, however, in store for 
them all — Briton and Roman alike. By 350 a.d. 
a huge amorphous rival had begun to overflow its 
Northern forest, a race of strong, eager men seeking 
more land. That their first attacks were toward 
Rome itself showed the empire's weakness. Rome's 
intentions toward outlying dependencies may have 
been of the best, but it was powerless to fulfil them. 
The navy, such as it was, was forced to concentrate 
in home waters ; and the army, called to protect 
the heart of the empire, left empty the barracks of 

1 Round Table, London, September 1913, p. 639, 


Then, on the disorganized Britain, borne by the 
north-east wind, fell the invaders. With them came 
many of our most cherished virtues and a new 
epoch of governmental theory. The Jutes, Angles, 
Saxons, Danes, and Norsemen came, not to super- 
impose themselves as rulers, but to colonize. They 
brought their families along. The climate suited 
them nicely. They wanted to live there and make 
the country their country. The fact that it was 
already inhabited formed only a temporary obstacle. 
As has happened repeatedly in history, those who 
came were strong ; those they found were weak. 
The right of prior occupation was matched against 
the right to take by force. In time the natives 
had disappeared and the newcomers were settling 
and improving the land. There was no looking 
back to a mother country for orders or protection. 
Their fathers across the North Sea had evolved 
certain governmental ideas. These the migrating 
generations had carried with them and planted in 
the new soil. They proved adequate ; and if any 
tie bound the lusty offspring to the ancestral home 
it could have been sentiment only — unencouraged 
by written and electric communication. The senti- 
ment was short-lived. 

Of these separate colonies there were as many as 
there were tribes, and as many tribes as there were 
shiploads. They all came from the great Teutonic 
stock that covered so much of north-western 
Europe. Five hundred years they spent trying 
conclusions among themselves, deciding what should 
be the language, the law, the name, they were to 
hand down to us. The people long remained 
without any name common to all; but in time 


their country became known as England. Here 
were established the characteristics that have 
marked us ever since. The framework of the 
language was set ; the greed for land was indulged ; 
and the instinct for self-government, unable to 
evolve for its own security any system of central 
control, proved finally the undoing of all the 
jealous little autonomies. When a single-minded 
force threatened their cherished liberties, they 
were capable of no single-minded resistance. A 
neighbour across the channel thought he could 
make good use of England, proved his point one 
day when the wind blew favourably towards 
Hastings, and became England's master. 

Then began a new governmental era, one having 
no parallel in our history since. The Saxon had 
been in most recent supremacy. Wealth and 
power passed from Saxon to Norman hands. 
Had the Duchy of Normandy been large enough 
to form the centre of its ruler's activities, England, 
like the Britain of the past, would have become a 
dependency of a foreign power. Two factors pre- 
vented : England, because of its size and of its 
separation from the continent was the more valued 
possession of the two ; and William and his 
followers, although considering themselves greatly 
superior in culture and breeding, were really of the 
same race as the men they conquered, and hence 
easily assimilated with them. Had this been an 
invasion of people, that is, of men with their wives 
and children — it must have meant extermination 
of the Angles, Saxons, and Danes, either in war or 
in economic strife. But no such colonizing force 
was at work. The lords of England were reduced 


to peasantry, and the peasants of whatever origin 
kept on about their affairs. In time the new 
nobility was no longer foreign. Neither a depend- 
ency, nor a colony, England gradually absorbed the 
Normans and all the importance of Normandy. 

From this assimilation England rose independent 
and a unit. The Normans, it has been said, crushed 
the Angles, Danes, and Saxons into one people. 1 
Just as inexorably were the Normans themselves 
fused into the common mass — 

"Thus from a mixture of all kinds began, 
That heterogeneous thing, an Englishman : . . . 
The silent nations uhdistinguish'd fall, 
An Englishman's the common name for all. 
Fate jumbled them together, God knows how ; 
Whate'er they were, they're true-born English now. 11 2 

Out of the vigour and strength that resulted have 
risen the Pan- Angles ; and no foreign power since 
then has conquered or ruled them in England or 
elsewhere. With several governmental units co- 
ordinated to no central authority, England had been 
devastated and had been unable to repel invasions. 
These local powers were now combined under a 
strong unitary government. So efficient did it 
prove for many generations, that Pan- Angles as a 
whole are only now realising its limitations. For 
five centuries no change in circumstances warranted 
the consideration of any other. 

Suddenly, in a few years, everything changed 
except the minds of men. The world began to 

1 C. H. Pearson, History of England during the Early and 
Middle Ages, London, 1867, vol. i. p. 136. 

2 Daniel Defoe, "The True-born Englishman: A Satire," in 
Novels and Miscellaneous Works, London, 1855, vol. v. pp. 441, 442. 


grow, and Europe was staggered by the knowledge 
of areas immeasurable as compared to the lands 
previously known. England then began to take 
its place as a great nation. In 1497 a ship, financed 
by Bristol merchants, discovered Newfoundland, 1 
and the sea-divided control of the Pan- Angles was 
foreshadowed. From this date, perhaps, Pan- 
Angle history may most conveniently be reckoned. 
If so, four hundred and seventeen years lie behind us. 
Of these the first hundred are negligible. That was 
an age of fable, when the children of Europe went 
out on lonely quests and staked their lives in ad- 
venture for prizes whose value they could never 
know. Men left England and circled the globe ; 
they fished in distant waters ; 2 they bartered with 
strange peoples ; but in the main they returned 
again to England. No colonial policy was required 
to meet their needs. 

After 1600, however, they less often returned. 
They settled the new lands, and grew great in 
wealth and population. They organized govern- 
ments and huge instruments of trade. Slowly the 
fabric grew that was to dwarf England in size and 
resources, and England, failing to understand that 
it was no loser thereby, but richer as a part of a 

1 Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffi- 
ques and Discoveries of the English Nation, Hakluyt Society 
reprint, Glasgow, 1904, vol. vii. p. 146: "IN the yere of our 
Lord 1497 John Cabot a Venetian, and his sonne Sebastian (with 
an English fleet set out from Bristoll) discovered that land which 
no man before that time had attempted, on the 24 of June, about 
five of the clocke early in the morning." Cf Alfred Caldecott, 
English Colonization and Empire, London, 1891, p. 23. 

2 D. W. Prowse, History of Newfoundland, London, 1895, pp. 
28, 58, 83. 


strengthening Pan- Angle civilization, found little 
light on the problems arising. In 1607 Virginia and 
in 1620 Massachusetts were permanently settled. 1 
During the same years Englishmen were acquir- 
ing titles and trading rights in India. Here, at 
the outset, we have all the elements that long 
made for obscurity and discord. 

In Virginia and Massachusetts the land was 
suitable for the occupations and for the breeding 
of white men. These settlements were typical of 
many in North America, South Africa, and Austral- 
asia. The settler changed his latitude and longi- 
tude, but little else. He pushed back the natives 
from the land he desired to use, gave the place an 
English name, and proceeded about his affairs with 
his fundamental ideals, habits, and institutions un- 
altered. He brought from England, besides furni- 
ture and bricks for his house, his language, his 
religion, and his notions of government. These he 
preserved and handed down to his children, who in 
turn thought and behaved as though Englanders, 
and in two localities, a hemisphere apart, named 
their land New England. Self-government was 
one of their inherited ideas ; they believed that he 
who supports the government with taxes should be 
represented therein. Settlements such as these are 
here distinguished as colonies. The first sprang 
from England, and in some cases have themselves 
been the prolific parents of new colonies. But of 
whatever origin, all are a product of the individual- 
ism of the Pan- Angle civilization. In them self- 

1 John Fiske, Old Virginia and Her Neighbours, London, 1 897, 
vol. i. pp. 93, 94 ; John Fiske, The Beginnings of New England, 
Boston, 1889, pp. 81-83. 


government has been a question of time only. 
" Assemblies were not formally instituted, but grew 
of themselves because it was the nature of English- 
men to assemble. Thus the old historian of the 
colonies Hutchinson, writes under the year 1619, 
* This year a House of Burgesses broke out in Vir- 
ginia.' "* However strongly such colonies may be 
attached by sentimental and political ties to some 
other governmental group, they belong to them- 
selves alone. On terms of equality they are part 
of the Pan- Angle power that controls the world. 

In India, and in the many other instances of 
the same sort, the land was not suited for the 
occupations and for the breeding of white men. 
It was filled with native inhabitants who neither 
gave way before the European, nor assimilated 
with him. The English language, law, and 
governmental forms might be superimposed to 
some degree, but the great bulk of the people 
continued to think, talk, and act in ways that 
were not our ways. Their civilization, however 
high, was not our civilization. Such lands, and 
only such lands, may be called " possessions " of 
any Pan- Angle nation. Ceylon belongs to the 
British Isles ; the Cook Islands belong to New 
Zealand ; Papua belongs to Australia ; and the 
Philippines belong to the United States. Because 
they " belong to " another than themselves, these 
lands are called dependencies. 

The men who ruled England in 1600 could not 
anticipate this distinction so as to make their 
phraseology, their thoughts and their efforts at 

1 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, London, 1883, 
p. 69. 


government correspond. Nor, as years passed, 
did they come to understand it. Often they 
knew little about these settlements, except that 
all were distant very many days sailing. In 
general, the tendency was to act as though all 
were possessions belonging to England and sub- 
ject to its will. To the statesman in London it 
might seem at most a theoretical difference ; not 
so to the man on the spot. If he were a colonist 
he felt his land a part of the Mother Country, or 
its equal in a larger group of which both were 
parts. His land did not and could not belong to 
England in any sense that gave him less liberty 
than Englanders enjoyed. 

Here, on the one side, was a stubborn fact ; on 
the other, an inability to recognize that fact. 
Friction resulted. In 1707 England united with 
Scotland to form Great Britain. But Great 
Britain, like England, thought colonies posses- 
sions. It so regarded the American colonies. 
Friction increased. 

The colonists understood what it was to desire 
to be "part of" and to find they were considered 
as " belonging to." In Taunton, Massachusetts, 
they raised a liberty pole, October 21, 1774. 
From it flew the flag of Great Britain bearing 
the words " Liberty and Union." To the pole 
was affixed the following lines : 


" Be it known to the present, 
And to all future generations, 
That the Sons of Liberty in Taunton 
Fired with a zeal for the preservation of 


Their rights as men, and as 
American Englishmen, 
And prompted by a just resentment of 
The wrongs and injuries offered to the 
English colonies in general, and to 
This Province in particular, . . ." 1 

Not enough of the Pan-Angle statesmen of 
those days had the insight to read rightly that 
inscription. It was only by severing the Pan- 
Angles that the American colonies demonstrated 
that their citizens were the peers of the citizens 
of Great Britain. 

Yet there were men on both sides of the 
Atlantic who even in those days appreciated that 
one group of English-speaking white men cannot 
be controlled by another. They understood the 
equality of citizenship in all Pan- Angles. Of 
these men it is enough to mention five: Burke 
of Ireland, whose words " ring out the authentic 
voice of the best political thought of the English 
race," 2 and who gave us the " Conciliation with 
America " ; Otis of Massachusetts, whose speech 
against the Writs of Assistance was only the 
beginning of his work ; Galloway of Pennsylvania, 
the Loyalist who refused re-election to the 1775 
Continental Congress when he had to choose 

1 P. D. Harrison, The Stars and Stripes, Boston, 1906, p. 24; 
ibid., p. 23 : " The Taunton flag was the regular English [Great 
Britain's] flag, adopted by the union of the aforesaid crosses 
upon a red field. Its significance lay in its motto, signifying 
that there was at that time no thought of severance from the 
mother country, their only thought being liberty of action ; 
and it has historic value because it was the first to wave with 
that motto." 

2 Woodrow Wilson, Mere Literature, Boston, 1900, p. 105. 


between America and Great Britain ; Pownall 
of England, Governor of Massachusetts 1757- 
1760, and later Member of the British Parlia- 
ment 1768-1780 ; and Franklin of Pennsylvania, 
who with Pownall worked for Pan- Angle unity 
on both sides of the Atlantic till he, like Galloway, 
had to decide, and ended by choosing not Great 
Britain but his own nation. The first was never 
in America ; the second was never in England ; 
the third saw England in his exile only after 
American nationhood was established ; and the 
fourth and fifth knew both England and America. 
These men did not discover to Pan-Angles the 
doctrine of no taxation without representation. 
That, like many other alleged Americanisms, was 
a Pan- Angle tenet already old. " The Principality 
of Wales, said Galloway, the Bishopric of Durham, 
and the Palatinate of Chester, laboured, just as 
America, under the grievance of being bound by 
the authority of Parliament without sharing the 
direction of that authority. They petitioned for 
a share, and their claim was recognized. When 
Henry VIII., he continued, conquered Calais, and 
settled it with English merchants, it was so incom- 
patible with English liberty to be otherwise, that 
Calais representatives were incorporated in the 
English Parliament." 1 But these five men may 

1 A. L. Burt, Imperial Architects, Oxford, 1913, p. 60. Henry 
VIII. above should read Edward III. After the battle of Crecy 
he besieged Calais in 1346. Cf. C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas 
Pownall, London, 1 908, p. 204, who refers to the same ideas as 
above, quoted from the 4th edition (1768) of Thomas Pownall's 
The Administration of the Colonies. For maps of these four 
historical areas, see W. R. Shepherd, Historical Atlas, Boston, 
1911, pp. 74 and 84. 


be said to be among those who rediscovered this 
tenet. As such they shared in the formation of 
the nationhood not only of America, but also of 
the five new nations of the Britannic world. 

In 1801 Great Britain and Ireland were formed 
into one political unit under the official title of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in 
these pages referred to as the British Isles. And 
still the distinctions between "part of" and "be- 
longing to " were not understood in the British Isles. 
Colonies and dependencies grew in importance and 
size, many of the former having colonies and de- 
pendencies of their own ; and still their radical 
differences were not clearly recognized. Repeat- 
edly such colonies as Canada, New Zealand, or 
South Africa have reasserted the Pan-Angle 
principle that one group of self-governing white 
men cannot be the possession of another. So strong 
has been the effect of this reiteration that now 
there is some tendency in the British Isles to err 
on the other side, and to consider India, the Malay 
States, and other dependencies as though they hold, 
or should hold, the same status as colonies. 

Failure to distinguish between areas that are 
self-governing and those that are not leads to a 
loose application 01 terms which contributes to 
further obscurity of thought. One recent instance 
is striking in its subtle suggestiveness. Most of 
the Malay Peninsula has been taken under the 
surveillance of the British Isles. Gradually one 
native ruler after another has been induced to 
desire the friendship of the men who came from 
the British Isles. 

Some of the areas so acquired are dubbed 


"States." 1 The collective government of this 
group of " States " has been given the grandilo- 
quent title " Federated Malay States." The Pan- 
Angle student, familiar with federation in the 
English-speaking nations which have already suc- 
ceeded in their autonomous efforts, cannot but be 
confused by hearing the word " federated " applied 
to regions where self-government is not even spoken 
of, and where the inhabitants take their political 
orders from such officials as are appointed by 
their white conquerors. The confusion is increased 
when a battleship guaranteed with funds of the 
Federated Malay States is presented to the govern- 
ment of the British Isles, and is made the occasion 
of fulsome speeches about the "loyalty" of the 
" King's subjects " in the Federated Malay States. 
The uninformed persons of the British Isles and 
elsewhere may not realize that this gift of the 
battleship Malaya means simply the imposition 
of additional taxes on the conquered subjects that 
" belong to " the conquering race. This is equally 
true whether or not has been obtained the approval 
of the figureheads that are known to the outside 
world as the "native rulers." 2 Such an instance 

1 For a definition of grades of government of dependencies of 
Britannic nations, see An Analysis of the System of Government 
throughout the British Empire, London, 1912, pp. 59-6 1. 

2 Round Table, London, September 1913, p. 697: "It is not 
true that she [Malaya] was offered as the result of pressure 
by the British Government. She owes her existence partly to 
the imagination of the Colonial Secretary in the Malay States, 
who would by general agreement have been well advised to 
keep his visions to himself instead of communicating them even 
to sympathetic chiefs, but the Government in the ' Malay 
States certainly received no suggestion on the subject from the 
Colonial Office.' " 


fogs our perception of the problems pressing for 
solution by the Britannic self-governing peoples. 

This confused thinking and failure to appreciate 
the difference between "part of" and "belonging 
to" has delayed Pan -Angle progress. It led 
to the disrupting American Revolution, to the 
Canadian Rebellion of 1837, and to frictions less in 
importance only because they were more promptly 
remedied. It has been an unnecessary difficulty in 
the way of all schemes proposed for closer Britannic 
union. Are the self-governing colonies to be united 
to each other and to the Mother Country ? — or to 
these and to the dependencies besides ? The word 
empire is variously used, and the thought under- 
lying it sometimes vague. To some Britannic 
writers it refers inclusively to every spot over 
which the British flag flies, classing all colours 
and conditions of men in one category. 1 Others 
restrict its use to self-governing areas and peoples. 2 
To still other minds it connotes lack of self- 
government, and is applicable only to the depen- 
dencies. 3 The "imperial parliaments" conjured 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. iv. p. 606. "Ency. Brit." in this and subse- 
quent notes refers to Encyclopaedia Britannica, Eleventh Edition, 
Cambridge, England, 1910. Also Empire Movement (Non-Party, 
Non-Sectarian, Non-Aggressive, and Non-Racial), London, 1913; 
Leaflet 1 9, Shorter Catechism : " The British Empire is that 
portion of the Earth's land surface which is subject to the 
authority of King George." 

2 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, London, 1883, 
p. 46 : " The English Empire is on the whole free from that 
weakness which has brought down most empires, the weakness 
of being a mere mechanical forced union of alien nationalities. 
. . . the English Empire in the main and broadly may be said 
to be English throughout." 

3 Cf. G. R. Parkin, Imperial Federation, London, 1892, p. 248 : 


up by these three definitions are vastly dissimilar. 
And the New Zealander, for instance, would like 
to know, before he becomes a party to one, whether 
he is going to help rule India, or to sit in joint 
deliberation with its representatives. 1 

The British Isles and the countries that have 
developed from British colonies form numerous 
and interrelated political groups. The largest, and 
now most important areas from a racial point of 
view, are New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, 
Newfoundland, Canada, the British Isles, and the 
United States of America. In this discussion these 
seven nations are considered as representing their 
race. Their peoples are known respectively as 
New Zealanders, Australians, South Africans, New- 
foundlanders, Canadians, Britishers, and Americans. 
These seven nations hold in actual or allied control 
lands amounting to sixteen million square miles, 
with a population of five hundred and thirty-five 
million people, 2 or thirty and thirty-three per cent, 
respectively of the entire surface, and the entire 

" Unquestionably confusion of thought is caused by the care- 
less use of the term Empire into which English people have 
fallen. Applied to India and the crown colonies it is admissible, 
. . . As a name for the ' slowly grown and crowned Republic ' 
of which the mother-land is the type and the great self-govern- 
ing colonies copies, the term Empire is a misnomer, ..." 

1 Richard Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, 1905, 
p. 276 : " Indeed, the inclusion of India involves the reductio 
ad absurdum of the imperial-federation theory which forms the 
logical complement of the expansion-of-England theory." 

2 Whitaker's Almanack, London, 1913, pp. 479, 6^6: 16,897,126 
square miles and 535,753,952 persons. 


population of the world. Rome at her greatest 
dominated a population of one hundred and twenty 
millions. 1 In these seven nations more than one 
hundred and forty-one millions are white people, 2 
nearly all speaking the same language, and all 
enjoying individual liberty of substantial equality. 
They govern themselves and they govern other 
peoples of other languages, colours, and ideals, to 
a total of nearly four times the entire Roman 
Empire. To the English-speaking whites these 
subject -peoples owe their privileges, such as they 
are. Success or failure in governing themselves 
and others depends for these whites on their ability 
so to control themselves that no foreign powers 
can interfere with this world-wide domination. 

The words " the English-speaking, self-governing 
white people of New Zealand, Australia, South 
Africa, Newfoundland, Canada, the British Isles, 
and the United States of America," make a long 
expression. No suitable abbreviation seems to 
have been devised. The word Pan- Angle as a noun 
and as an adjective is here offered. 

1 An Analysis of the System of Government throughout the British 
Empire, London, 1912, p. v, gives the Roman Empire population 
as eighty-five millions and the British Empire as four hundred 
and ten millions. But see Edward Gibbon, Decline and Fall of 
the Roman Empire, London, 1782, vol. i. pp. 51, 52: "We are 
informed, that when the emperor Claudius exercised the office 
of censor, he took an account of six millions nine hundred and 
forty-five thousand Roman citizens, ... it seems probable, 
that there existed, in the time of Claudius, about twice as many 
provincials as there were citizens, . . . and that the slaves were 
at least equal in number to the free inhabitants of the Roman 
world. The total amount of this imperfect calculation would 
rise to about one hundred and twenty millions of persons." 

2 Cf. post, p. 81, note 1. 



There are various reasons why other words are 
unsatisfactory. None in existence exactly denotes 
the meaning which is here desired. Anglo-Saxon 
may refer to the fusion of two stocks of conquering 
immigrants who contributed men and vitality of 
ideas to the present Pan- Angles. Sometimes, how- 
ever, it has referred to only one of these tribes, the 
Saxons, and designated them as the Saxons coloniz- 
ing Angle-land, as opposed to the parent stock, 
the Saxons of the continent. 1 Some writers have 
employed the word loosely as a collective name for 
all persons and ideas whose ancestry can be traced 
to the British Isles. Again, a literature, a law, an 
architecture, and a language is each called Anglo- 
Saxon. Moreover, there is a people called Saxons, 
and a land of Saxony, forming no part of the Pan- 
Angle group. Anglican is one of our race names, 
with its roots deep in the past, but it has already 
a restricted meaning as a name for one of our 
religious creeds. English is equally unsatisfactory. 
It is properly applied to our common language and 
to the people inhabiting a part of the British Isles. 
Even this seemingly simple meaning has not been 
faithfully preserved. Writers, otherwise careful, 
speak of the English flag and the English Parlia- 
ment, when they mean the flag and Parliament of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 
Robert Louis Stevenson, by a recent student and 
author, was called an Englishman ! 2 This inexact- 
ness is equally distasteful to those to whom the 
appellation rightfully belongs, and to those who 
have names of their own of which they are proud. 

1 Cf. Ency. Brit., vol. ix. p. 588. 

2 Price Collier, England and the English, London, 1911, p. 341. 


To avoid confusion, the word English in this 
discussion is restricted as far as possible to the 
language alone, or is used in the sense of belonging 
to or originating in England. The term England 
refers only to the geographic area bearing that 
name. 1 The inhabitants of England are herein 
referred to as Englanders. 2 It would be well to 
have a name for these self-governing, English- 
speaking white people that would direct the mind 
back to the European stocks, whose bloods have 
mingled in the British Isles and in these six other 
nations, and that would suggest the origin of the 
ideals and of the men that have made possible the 
present world domination of these people. Failing 
such an extensively composite and suggestive word, 
resort is had to the name of one of these many 
tribes. They are but one of many peoples that 
went to our making. The Angles to-day exist no- 
where as Angles. But they gave their name to 
our tongue and to the country through which we 
have inherited much. Every English-speaking 
schoolboy knows Gregory's exclamation at the sight 
of the fair-skinned children brought from Britain. 3 
" Angels," they may have looked to the fervent 

1 As to quoted passages, the reader is cautioned to distinguish 
in each instance the meanings of the terms England, Britain, 
Great Britain, British, Britannic, etc. The usage in one quota- 
tion may differ from that in another and from that in the non- 
quoted passages. The terminology in the latter has been 
adopted to accord with the most accurate and consistent present 
usage. The only innovation in terms here employed is the word 

2 Sir Walter Scott, The Abbot, iv. : " I marvel what blood thou 
art — neither Englander nor Scot," quoted in New English 
Dictionary, Oxford, 1891 — "Englander." 

3 Ency. Brit., vol. xii. p. 566. 


priest, on their block in the Roman slave market ; 
but, as " inheritors of the earth, successors to Rome 
about to fall," he might prophetically have saluted 
them. Their political descendants have abolished 
slavery throughout a large part of the world. They 
are the white people who speak English, citizens of 
the autonomous nations : New Zealand, Australia, 
South Africa, Newfoundland, Canada, the British 
Isles, and the United States of America. Pan- 
Angles they are here called, and their nations, Pan- 
Angle nations. 



If an intelligent traveller from Mars were to tour 
the earth to-day he would jot down in his note-book 
that New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, New- 
foundland, Canada, the British Isles, and the United 
States were all inhabited by the same sort of people. 
Their language, their forms of government, their 
ways of thinking and of conducting the various de- 
partments of life would lead him to think so. And 
he would be right. The English-speaking traveller, 
denied the point of view of an outsider, is prone to 
take the likenesses for granted and to dwell on the 
differences, using his own local group as a yard-stick 
to measure the rest. Beneath his criticism, how- 
ever, he is conscious that in these countries he is at 
home in the same sense that he is an alien in all 
others. Whichever of the seven he may be from, 
he finds in each of the other six, men he can hardly 
tell from himself, and realizes that in his own 
political unit, whose oneness he never questions, 
there are communities with natures more dissimilar 
than are the natures of these seven nations. No 
knowledge of history is needed for either him or 
the Martian to conclude that while they use 
different names to designate this part or that, 


they are speaking always of one people and one 

Of what stuffs the English-speaking people were 
fashioned has already been explained. England, 
when colonization began, held the germ of the 
future Pan- Angles. Within two centuries Scotland 
and Ireland were united with England and Wales 
under one government, and the English language 
and English ideals penetrated further and further 
into those once Celtic strongholds. Welsh, Scots, 
and Irish brought their contributions to our develop- 
ment. They wrote English poems and English 
books. They officered the army and built battle- 
ships. They made and administered laws, and 
furnished prime ministers for the British Isles. 
Like the Englanders they too migrated to the new 
Pan- Angle lands, seeking religious or political 
liberty in some cases, but oftenest seeking the 
means of a more satisfactory life. These they have 
found. By this blending of all British Isles stocks 
came new vitality to the Pan-Angles. 

Three centuries ago this diffusion of Britishers 
began, and it continues to-day in far greater numbers 
than then. 1 Nor have they come less to the United 
States since it became independent of Great Britain. 2 

1 Whitaker's Almanack, London, 1913, p. 484 : 454,527 British 
and Irish emigrants left the British Isles in 1911. Of these 
80,770 went to Australasia; 30,767 to South Africa; 184,860 
to Britannic North America; and 121,814 to the United States. 

2 A. L. Burt, Imperial Architects, Oxford, 1913, pp. 123-124: 
" In sixty years (1815-1876) eight and a half million people had 
emigrated from Great Britain. Of these only three million settled 
in the Colonies. The rest went to the United States. . . ." 


A French student divides the American people into 
two groups : those whose ancestors were in the 
United States previous to 1830, and hence almost 
totally British, and those descended from persons 
immigrating since that time. The former, accord- 
ing to his computation, comprises more than one- 
half of the present population of the United States. 
And of the latter, one-third at least are likewise of 
British stock. A total of two-thirds, or perhaps 
even of three-fourths, of the American people to-day 
are, he concludes, the descendants of Britishers. 1 
The Irish he considers an important element. Of 
the result of the mingled immigrations of the Irish 
and other Celts with the Scandinavians and 
Germans, an American student says : " When 
we remember that it was the crossing of the 
Germanic and the Celtic stocks that produced the 
English race itself, we are obliged to assume that 
the future American people will be substantially 
the same human stuff that created the English 
common law, founded parliamentary institutions, 
established American self-government, and framed 
the Constitution of the United States." 2 Of all 
Pan- Angles a tremendous majority are of British 
descent. Of all Pan- Angles outside the British Isles 
a majority are still of British descent ; and theirs 
has been the influence that has made six new nations 
vastly alike, and like, also, to the Mother Country. 
In some instances, notably in Canada and in 
South Africa, the Pan -Angles found on their 

1 Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, Les Etats-Unis au Vingtieme Siecle, 
Paris, 1904, pp. 25-26. 

2 F. H. Giddings, Democracy and Empire, New York, 1900, pp. 


arrival other peoples, sprung from European stocks, 
firmly rooted to the land. Descendants of these 
first settlers still form communities apart, in which 
one hears English less often than French or Taal, 
as the case may be ; much as one finds communities 
in the British Isles where only a form of Celtic is 
spoken. In other places, too, as in New York and 
London, are little foreign nuclei engaged in some 
particular trade, where a man can live and earn his 
wage and know no English. These are, however, 
the remarked exceptions. 

British blood, moreover, has not in the meantime 
been stagnant. Through these centuries, as from 
earliest history, it has been constantly enriched and 
invigorated by admixtures from the continent of 
Europe. To the British Isles, South Africa, 
Newfoundland, Canada, and the United States, 
non - British peoples have come. Even New 
Zealand and Australia, almost purely British as 
they are, have their French and German settle- 
ments respectively. In the British Isles the 
reception and absorption of foreign stocks has been 
unspectacular. Individuals, or from time to time 
groups, seeking the larger tolerance of England, 
have taken up an abode there. One has but to 
observe and listen in the streets to be convinced 
that foreign invaders, though with no hostile intent, 
still land on British soil. Outside the British Isles, 
this replenishing of the British stock by " foreign " 
immigrants often presents features that are spectacu- 
lar — especially where the bulk of the foreigners 
now arrive — in the United States and Canada. 1 

1 Round Tab le, London, September 1913, p. 723: "Last year 
the United States received immigrants from other countries 


The immigrant often comes with no ability to 
speak English or to understand the habits of mind 
and forms of government of those who do. He 
may never have been proudly conscious of any 
nationality. But in an amazingly brief length of 
time, we find him taking his place among his 
Pan- Angle fellows and conducting himself as one 
of them. In one generation he is transformed into 
a Pan-Angle. 

This process of assimilation was formerly un- 
conscious on the part of the receiving nations. 
Now, as the task has grown more stupendous, 
special machineries in the way of day and night 
schools and settlement clubs and classes have been 
devised in the larger centres, and are maintained 
at the expense of the public. The immigrant, 
safely arrived, finds himself still outside the unyield- 
ing wall of the English language. He cannot ask 
for food or work. Even those from his former 
country talk English together, and jeer at his 
ignorance. By hard experience and whatever help 
is offered, he qualifies himself in this first requisite. 
With his English he acquires much else. He 
learns words which express ideas peculiar to Pan- 
Angle psychology. From the words he progresses 
to the ideas themselves. Thus he learns somewhat 
of the theory of law and government, and of the 
aspirations and ideals, and of the expected privileges 
that have evolved with this language. The pride 
of the Pan- Angle comes over him, and a faith in 
those precepts of individual freedom of which he 

equal to three-quarters of one per cent, of the total population. 
The influx to Canada was between six and seven per cent, of the 
total population." 


had never dreamed, it may be, until he learned to 
read and talk of them in English. " An English- 
man's house is his castle." Here is a promise of 
privacy perhaps unknown in the land he has quitted. 
" Government derives its just powers from the 
consent of the governed." This is a long step from 
the doctrine of the Divine Right of kings. Thus 
with the language goes an atmosphere of many 
things that are not to be translated, historical 
heritages which the immigrant must substitute for 
those of his birth. As he practises the new tongue 
amid increased material and spiritual comforts, his 
perception quickens and he is already fairly started 
to become one of us. "I am an American," he 
cries ; or " 1 am a Canadian " : more noisily, perhaps, 
because his liberties are newer, but speaking none 
the less from the same fountains of pride that in- 
spire — " I am an Englishman." 

On the second generation the same force 
operates ; the stubbornness of the English-speaking 
people for their language acts firmly as the 
Inquisition and gently as a blessing. They attend 
tree schools, read only books written in English 
from the point of view of English-speaking people 
and on subjects interesting to such people, Non- 
Pan- Angle theories of government are non-existent ; 
alien moral standards unheard of. The wall that 
once hedged the father out, hedges the children in. 
More often than not they cannot speak the tongue 
their parents were born to. With Ivanhoc and 
King Lear they are familiar; they quote Burns 
and Wordsworth and Longfellow; after local 
history they study that of England. The history 
and poets of their fathers' native lands are foreign 


and unknown. If oratory be demanded, it is 
Burke or Lincoln who furnish the words and 
sentiments to young Hans and Pietro. 1 

This is a consideration of English-speaking whites, 
and as such is not concerned with the non- whites 
of various races and various and inconsistent degrees 
of subjection or citizenship, who dwell in Pan- 
Angle countries. The aborigines of the United 
States and Canada, of New Zealand and Australia, 
are now problems of the past, solved according to 
nature's rule of the survival of the fittest. They 
could not live and increase in the environment the 
white man was strong enough to throw about 
them. The negro, numbering almost four times 
the whites in South Africa 2 and one-eighth of 
the whites in America, 3 is a problem yet 
unsolved, for nature has not yet made it clear 
which, all things considered, is the most fit. He 
not only thrives in contact with whites, but with 
his low standard of living multiplies more rapidly. 
The Asiatic races are the problem of the future. 
In every quarter we see a determination that it 
shall not grow beyond its present incipient stage. 
All Pan- Angle nations may not be able to obtain, 
as Australia wishes to, an exclusively white popu- 

1 Boston (Massachusetts) Transcript, November 19, 1913: 
'•Chicago, Nov. 19 — Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg address, 
which was delivered fifty years ago to-day, w r as read to-day to 
the one million pupils in the public schools of Illinois. Pupils 
above the sixth grade had memorized the address and recited it 
at the hour at which President Lincoln began his speech. 
To-night the speech will be repeated in nearly every night school 
and social centre in the State." 

2 Britannica Year Book, London, 1913, p. 703. 

3 Cf. post, p. 8 1 , note 1 . 


lation. But each nation, whenever non-whites 
appear to endanger the success of white local self- 
government, are able to exclude from the privilege 
of the franchise any non-assimilable inhabitants. 
In each of these seven nations white local autonomy 
is recognized as necessary. The existence of these 
problems in no way modifies the definition of Pan- 
Angles as English-speaking whites who are the 
self-governing forces in the seven above-named 

The language Pan-Angles speak grew out of 
the Germanic tongues of the Saxons, Angles, 
Danes, and Jutes. Our most common and familiar 
words have been in uninterrupted use since the 
days of those invaders. 1 To this Teutonic basis 
was added the French of the Northmen called 
Normans. A proclamation of 1258 is sometimes 
called the first specimen of English, 2 but its 
resemblance to modern speech is not for the 
uninstructed to discern. Through the thirteen, 
fourteen, and fifteen hundreds English took on a 
form more intelligible to us of to-day. In the 
latter part of the fifteen hundreds a great poet and 
playwright employed it so effectively that his 
diction and style became a standard. 3 From the 
same epoch dates the translation of the Bible and 
its popular use. "The English version of the 
Bible remains the noblest example of the English 
tongue, while its perpetual use made it from the 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. ix. p. 597. 

2 Ibid., vol. ix. p. 594. 

3 Ibid., vol. ix. p. 596. 


instant of its appearance the standard of our 
language." 1 

Thus it came about that in the Mayflower and 
other early emigrant ships was carried to the 
new countries an English of authenticated stamp. 
The standards then recognized are still recognized. 
This was, however, the English of books and 
education. Each shire of England in its own 
speech bore witness to its past. Kent and York- 
shire often could not understand each other, and 
words used in one were unknown to the other. 
The emigrating Englander carried with him 
accordingly, besides the English as established 
for educated men, the common dialect of his 
neighbourhood. In the colonies these differences 
tended to vanish under the influence of the press, 
free schools, and easy methods of travel ; though 
occasionally in a word, or here and there a pro- 
nunciation, the delighted etymologist sees the 
ghost of some local English usage, as in the 
old Devon still spoken in Newfoundland. 2 In 
England these local variations of speech have 
persisted longer, and still puzzle the unaccustomed 
ear. In America there still exist words and 
expressions which when they left England were 
in good usage, but which have there since been 
dropped. Though the dictionaries of to-day call it 
an Americanism, Shakespeare wrote : " Better far, I 
guess, That we do make our entrance several ways." 3 

1 J. R. Green, A Short History of the English People, London, 
1898, vol. ii. p. 934. 

2 J. G. Millais, Newfoundland and its Untrodden Ways, London, 
1907, p. 339. 

3 Henry VI., Pt. I., Act u., Scene i., line 29. Cf. John 
Bartlett, Concordance of Shakespeare, London, 1894 — "Guess." 


The variety and interest of the English language 
does not lie alone in these historical survivals. It has 
been, and still is, constantly enriched from outside 
itself. In the colonies and dependencies, and in 
foreign lands as well, the English language has 
come in contact with practically all the tongues 
of the earth. From these it has helped itself 
according to need or fancy. The result gives 
locally a strong dash of colour which inevitably 
tends to tinge the whole. Ranch, trek, amok, 
portage, taboo, tomahawk, coolie, — have long since 
ceased to serve limited communities, and stand 
acknowledged in our dictionaries besides words 
of Saxon and Norman pedigrees. Spruit, kai, bila- 
bong, — if not lost altogether will come to the same 
dignity. Whether the new word is taken from 
another language or coined from English roots as 
local slang, the story of a growth in usage is the 
same. The "tramp" and "sun-downer" may 
consort together in any library with a " creeper," 
a "tenderfoot," and a "new chum." In language 
usages we have no authority but our own desires. 

Such is our language, a living thing growing 
in parts, dying in parts, and ever ready to adapt 
itself to local needs. It is, moreover, uniform, 
as nearly as any living tongue can be uniform. 
The peculiarities of speech observed in different 
localities are enough to furnish picturesque touches 
for a novel and humour to the stage, but never 

Also Geoffrey Chaucer, "The Canterbury Tales, (A) The 
Prologue," in The Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer, W. W. 
Skeat ed., Oxford, 1894, vol. iv., line 82 : "Of twenty yeer of 
age he was, I gesse." Ibid., line 117: "A forster was he, soothly, 
as I gesse." 


enough to make even the slightest barrier between 
any two regions. Even so it is a matter largely 
of pronunciation and inflection. The writer who 
would suggest the twangs and drawls, and indicate 
the r's that are rolled or ignored, and the h's 
insecure in position, has hard work with tortured 
spelling to accomplish his end. To the art of 
printing and all the publishing, useful and other- 
wise, it has made possible ; to popular education 
and the reading it stimulates, we owe a uniform 
written language. Had the colonists gone forth 
and builded their nations prior to the days of 
type and presses and cheap books, the Kansan and 
Tasmanian might have been to-day as linguistically 
remote from each other as both are now from the 
Anglo-Saxons of Bede's days. Instead, though 
they may " labor " or " labour " according to fancy, 
and each have his preference about going to 
"jail" or to "gaol," they are able to pool their 
literatures and draw from a common fund. To 
increasingly comfortable and rapid means of trans- 
portation, whether of the tourist, the British 
bagman or American drummer or the job hunter, 
we are indebted for our homogeneous speech. 
And in that common speech lies possibly the 
strongest tie between Pan-Angles and the one 
that makes all others potent. 

Every Pan- Angle is in instant communication 
with every other Pan- Angle wherever he may meet 
him. Through books, newspapers, and magazines 
written in his mother tongue, he may be in con- 
stant touch with the doings of the whole Pan- 
Angle world. American youths study Geikie's 
Geology in their schools ; New Zealanders buy 


and read the Atlantic Monthly ; and the Century 
Dictionary is in use at Oxford. Men like Lord 
Bryce and Admiral Mahan write on matters vital 
to the existence of Pan- Angle civilization ; and 
attention and esteem are theirs from every 
thoughtful English-speaking man. Through the 
pulpit, the lecture platform, and the stage, the 
people of each nation daily form first-hand ac- 
quaintance with the representatives of each of 
the other six — no bar of translation or interpre- 
tation standing between. Of the popular authors 
and novelists, one-half of their readers probably 
hardly know which are American, which Britannic. 
Thus our common language produces a continuous 
interchange of thought which makes for mental 
unity and keeps us one people. 

Through this world-wide interchange of thought 
we see not only each other, but ourselves, from 
the point of view of each other. Family criticism 
is often harsh when most friendly ; and among our- 
selves we speak our minds freely, whether it be 
tolls, boundaries, or table manners under discussion. 
Frank opinions are sometimes resented. "I do 
not talk through my nose," says the American. 
" Nor do I use my a's like a cockney," retorts 
the Australian. " I have no accent," rejoins the 
Englander with an unmistakable drawl. " Look 
at your police and your yellow press," say six of 
us, and the American stands ashamed. " Look at 
the abject misery of your poor and the waste of 
your fertile lands," and the Englander winces. 
" Look at your defenceless condition," and New- 
foundlanders, Canadians, New Zealanders, Aus- 
tralians, and South Africans all admit the indict- 


ment. Mutual criticism is accordingly not without 
profit. In each other's virtues and failings we find 
models and warnings, for our ideals are in the 
main the same, and to no foreign opinion are we 
so sensitive as to the opinion of other members of 
our own family. 

In Pan- Angle nations there are to-day more 
people speaking English than have ever before in 
the world's history spoken one tongue. 1 But even 
outside of those seven nations, English ranks as the 
world language, the one most useful for commerce, 
travel, or education. Some maintain that it is the 
richest language known. On a computation of 
words that may perhaps be so. 2 Others claim it is 
easy to learn. No one calls it easy to spell. Some 
say English-speaking people cannot learn other 
languages ; others say they will not. The story is 

1 The world contains one hundred and sixty million English- 
speaking people, according to Whitakers Almanack, London, 
1913, p. 99- Of the one hundred and twenty millions computed 
to have been under the control of the Roman Empire only a 
portion spoke Latin. 

2 The Outlook, New York, August 9, 1913: " Four new 
words are added to the English language every day, if we may 
accept the dictionaries as a standard of measurement. During 
the last three centuries the rate of growth of the dictionaries 
has been 1500 words a year. In l6l6 John Bullokar . . . 
published his Compleat English Dictionary, with 5080 words. . . . 
There are now in fact 600,000 English words, but about one- 
quarter of this number are rare scientific terms or words that 
are obsolete or obsolescent." Cf. Boston (Massachusetts) Tran- 
script, May 28, 1913, Franklin Clarklin, a A Supreme Court of the 
Language " : " This year will see the issue of an English language 
dictionary containing 450,000 words. It is said that the largest 
German dictionary including personal words has 300,000 words, 
a French one 210,000 words, a Russian and an Italian 140,000 
words each, and a Spanish 120,000 words." 


told of a man for many years the only British 
resident on 1500 miles of Arabian coast. He 
knew less than a dozen words of Arabic. " How 
do you carry on your trade ? " someone asked. 
" Oh," he replied, " the beggars have got to learn 
English." 1 Similar is Mr. Dooley's promise to the 
Filipinos: " An' we'll larn ye our language, because 
'tis aisier to larn ye ours than to larn oursilves 
yours. " 

That the wide knowledge of its language is a 
source of advantage to a nation, Benjamin Franklin 
pointed out in a letter to Noah Webster in 1789: 
" The Latin language, long the vehicle used in 
distributing knowledge among the different nations 
of Europe, is daily more and more neglected ; and 
one of the modern tongues, viz. the French, seems 
in point of universality to have supplied its place. 
It is spoken in all the courts of Europe ; and most 
of the literati, those even who do not speak it, have 
acquired knowledge enough of it to enable them 
easily to read the books that are written in it. 
This gives a considerable advantage to that nation ; 
it enables its authors to inculcate and spread 
throughout other nations such sentiments and 
opinions on important points as are most conducive 
to its interests, or which may contribute to its 
reputation by promoting the common interests of 
mankind. It is perhaps owing to its being written 
in French, that Voltaire's treatise on * Toleration ' 
has had so sudden and so great an effect on the 
bigotry of Europe, as almost entirely to disarm it. 
The general use of the French language has like- 
wise a very advantageous effect on the profits of 

1 Manchester (England) Guardian, March 24>, 1913. 


the bookselling branch of commerce, . . . And at 
present there is no capital town in Europe without a 
French bookseller's shop corresponding with Paris. 

" Our English bids fair to obtain the second 
place. The great body of excellent printed sermons 
in our language, and the freedom of our writings 
on political subjects, have induced a number of 
divines of differents sects and nations, as well as 
gentlemen concerned in public affairs, to study it ; 
so far at least as to read it. And if we were to 
endeavor the facilitating its progress, the study 
of our tongue might become much more general." * 

By 1856 the use of our language had progressed 
so that Emerson thought it "destined to be the 
universal language of men." 2 

That we who talk English go about with an 
assumption of superiority, there is abundant testi- 
mony. In 1676 an English ship visited Mauritius, 
then a possession of Holland. A modern historian 
quotes from the records of the Dutch Governor : 
" This breed imagine the Hollanders are of a lower 
stock, naturally inferior, who ought always to be 
humbly and servilely at their disposal." 3 A 
Bostonian, who sailed from his home port for 
Liverpool on news of the ratification of the treaty 
of Ghent, mentions a British army officer with 
whom he chatted in London in 1815 : " The 
colonel complimented the American troops in a 
curious manner by observing that they were brave 

1 John Bigelow, The Complete Works oj Benjamin Franklin, 
New York, 1888, vol. x. pp. 177-178. 

2 R. W. Emerson, English Traits, 1856, Boston reprint, 1894-, 
p. 287. 

3 Albert Pitot, TEylandt Mauritius, 1598-1710, Port- Louis, 
He Maurice, 1905, p. 178. 


and it was not to be wondered at since they 
were 'descendants of Englishmen.' It required 
all my gravity to make an acknowledging bow for 
this compliment ! I frequently found that the 
bravery displayed by the Americans in the last 
war was accounted for from this source." 1 " They 
[the Scots] are bumptious, very bumptious," says 
Goldwin Smith. " They try to force their Burns 
down our throats." 2 "Do not, above all things," 
counsels an official circular addressed to British 
emigrants to Canada, "try to impress on your 
Canadian employer how much better we do things 
in England, for it will only make him dislike 
you and perhaps not care to keep you in his 
employ. Canadians, too, often resent criticism of 
their country or its methods, but you should 
remember that they have been working in Canada 
long before you were born, and that they are more 
likely than a stranger like yourself to know what 
suits that country best." 3 The American Ambas- 
sador, speaking in London in 1913, said " he was 
asked almost every day by the kindly people whom 
he met — and he could not too strongly emphasize 
the word ' kindly ' since he had come to England — 
how they were getting on in the United States 
assimilating the endless hordes of people from all 
lands who came to their shores. He did not wish 

1 J. B. Crocker, ed., England in 1815, as Seen by a Young 
Boston Merchant : Being the Reflections and Comments of Joseph 
Ballard on a Trip through Great Britain in the year of Waterloo, 
Boston, 1913, p. 22. 

2 Arnold Haultain, Goldwin Smith His Life and Opinions, 
London, p. 162. 

3 Quoted, The Times Weekly Edition, London, October 17, 


to boast. He was a humble man from the humblest 
of countries. (Laughter.) But he was delighted 
to assure them that the Anglo-Saxon, or British, 
race, who settled the United States first, shaped 
its destinies, directed its energies, according to 
their conscience, against their own Motherland, 
and developed themselves and the great territory 
which they subdued, to this day, no matter how 
many men came from how many lands, still ruled 
it and led it. (Cheers.) And there was no time 
in sight when that would have changed. Every 
President of the United States had been of English 
or Scottish blood dominantly. Out of 121 mayors 
of cities only 1 1 per cent, had names which showed 
that they or their predecessors came from countries 
other than the United Kingdom. Only 14 per 
cent, of the representative men who took part in 
the government of the United States in the House 
of Representatives or the Senate bore foreign names, 
which left 86 per cent, who came from the United 
Kingdom. The Anglo-Saxon was quite as much 
the leader of men in the great Republic as he was 
in the great United Kingdom. That was not a 
boast ; it was a natural phenomenon. It was 
destiny, and they could not help it if they would. 
Americans deserved no particular praise for it. 
They believed, just as Englishmen believed, that 
they were born to rule the world." 1 "That com- 
placency which never deserts a true-born English- 
man " ■ speaks wherever a Pan- Angle voice is raised. 

1 The Times Weekly Edition, London, July 25, 1913. 
Account of Anglo-Saxon Club Dinner, July 18, 1913. 

2 R. W. Emerson, English Traits, 1856, Boston reprint, 1894, 
p. 280. Cf. ibid., p. 145: "An English lady on the Rhine 


Foreign testimony on this point in our character is 
unanimous, but no foreigner can demonstrate so 
vividly the arrogance of our self-satisfaction as do 
we in our every act and attitude. Moreover, what 
do most of us care about what foreigners think? 
Was it not Dr. Johnson who said, " All foreigners 
are mostly fools "V 

As Pan- Angles we are, in short, the cream of 
the earth. As Britishers, Americans or Australians 
we are the cream of the cream. As Englanders, 
Missourians, or Queenslanders we are something 
even more superlative. As Londoners, St. Louisans, 
or Brisbanians, — words fail to express the height of 
our self-approval. The Englander says little on 
the subject but, like the calm ungainsayable fog of 
his habitat, simply is. If called from his high 
estate to pass judgment, he characterizes the rest 
of the world as " beastly peculiar." " Colonials," 
in this term he lumps also the inhabitants of the 
United States, are to him unfortunates, having 
"jolly rotten luck to live way off out there." The 
American, more nervously pitched, raises his voice 
and talks long about his bigness. " You call that 
a river ? " he indicates the Thames. " Why, if we 
had a damp streak like that in one of our fields in 
Iowa, we'd tile it just to keep from getting our 
feet wet crossing." The Australian, conscious that 
little attention has been paid him as yet, and con- 
scious too that his " potentialities " are really great, 

hearing a German speaking of her party as foreigners, exclaimed, 
' No, we are not foreigners ; we are English ; it is you that are 
foreigners.' " 

1 Cf. Price Collier, England and the English, London, 1911, 
p. 359. 


aggressively balances a chip for the inspection of 
critics. His sheep, his harbour, his apples, his stars 
— woe to anyone who fails to acquiesce in their 
paramount excellence ! " And after all," he sighs, 
returned from the other fair places of the earth, 
"after all, there is only one Sydney." 

Such are our local prides, or such at least do 
they appear in their most blatant types. "The 
habit of brag runs through all classes " * wherever 
we live. Those of us who observe the good form 
of appearing tolerably meek-minded, are perhaps 
at heart no more so. Why, then, do we smile 
tolerantly at all the world and take no offence at 
each other ? Because each is confident of his own 
place in the sun, and confident too that the Pan- 
Angles, although he may not use that term, by 
virtue of these very local prides, are one in their 
desire and determination to maintain their civiliza- 
tion against all others who are not of our language 
and our ways. 

An American was one day asked by a cutlery 
salesman from Birmingham (England), " Are you 
not humiliated by having no national language ? " 
" We have one," was the prompt reply ; "it is 
English." So would have spoken a Canadian or a 
Newfoundlander, a South African, a New Zealander, 
or an Australian. That is one of our prides. Our 
language is ours. It reflects our many-rooted 
origins, our varied and severally branched histories, 
our constantly converging growths. It binds us 
to the ideals of our kind. Its very name takes us 
in imagination to the infancy of our race, where 

1 R. W. Emerson, English Traits, 1856, Boston reprint, 1894, 
p. 145. 


from subservience to the wills of others the in- 
dividual emerged. " The English have given im- 
portance to individuals, a principal end and fruit 
of every society. Every man is allowed and 
encouraged to be what he is, and is guarded in the 
indulgence of his whim. ' Magna Charta,' said 
Rushworth, ' is such a fellow that he will have no 
sovereign.' By this general activity and by this 
sacredness of individuals, they have in seven 
hundred years evolved the principles of freedom. 
It is the land of patriots, martyrs, sages and bards, 
and if the ocean out of which it emerged should 
wash it away, it will be remembered as an island 
famous for immortal laws, for the announcement 
of original right which make the stone tables of 
liberty." 1 To acknowledge the relation of America 
to the land of these struggles and their earliest 
successes can never be humiliating. England's 
past belongs to us all, and to-day England is one 
of us. There, was cradled the individualism of 
our Teuton forbears that has grown into a civilizing 
world-wide domination. We all have helped to 
nurture and shield it. We are as seven guardians 
whose harmony is secured not only because they 
are one in aim and method but because being one 
in language they are bound into understanding. 

The Pan- Angle enjoys the highest standard of 
living known to any comparable number of people 
in the world, either formerly or to-day. If civiliza- 
tion depends on the margin of wealth above mere 

1 R. W. Emerson, English Traits, 1856, Boston reprint, 1894, 
p. 291. 


means of existence, Pan-Angles are the most 
civilized of the races. 

Given a hypothetical community possessed only 
of such material resources that all the energies of 
every member must be used to provide food and 
protection from the elements, and there is pre- 
sented the lowest possible standard of living. 
Anything lower would mean starvation, ex- 
posure, and death. Add but ever so little to 
those resources, so that some few, still fed and 
sheltered, may employ their energies in other 
ways, and they may become scientists and prolong 
the lives of their fellows and teach them more 
productive methods of food getting; they may 
become artists and poets for the delight and 
recreation of the rest ; they may devise laws and 
systems of government to regulate labour and 
control wealth ; and may develop certain in- 
stinctive cravings into hopeful religions. The 
community has now taken its first steps toward 
what we call civilization. Add further to the 
resources, increase the amount of energy that 
can be spent in channels other than the main- 
tenance of life, and there is developed a complex 
organism, with churches and schools, music and 
literature, steam transportation, electric machinery, 
and contrivances of many other sorts to make life 
comfortable, enjoyable, and inspiring. Between 
this hypothetical primitive community and civili- 
zation as the Pan- Angles understand it are many 
stages, some of them occupied to-day by our 
neighbours whose material resources have not 
increased to the extent of ours. Now, of all the 
world, the people having most time and strength 


after their physical necessities are secured are the 

The per capita wealth and the per capita land 
holdings of the Pan-Angles are greater than those 
of any other comparable number of people. Their 
diet is more generous, more costly, and more 
varied. Their apparel is more expensive, and 
their housing more capacious and more comfort- 
able. They are able to support a greater number 
of instructors and entertainers in their writers, 
artists, and musicians. Hardly an act of their 
lives, hardly an article they use, but has some 
embellishment not strictly necessary to life and 
utility. With all this the Pan- Angles, so much 
have they beyond the mere means of existence, 
furnish lavishly the pleasures of the so-called 
" higher life " to their own souls. They study 
philosophies and ponder the rights of man; they 
support the weak and economically useless with 
the proceeds of their own labour. They send of 
their wealth to other civilizations, as missionary 
reports testify, trying to contribute to their wel- 
fare. And with all this spending, they still have 
at their disposal such resources that they increase in 
numbers from generation to generation, and each 
generation has more than the generation before. 

The reason for this high standard of living is 
not far to seek. We have all this because we 
have been strong enough to take land, the source 
of food and shelter, the basis of all life and 
wealth. The Teutons came and took England; 
the Normans came and took England ; and Pan- 
Angles since have taken land in every continent 
and throughout the seas : from the bleak coast 


and rich shore-fisheries of the Labrador to the 
fertile plains of the Missouri and the grassy 
ranges of Otago. In Canada and the United 
States for years land was the prize that the 
country offered to pioneers, giving thousands of 
acres in parcels of one hundred and sixty as long 
as they lasted. From their land and sea- coast 
holdings, the Pan- Angles have taken the yield of 
fish and grain and meat ; and those who laboured 
in getting food produced enough for themselves 
and for their fellows who were working in other 
ways. Besides food, these lands provided many 
other of the essentials of the standard of living 
we desire. 

Other lands rich in promise came under the 
Pan- Angle gaze. Often there seemed the best 
of reasons why we should not go and live there. 
We thereupon set up additional factories at home 
and made cloth and knives above our own de- 
mands to send out to those countries in trade. 
By working at home in smoky cities we were able 
to gather the food and the luxuries we wanted 
from all parts of the world. These lands we have 
taken into our custody in order to guarantee our 
trade supremacy. Unproductive spots here and 
there, such as Gibraltar, Aden, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong, we have been forced to hold to facilitate 
and protect our trade. In the main we acquired 
some very valuable pieces — the most valuable in 
sight some of our rivals have thought. We never 
know how valuable a place may be, and, con- 
versely, we never appreciate what a nuisance a 
place may be until after we have taken it. Yet, 
the nuisances we try to turn to useful account. 


Land to occupy or to trade with, the Pan-Angles 
have been able to acquire because they were strong. 
France, Spain, and Holland wanted North America ; 
the Pan-Angles took it. France wanted New 
Zealand and Australia ; the Pan- Angles took them. 
Portugal and Holland both had ports at Cape 
Town before the British flag flew there. And as 
to dependencies or trade lands, India, Mauritius, 
Malacca, Ceylon, the Philippines, were all wrested 
from other nations, while hosts of islands in every 
sea fell undisputedly to us, only because no other 
powers felt strong enough to contest the point. If 
at any time we had been unable to take these, we 
should have been unable to grow and increase our 
standard of living to its present degree of comfort. 
There is among us to-day a great abhorrence of 
war. We should like to abolish it together with 
pain, death, and all other evils. The human race 
has already learned and accomplished much toward 
that end. Doubtless more will be revealed. That 
our presence here, however, and that of our children 
to come, is due to the efforts our fathers displayed, 
seems evident. Perhaps we ought not to risk that 
heritage too lightly. 

Not a single Pan- Angle is willing to reduce his 
race numbers. He wishes his children to live and to 
have children in turn. Not a single Pan- Angle is 
willing to reduce his standard of living. He wishes 
for himself more leisure, more nourishing and 
cleaner food, greater safety in all his employments. 
He wishes to see no poverty and no discomfort. 
He is busy passing laws in all his legislatures to- 
day in his efforts to attain all this. 

What the Pan- Angle has, he got by taking land 


and making the best use he knew of it. For years 
the British Isles alone of the Pan- Angle nations 
sent out migrants. For years the British Isles 
alone was the manufacturing country, the others 
growing food for themselves and for export. The 
United States is now sending out migrants ; it is 
likewise sending out less and less food. Pownall 
foresaw that " when the field of agriculture shall 
be filled up . . . the moment that the progress of 
civilisation, carried thus on its natural course, is 
ripe for it, the branch of manufactures will take its 
shoot and will grow and increase with an astonish- 
ing exuberancy." 1 The same future doubtless faces 
the other five of us. New lands are less easy of ac- 
quisition in these days. We have recently enlarged 
our holdings in the neighbourhood of the two poles, 
but the opportunities even there grow fewer. Lands 
are becoming more thickly populated and better 
defended. But beyond that, we have developed 
certain scruples that our forefathers in their takings 
did not know. Only a need equal to theirs will 
perhaps impel us to similar exercise of force. That 
need will not come until our standard of living is 
threatened. Colonizing apart, there is left to us 
trade ; and trade apart, we still have our present 
lands to develop to their highest point. This pro- 
blem of development is now receiving our best 
attention. We support costly bureaus and experi- 
ment stations to discover and teach us the means 
of so intensively cultivating that we may get the 
highest possible yield from our land. We shall 
not relax these efforts. 

But as we utilize our lands and increase our 

1 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, p. 401. 


trade, other civilizations will be desiring to raise 
the standards of living among their increasing 
populations. They will need more land. They 
will covet some of our little-used pieces, Northern 
Canada or Northern Australia, lands we mean to 
develop ourselves. No Pan-Angle is minded to 
part with them. Our rivals, as they grow, will 
need more trade in order to keep more factories 
busy to buy more food. They may covet our 
markets, so that rice and tea and rubber from our 
present possessions may come to them. If at any 
time we lose land or trade, by so much must part 
of our numbers suffer, must be less well housed, 
and less well nourished, less well cared for if sick. 
No Pan- Angle sees his way to closing up his fac- 
tories or to putting himself in a position where he 
and his children can build no more. More babies 
mean a demand for more food, and we hope to 
give them more advantages of every sort. The 
only way to retain our lands and our trade is to be 
strong enough to protect them. There is no cheaper 
nor more effective strength than in co-operation. 



The individualism of the Pan- Angles is rooted in 
our earliest struggles for personal liberty, and its 
first successes were won far beyond the confines of 
known history. The institutions in which it is 
expressed we trace back through English to Teuton 
practices, where they are lost from sight. How 
they have been modified and enlarged since, and 
what we have wrought under the impulse of this 
dominant characteristic is abundantly recorded. 
It is the mainspring of all our achievement. 

The Pan- Angles collectively are conservative 
and slow to move. They respect tradition and law, 
and break with the past less easily than more 
volatile peoples. The individual Pan- Angle, on 
the other hand, makes often his own law, dis- 
regarding and outrunning the law of his group. 
It is a trait we approve ; the Robin Hoods ashore 
and the Drakes afloat have our sympathy, as well 
as often our gratitude for the substantial gifts their 
individual enterprise has left us. No theory, no 
agreed-upon plan has led us in our various en- 
deavours, but always the success of some man who 
went that way on his own. Adventurers have 
gone out across trackless land or water wastes, and 
we have followed with our commerce and settlers. 


Idealists have gone questing for religious or civil 
liberty, and we, guided by their footprints, draw 
bills of rights, reform our property laws, and our 
suffrage, and remove religious disabilities. 

From less than sixty thousand our holdings 
have increased to more than sixteen million square 
miles, 1 through the spirit of individual men. Each 
acquisition presents similar features. A Pan- Angle 
wanders off and finds something he wishes. He 
takes it. Sometimes he calls on the homestayers 
for aid. Sometimes they give it ; often not. 
Seven times the British Isles refused to acknow- 
ledge that the British flag flew over New Zealand ; 2 
and the Queenslanders, who in 1883 raised the 
Britannic colours in New Guinea, were ordered 
from London to lower them again. 3 The pioneer 
puts the best he has into the struggle, for far from 
being an altruist with one eye on a grateful 
posterity, he is fighting for his own valued 
possession, whether it be land, the right to trade, 
or to collect copra in comfort. If there is room 
for more than one, and the chance of success 
promising, other adventurous individuals join him. 
Together they at last attract the ear of the home 
government which, if induced to interfere, does so 
to protect the interests of its citizens — or subjects, 
as the case may be — from outside encroachment. 
The sway of the Pan-Angles has thus been 

1 Modern England, 50,916 square miles, and all Pan- Angle 
nations and their dependencies, 16,897,126. See post, p. 81, 
note 1. 

2 Round Table, London, February 1911, p. 207 : "1817, 1823, 
1825, 1828, 1832, 1835, 1836." 

3 A. W. Jose, History of Australasia, Sydney, 1911, p- 187. 


extended — a little. 1 The next little will be added 
in a similar manner. No one plans for it, but in 
some opportune moment the leader arises. 

In some cases elaborately organized companies 
with directors and stockholders seem to take the 
place of the individual. That is only seeming. 
Whether it be the East India Company, or the 
Hudson's Bay Company, or the British South 
Africa Company, there is always a Rhodes at the 
heart of it. And half of its success in the end 
depends on agents who take their own counsel and 
work by themselves, thereby extending their com- 
pany's power, as the company extends the nation's. 
That this character was recognized from the begin- 
ning witnesses the Royal Charter granted " the 
Governor and Company of Adventurers of England 
trading into Hudson's Bay." 2 

Of the men who failed to make good, who could 
not take what they wanted, we hear little. Their 
dreaming and daring, their judgment and fortitude, 
are their own affair ; they are part of the unenlisted 
legion our individualism has produced. A sympa- 
thetic editor in America writes as follows of 
a young English individualist in Somaliland : 
" Richard Conyngham Corfield . . . was stationed 
in one of the most inaccessible and undesirable of 
Britain's many wild lands. He hoped to make a 
name for himself, to conquer a little empire of his 
own and restore it to his country, to humiliate the 
Mad Mullah who had humiliated England, and to 
earn promotion. So, on his own responsibility, he 

1 Cf. Ency. Brit., vol. xxvi. pp. 692-693, on the story of Texas. 

2 For an account of which, see Beckles Willson, The Great 
Company (1667-1871), London, 1900. 



led his little army against the fanatic horde of the 
Mullah. The spirit of adventure moved him as it 
moved the heroes of the early days of British empire 
building. He lost, as many another adventurer has 
lost ; had he won he would have been remembered 
for some time. But, having lost all, even his name 
will be forgotten within a twelvemonth." 1 

Extended holdings in personal liberty have been 
won for us by this same individualism. A cargo 
of tea was stolen and maliciously destroyed, and 
now Pan- Angles feel certain they have the right 
to vote their own taxes. The city of Birmingham, 
England, in 1819, elected a representative to the 
Parliament of the British Isles, in which it was 
allowed no representation. 2 In 1832 a Reform Bill 
gave them and all their neighbours a share in 
parliamentary legislation. John Brown was hanged 
for " treason, and conspiring and advising with 
slaves and other rebels, and murder in the first 
degree." 3 But within four years slavery had been 
abolished in the United States, and every school 
child in America for years gave vocal testimony 
that, while their hero's body lay " a-mouldering in 
the grave," his soul went " marching on." 

With individualism goes self-reliance — having 
these we are also self-sufficient. We want our 
ways of doing things, and are ready to sacrifice a 
great deal to get them, for we know our ways are 
right. We want room in which to express our- 
selves. Daniel Boone left his Kentucky home 

1 The Cleveland Plain Dealer, Cleveland, Ohio, September 2, 
1913; but cf. United Empire, London, December 1913, p. 934 
concerning a statue to his memory at Berbera. 

2 Ency. Brit, vol. ix. p. 556. 3 Ibid., vol. iv. p. 660. 


when a neighbour moved to within twenty miles 
of him, because the country was becoming too 
thickly settled. Others like him trudged mile by 
mile across the whole North American continent. 1 
With them went Pan- Angle women. 2 In the con- 
flict for the possession of North America, the Pan- 
Angles won. They were still of true British blood, 
while the French were largely Indian. 3 The 
French had adapted themselves to the country, 
while the Pan- Angles had adapted the country to 
themselves. Arrived after successive generations 
at the Pacific Coast they were still Pan- Angles 
with their essential characteristics unchanged. In 
the back-blocks of New Zealand and Australia, 
and the table-lands of Rhodesia, men of the same 
type are living to-day. If their individualism is 
intensified and in their own opinion improved, it is 
because they have plenty of room. The pushing 
American is but the individual Britisher let loose in 
a larger field. These men may be described in the 
words Pownall used of the Americans : " An un- 
abated application of the powers of individuals and 
a perpetual struggle of their spirits sharpens their 
wits and gives constant training to the mind. . . . 
This turn of character, which in the ordinary 

1 Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, Les Etats-Unis au Fingtieme Steele, 
Paris, 1904, pp. 37, 38, claims that the country to the south of 
the long Canadian frontier was opened up by successive waves 
of people of the same blood, the pioneers being almost entirely 
sons of pioneers. 

2 Ency. Brit., vol. xxvii. p. 691 '• "The new life bore most 
hardly upon women ; and, if the record of woman's share in the 
work of American colonization could be fully made up, the price 
paid for the final success would seem enormous." 

3 W. M. West, Modern History, Boston, rev. ed., 1907, p. 300. 


occurrences of life is called inquisitiveness, and 
which, when exerted about trifles goes even to a 
degree of ridicule in many instances, is yet, in 
matters of business and commerce, a most useful 
and efficient talent." 1 An Australian, as he de- 
scribes himself, in his roomiest of our nations, " is 
little other than a transplanted Briton, with the 
essential characteristics of his British forbears, the 
desire for freedom from restraint, however, being 
perhaps more strongly accentuated." 2 

With all his individualism the Pan- Angle has a 
gift for combining. He would rather act alone. 
But when desirous of results he cannot obtain by 
himself, he is not afraid of uniting with his fellows. 
In order to combine effectively, mutual confidence 
is necessary. We have that trust ability. Indeed, 
we use the very word "trust" to designate in 
popular parlance certain combinations : " the money 
trust," "the labour trust," and the multitudinous 
other smaller and lesser combinations, down to the 
facetiously referred to "plumbers' trust," which 
all appear huge in direct proportion to the distance 
of the spectator. Viewed with the eye of the 
insider, such aggregations of capital and power 
are merely the co-operations of many individuals 
to produce results — it may be the building of a 
railroad or the distribution of a food — that no one 
could accomplish alone. It has been the outsider 
who objected to their power. To our combinations 
in the matter of government few of us object, 

1 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, pp. 400- 
401. Cf. Edmund Burke in Conciliation with America, par. 37. 

2 Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, No. 4, 
1911, p. 122. 


because we all are insiders. Much of our progress 
in the path of individual freedom has come through 

The barons combined to secure Magna Carta. 
New Zealanders use their government (the com- 
bination at their disposal) to remedy injustices 
against their individual members. 1 The thirteen 
American states, each bristling with a sense of 
individualism, recognized that they could secure 
this precious possession only through joining to- 
gether. Benjamin Franklin had voiced their situa- 
tion earlier, when he said : "If we do not hang 
together, we shall hang separate." Their first 
attempt at combination had to be discarded be- 
cause they were not hanging together firmly 
enough. But from 1789 to 1914, their second 
effort has exhibited to the world the largest volun- 
tary political association as yet seen, proving a new 
method of adjusting local needs and differences. 
It has succeeded in so much that it has bound 
together a nation, or an assemblage of nations 

1 J. E. Le Rossignol and W. D. Stewart, State Socialism in 
New Zealand, London [1911], p. 17: "The people of New 
Zealand are not doctrinaires, and the academic question as to 
the proper spheres of governmental and individual activity is 
seldom discussed. The State has taken up one thing after 
another as the result of concrete discussion of concrete cases. 
Usually, if not invariably, abuses have been thought to exist, 
which the State has been called upon to remedy : the great 
landowners have stood in the way of closer settlement : wages 
have been low and conditions of labour bad : rates of interest, 
insurance premiums, prices of coal, and rents of dwellings have 
been thought to be high : the oyster beds have been depleted 
by private exploitation : taxation has fallen too heavily upon the 
poor : for one cause or another there has been complaint, 
complaint has grown into agitation, and agitation into legislation." 


now numbering forty-eight, in security and pro- 
sperity, while retaining to each individual locality 
and to each citizen a fair share of the liberties for 
which the race has long been striving. 

While these political combinations are guarding 
our individualism they are at the same time depen- 
dent upon it. " England expects her navy will 
do its duty," was not the signal Nelson hoisted 
on the Victory. His appeal was to " every man." 
" Keep cool and obey orders," admonished Dewey 
at Manila, recognizing that in the intelligent self- 
subordination of each member of each crew lay 
the strength of his fleet. 

The individualism of the Pan-Angle forms the 
keynote of all his theories and practices as to 
government. He wants to attend to his own 
affairs. He prefers to give personal attention to 
the making and administering of laws. In so far 
as it seems impossible or impracticable to do this, 
he has recourse to the best alternative, and wishes 
someone representing him to attend in his stead 
to those matters. This representative is often 
limited in power by written instructions from his 
principal, and provision is made in some cases for 
the revision of the agent's acts by the same ulti- 
mate power. And to whatever extent changing 
circumstances make again feasible the personal 
participation of the individual, to that extent he 
dispenses with the services of his deputy. Here 
is the whole story of government among the Pan- 

Early accounts of the Germanic tribes tell us 


that the freemen assembled to determine matters 
of public concern, and there each in person gave 
his opinion and assented or dissented to the opinions 
of others. This was a simple presentative govern- 
ment : each man presenting himself at the meeting 
or moot, and speaking in his own interests. Laws 
were made, and leaders or kings chosen and deposed. 
Only lesser questions were for the chiefs, the 
important questions were for the community. 1 

As the areas having common interests widened, 
not all the men who had the right found it con- 
venient to attend the assembly. They might still 
present themselves at some local gathering, a town 
meeting, or a burgh meeting, within range of their 
travelling powers, but to the more general assembly 
only the great and strong were able to go. There 
grew up the practice, too, that summons should be 
sent out, inviting to the assembly. This worked 
to discourage the full attendance of all who 
formerly had the right to come. The Witen- 
agamot or Witan, gathering of wise men, is the 
name by which this early legislative body was 

In 1068 all the landowners of England repaired 
to a great assembly at Salisbury to swear fealty to 
William the Conqueror. Part of them were sum- 
moned personally, and in time came to claim a right 
to a summons to succeeding assemblies. In these 
they were more or less powerful according to the 
nature of the king, and more than once extorted 
from him charters of rights, re-establishing or en- 
larging their ancient privileges. For two centuries 

1 Arthur Murphy, The Works of Cornelius Tacitus, London, 
1793, vol. iv. p. 16. 


they participated in the form of electing kings. 
The vast multitude, however, the "land-sitting 
men," were summoned to Salisbury in a body, and 
for that occasion only, and gradually lost all right 
of personal attendance at later assemblies. 1 

Meanwhile the Angles and Saxons and their 
Teutonic kindred had long — even before leaving 
the continent — been familiar with the idea of 
representation. 2 Free men might be appointed 
or selected, not necessarily by vote, to attend a 
moot, including several towns or burghs, with 
authority to act there in the name of their fellows. 
And when, after the Norman Conquest, the people 
had sufficiently recovered themselves to be able to 
refuse taxes levied without their consent, the 
natural method of giving or withholding that 
consent was through representatives. 

If the king wanted money, he might ask the 
lords and bishops who were present and could 
speak for themselves in his councils, but he must 
ask also the people who, unable to present them- 
selves in a vast body, were represented by some 
one who spoke for them. 

King John in 1213 bids "discreet men" from 
each shire come to Oxford, 3 and his son Henry III. 
in 1254 issues a writ requiring "to cause to come 
before the King's Council two good and discreet 
Knights of the Shire, whom the men of the county 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. xxiii. p. 110. 

2 Ibid., vol. xx. p. 837 : " The Angles, Saxons and other 
Teutonic races who conquered Britain brought to their new 
homes their own laws and customs, . . . and a certain rude 
representation in local affairs." Cf. also Woodrow Wilson, 
The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, pp. 560, 56l. 

3 Ency. Brit., vol. ix. p. 491- 


shall have chosen for this purpose in the stead of 
all and of each of them, to consider along with the 
knights of other shires what aid they will grant 
the king." 1 In a similar writ of 1295 the term 
"to be elected" is first used instead of the less 
specific instruction "chosen." 2 The word repre- 
sentative, to describe such a person "chosen" or 
"elected" "with full and sufficient power for 
themselves and for the community " 3 was not yet 
in use. It appears in print in Cromwell's time, 4 and 
was then possibly new political jargon. 

The council so composed developed into the 
British Parliament, that name coming into use for 
it in 1275. 5 With the king it was for years the 
law-making power of the British Isles. The peers 
held their seats in the House of Lords by personal 
right, as did the wise men of the Witenagamot. 6 
They acted on their own account, and were respon- 
sible to no one. The members of the House of 
Commons held their seats by no personal right, 
but as representatives of a large body of commoners 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. xxiii. p. 109. 

2 Ibid., vol. xxiii. pp. 109-110. 

3 Ibid., vol. xxiii. p. 110. 

4 Ibid., vol. xxiii. p. 109: "In 1651 Isaac Penington the 
younger published a pamphlet entitled ' The fundamental right, 
safety and liberty of the People ; which is radically in them- 
selves, derivatively in the Parliament, their substitutes or repre- 
sentatives.'" Cf. New English Dictionary, Oxford, 1891, 
" Representative," where 1658 is mentioned as its first use. 

5 Ency. Brit., vol. xx. p. 835, and vol. ix. p. 491. 

6 The House of Lords contains a certain representative 
element in the Irish and Scottish members. These are some 
only of the peers of their respective countries, and are elected 
by their fellow peers to seats in the House of Lords — those from 
Ireland for life, and from Scotland for a session. 


who could not all attend. They were chosen for 
this purpose, and derived authority from the people 
who employed them. The king in his own right 
gave or withheld his sanction to the measures 
agreed upon by the two houses. It followed that 
the king and peers had no vote for representatives 
in Parliament, as, being present to act for them- 
selves, they needed none. 

The character of the law-making power has 
gradually altered. Since the days of Queen Anne 
no sovereign has attempted to veto a bill passed 
by Parliament. 1 Since 1834 no sovereign has dis- 
missed a ministry, 2 nor has he formed one, 3 and 
the ministry has come to be responsible to the 
representative branch of Parliament alone. From 
1835 to 1911 the presentative branch was purely 
a revising chamber. 4 Since 1911 it has been 
permitted to delay only, but not to prevent, the 
passing of a law desired by the representative 
branch, Parliament becoming thus in essence uni- 
cameral. The king and the lords hold positions 
of great historical and sentimental value; their 
personal influence may be as great as they can 
make it. The House of Commons, however, is 
now the sole power of legislation in the British 
Isles. It is hence fair to say that the presentative 
element is negligible in the national government 
of the British Isles. 

Across the Atlantic went the developing 
political structures of the Pan -Angles. The 
colonists, in the simplicity of their social organiza- 
tion, approached early Teuton conditions. They 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. xii. p. 295. 2 Ibid., p. 295. 

3 Ibid., vol xxiii. p. 112. 4 Ibid., vol. xxiii. p. 112. 


had the benefit, however, of all the experience the 
race had accumulated since that time. In New 
England from the earliest settlement till to-day 
the town meeting has been at the basis of govern- 
ment. It is the folk moot flourishing in new soil, 
and with the House of Lords (as it existed till 
1911) could claim descent from the presentative 
government of our political forbears in the German 
forests. Of Virginia it is written that in " 1619 a 
House of Assembly * broke out ' in the colony . . . 
then just twelve years old. In that Assembly we 
see the first-born child of the British Parliament, 
the eldest brother, so to speak, of the legislatures 
of the United States and of the English colonies 
of to-day. This Assembly was composed of a 
council and a body of twenty-two representatives 
from the eleven plantations, elected by the free- 
holders, imposing taxes and passing laws, meeting 
either annually or at frequent intervals." 1 In this 
manner were our notions of representative govern- 
ment transplanted. 

A representative is not necessarily chosen by 
the people he represents. 2 In the early parlia- 
mentary days he often was not, but was arbitrarily 
appointed by the king. Since then the people 
have taken upon themselves the right of designat- 
ing who is to represent them, and an increasingly 
large number of any given community has gained 
participation in that right. In some cases the 
people have arranged to make their choice in- 
directly. An example is the election prior to 1913 
of United States senators by the people of the 

1 Alfred Caldecott, English Colonization and Empire, London, 
1891, p. 129. 2 Cf. ante, p. 56. 


state, but through the state legislature ; another, 
is the appointment of the upper house, as in 
New Zealand, by the elected members of the 
lower house. But as evidence of the people's wish 
to keep control over their representatives, one may- 
note the agitation for direct election in both these 
cases, and the virtual direct election of senators in 
some states of the United States, even before the 
Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States came into force in 1913. 1 

There are certain difficulties attendant upon 
representation. The agent may fail truly to 
represent, and the Pan- Angle people are constantly 
seeking to devise and perfect methods of minimiz- 
ing this difficulty. One means toward that end 
has been sets of written instructions called con- 
stitutions, 2 adopted by the people and set over 
their representatives. The written Constitution of 
the United States and those of its original thirteen 
states were early edicts of the people restricting 
the power of the people's representatives. In the 
political talk of our times we find persistently re- 
curring the words initiative, referendum, and recall. 3 
What success will attend the movements for which 
they stand, movements which merely extend or 
return to ancient practices, it is too early to say. 
But the thing that is plain is that these are all 
efforts of the people to exercise their right to 
govern themselves presentatively, because they 

1 CI post, p. 109, note 1. 

2 The variety of uses of the word " constitution " is referred to, 
post, pp. 95-108. 

3 Cf. W. H. Taft, Popular Government, New Haven, Connec- 
ticut, 1913, pp. 42-95, for a discussion of these three terms. 


think representation in present practice not entirely 

Once presentative government over even a 
comparatively small area was impracticable because 
of the time necessary to cover distances. Now the 
results of an election involving millions of voters 
and extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific can 
be known a few hours after the closing of the polls. 
Burke thought the two months' sailing between 
Great Britain and America an insuperable obstacle 
to joint representation, although Franklin and 
Pownall disagreed with him. 1 Such is our speed 
of travel to-day that representatives from every 
Pan- Angle nation could reach North America in 
less than a month. Not only that, but thanks to 
electricity, a referendum could be held all over the 
Pan- Angle countries to-day as successfully as the 
town meeting was held a hundred years ago. And 
the decisions it reached would be known through- 
out the world in a fraction of the time that was 
needed for the deliberations of the Witan to reach 
the outskirts of the kingdom. 

In what proportion the governments of the 
seven nations are presentative and in what propor- 
tion representative, it would be difficult to tell. 
Easy it is, however, to recognize these forms every- 
where. Whether it is the adult population of 
New Zealand balloting on national prohibition ; 
the men of a New England town meeting voting 
its school appropriation ; or the members of the 
House of Lords discussing federation within the 
British Isles — we have a purely presentative bit of 

1 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, pp. 


governing. If it is the representatives of an 
Australian state voting on a minimum wage bill ; 
the members of the British House of Commons 
passing a compulsory insurance act ; or those of 
a Canadian provincial legislative assembly voting 
to exclude Asiatics, the principle is identical. 
Government in these cases is representative. 

The tendency is towards an increase in the 
presentative element, as is evidenced by growing 
popular control. Not only our laws but our 
forms of government show this. The Pan- Angle 
notion of an executive at the time the first colonies 
were forming was drawn from a kingship which 
then meant a permanent tenure of office. The 
president of the United States who holds office 
for a fixed length of time was created after that 
model. He represents, but once elected cannot be 
recalled. 1 In the British Isles changes have come 
about, and the prime minister who now wields exe- 
cutive power can be recalled any day by the people 
speaking indirectly through their representatives, 
popular opinion swaying his party adherents to re- 
linquish their efforts in his support. 1 In this respect 
the British Isles organization has proved more sensi- 
tive than the American to the spirit of the times. 2 

In our governments various individuals and 
classes, or what would in modern days be called 
"interests," struggle for supremacy. When a 
minority is successful we dub it aristocracy or 
privilege. At one time the king was the privileged 
minority. In 1215 the barons attacked the 

1 Recourse to the grave process of impeachment lies outside 
normal procedure and is here disregarded. 

2 Cf. post, p. 113 et seq. 


privilege of this minority ; the king asked to have 
the matter arbitrated by a third party. The 
barons, who apparently understood something 
about arbitration, refused. They also refused to 
give any assurance of their own good behaviour ; 
Magna Carta was a check on the king only. 
Moreover " Magna Carta can hardly be said to 
have introduced any new ideas. As Pollock and 
Maitland (History of English Law) say ' on the 
whole the charter contains little that is absolutely 
new. It is restorative.' " * Since then many 
aristocrats have enjoyed special privileges : certain 
churches, certain forms of industry, holders of 
certain kinds of property. Against all these in 
turn the levelling force of democracy has been 
hurled. It can be said in general that we are 
travelling, though with a wise conservatism, away 
from the aristocratic to the democratic, by which 
is meant that privileges are becoming more seldom 
to the few and power more usual to the many. 
Democracy, it seems likely, is to be our common 
future. But, in the meanwhile, the present stage 
of all our governments may truly be said to be 
representative action with presentative sanction. 

Allied to the question of government is that of 
suffrage. While all are subject to the government 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. xvii. pp. 315, 317; but also cf. ibid., vol. ix. 
p. 488 : " It was the first of the many occasions in English history 
when the demand for reform took the shape of a reference back 
to old precedents, and now (as on all subsequent occasions) the 
party which opposed the crown read back into the ancient 
grants which they quoted a good deal more than had been 
actually conceded in them." 


of the land, only some take active part in determin- 
ing what it shall be. And here, again, the indivi- 
dualism of the Pan- Angles is an insistent factor. 
Voters, whether sopresentatively or representatively, 
have been in our past one of the privileged minori- 
ties — all individuals reckoned. They are so still. 
But by constantly receiving into their ranks bodies 
of newly enfranchised persons, they bid fair to 
become the majority. Social, religious, property, 
and educational disqualifications long kept many 
men from the suffrage. Many of these disabilities 
have been abandoned, some in all places, others in 
some places only. Sex alone has kept many from 
voting. This disqualification has been in places 
and in some respects removed. Whatever one 
may believe as to the wisdom of entrusting the 
ballot to the few or to the many, it has long 
seemed evident that the race was advancing to- 
ward universal adult male suffrage. Now many 
would say instead that the goal is universal adult 

On our respective paths toward this goal our 
various electoral units mark various stages of 
progress. Identical voting qualifications may be 
found half a world apart, while neighbouring 
groups differ. No two probably agree in every 
slight detail, though the range of dissimilarity 
is narrow. Certain property and educational tests 
are not infrequent, especially in the older Pan- 
Angle organizations. The newer ones, as a rule, 
are the more democratic. Women hold suffrage 
privileges in at least some respects very extensively, 
the newer communities again being more liberal 
in this. Plural voting obtains in the British Isles. 


These local differences produce no confusion, but 
keep our progress orderly. 

Of the United States it has been said, " There 
is a great advantage in having different State 
governments try different experiments in the en- 
actment of laws and in governmental policies, so 
that a State less prone to accept novel and untried 
remedies may await their development by States 
more enterprising and more courageous. The end 
is that the diversity of opinion in State governments 
enforces a wise deliberation and creates a locus 
poenitentioe which may constitute the salvation of 
the Republic." 1 Equally might this have been 
stated of the effect of the diversity of opinion in 
the Pan- Angle units on the progress of the whole 

In no regard more than in the question of 
suffrage, is seen the value and need of local option. 
It permits progress in whatever respect progress 
is possible, and prevents the misfortunes that 
accompany attempts to force progress where the 
time and conditions are not ripe for it. Through 
the exercise of local option the suffrage has been 
constantly extended, a bit here and a bit there, 
throughout Pan- Angle countries without seriously 
affecting our political stability. Any attendant 
shock is confined within narrow boundaries. 2 If 
Texas and Vermont, Tasmania and South Australia, 
Transvaal and Cape Province have different suffrage 

1 W. H. Taft, Popular Government, New Haven, Connecticut, 
1913, p. 155. 

2 The exception to this statement is apparent in the British 
Isles, where suffrage is a national affair, and no federal frame- 
work affords a basis for local option on this privilege. 



requirements, it is because they differ in history 
and composition and hence in needs. The desires 
of their inhabitants could not be satisfied by a 
single law. To seek to establish one would be 
to estrange all and satisfy none. 

The question of negro suffrage is in point. The 
northern states of America, where the negroes 
were comparatively few and were to some degree 
at least educated, felt favourably toward negro 
suffrage. After the Civil War the northern voters, 
acting through the central government, were able 
to give the vote to the negro, not only within their 
own borders but throughout the country. The 
results were most unfortunate. The Pan- Angle 
population of the southern states thereby lost their 
local autonomy. The men most fit to govern in 
these states were forced in self-defence to become 
law-breakers. It took many years to undo the 
mistake and re-establish there the will of the Pan- 
Angle community. Through the intelligence of 
the South in framing legislation, and the forbear- 
ance of the North in not overriding this legislation, 
it is now adequately accomplished. " Hitherto, no 
amount of legal ingenuity has sufficed to extract 
from the United States supreme court a direct, 
straightforward decision on the constitutionality of 
the 'grandfather' clauses in the election laws of 
many states, whereby the Negro voters have been 
disfranchised. The court has invariably disposed 
of cases designed to test the constitutionality of 
such laws on technical grounds." 1 South Africa, 
when the subject arose in Constitutional Conven- 

1 Spring Ji eld (Massachusetts) Weekly Republican, November 20, 


tion, was wiser. No part overruled another part. 
" In respect of the admission of natives to the 
parliamentary franchise the practice of the Cape 
Colony was in direct conflict with that of the 
remaining colonies. As no agreement on the 
question of the admission or non-admission of 
natives to the Union franchise could be reached, 
the Convention decided that the franchise qualifi- 
cations existing in the several colonies should stand 
as the franchise qualifications for the Union Parlia- 
ment in the respective provinces of the Union. As 
the result of this compromise, while the native 
voters in the Cape Province obtained the Union 
franchise, practically no natives were admitted to 
this privilege in the remaining three provinces." 1 
With certain temporary limitations, provision is 
made for the elimination of the vote of the coloured 
inhabitants of Cape Province. 2 It is now generally 
acknowledged that no community of Pan- Angles 
is to be forced to accept as voters those whom it 
considers non-assimilable. 

Our law, like our language, has flowed from 
many sources and has been subjected to foreign 
influence. The colonists carried out with them 
the English common law, the sources of which 
" have been stated to be ' as undiscoverable as those 
of the Nile.' " 3 Quite different from this is the 
common law of Scotland, " based on the principles 

1 W. B. Worsfold, The Union of South Africa, London, 1912, 
p. 126. 2 Ibid., pp. 139-140. 

3 An Analysis of the System of Government throughout the British 
Empire, London, 1912, p. 44. 


of the Roman Civil and Canon law as applied and 
modified by a long series of statutes of the Scots 
Parliament and decisions of the Scottish courts. . . . 
A detailed comparison of the differences between 
the private law of England and Scotland would in- 
volve a survey of the whole domain of jurisprudence 
and would be the work of a lifetime." * From 1642 
to 1652 occurred the English Civil War, followed 
by the Commonwealth. In those stormy years 
which seem, as writes an Australian jurist, "to 
have anticipated almost every effort of modern 
political thought, scarcely any cry was more per- 
sistently raised by the reform party than the cry 
for reform of the law. It was the first great period 
of conscious law reform." 2 All the Pan- Angle 
nations, save only the British Isles and Newfound- 
land, had the stress of that period reflected in the 
history of their settlements, or were founded after 
the results of that war had been produced. 

In the new countries the legal influence was 
predominantly British, but in some parts the colon- 
ists encountered communities of Europeans of 
other civilizations and of other legal theories. In 
Quebec and Louisiana they met French law; in 
western United States, Spanish ; and in South 
Africa, a form of Roman-Dutch. Being elements 
in civilizations which only gradually have blended 
into that of the Pan-Angles, these laws have in 
greater or less measure survived. But in such 

1 An Analysis of the System of Government throughout the British 
Empire , London, 1912, pp. 44-45. 

2 Edward Jenks, The Future of British Law : An Inaugural 
Lecture delivered before the University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 
1889, pp. 6-7. 


localities slowly the foreign law merges into that of 
the local Pan- Angles. As an example we have 
South Africa : " The local Dutch statute law was 
abandoned perforce as obsolescent, and replaced 
almost entirely by local enactments based upon 
the existing circumstances of the colony or founded 
upon English statutes, and the Roman-Dutch 
common law, broadly speaking, came to be ad- 
ministered concurrently with English common law. 
Nor was it surprising that, with judges and ad- 
vocates alike versed in the decisions and practice 
of the English Courts, English principles were 
more and more closely woven into the fabric of the 
Colonial law. And apart from the influence of the 
' case-law,' thus built up through the Colonial 
Reports, circumstances — or rather its greater 
capacity to satisfy the conditions of modern life — 
gave the regulation of the field of commercial inter- 
course almost exclusively to English law." 1 A 
like story might be told of French law in Louisiana. 
In other instances, where perhaps it receives no 
official recognition, non-English law has doubtless 
had its effect on what may be loosely called Pan- 
Angle law. As long as it suits the people and 
their needs better, so long a law exists regardless 
of its origin. But experience shows that the law 
of any Pan- Angle nation tends to conform to the 
practices of our whole civilization. 

Because the English common law forms so large 
an element, and because it has among us been 
modified only by English-speaking people, the 
Pan- Angle law, though drawn from many sources, 

1 W. B. Worsfold, The Union of South Africa, London, lpl2, 
p. 438. 


still presents a certain homogeneity. " An English 
barrister . . . when once he enters an American 
court, or begins debating legal questions with 
American lawyers, . . . knows that he is not 
abroad, but at home ; he breathes again the legal 
atmosphere to which he is accustomed. The law 
of America, he finds, is the law of England carried 
across the Atlantic, and little changed even in form. 
In all legal matters it is the conservatism, not the 
changeableness, of Americans which astonishes an 
English observer. Old names and old formulas 
meet us in every law court. Some twenty-six 
years ago there were to be found in Chicago in 
daily use forms of pleading which had long become 
obsolete in England." 1 

It is in our common tendencies, however, that 
the legal attitudes of the seven nations show most 
striking accord. Jenks, quoted earlier, concludes 
that we are in favour of uniformity, simplicity, 
greater freedom of the individual, and more fluidity 
of capital and labour, so much so, that " The courts 
will not even enforce effectively a contract of service. 
To do that, it is said, would be to legalize slavery, 
and the fact that the slave has become such by his 
own act makes no difference. It is considered that 
the perfect spontaneity of labour is of more value 
than the sacredness of contract." 2 Further than 
this, actual legislation repeats itself in the many 
Pan- Angle law-making bodies. The British Isles, 

1 A. V. Dicey, a A Common Citizenship for the English Race," 
in Contemporary Review, vol. lxxi., April 1897, p. 469. 

2 Edward Jenks, The Future of British Law : An Inaugural 
Lecture delivered before the University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 
1889, p. 11. 


Massachusetts, New Zealand, and Australia test 
the merits or demerits of a minimum wage law. 
Compulsory insurance, old age pensions, maternity 
benefits, and arbitration statutes spring up every- 
where. In efforts to solve some problems one part 
of the Pan- Angles leads ; in others another part. 
Whether this is regarded as reform or experimenta- 
tion is not under present discussion. The whole 
Pan-Angle civilization appears headed towards what 
is called by some social amelioration and by others 
paternalism. Whatever its true name, this race 
progress starts from a greater recognition of the indi- 
vidual and hopes for his greater comfort and welfare. 
Of law among the Pan- Angles it may be said 
that it shows plainly its relation to English common 
law ; that it is affected by local conditions resulting 
from historical causes ; that it exhibits certain 
common tendencies, and among those is a regard 
for the individual and a passing from the viewpoint 
of status to that of contract. 

All this can be seen in the laws regarding marriage 
and divorce. These, as well as our prejudices in 
such matters, are still largely determined by the 
dead hand of the Middle Ages. But the Teutonic 
ideal of the equality of the marriage partnership 
has survived the accumulation of dogma. Our 
release from its grip has not depended on the 
divorce of an English king, nor the accompanying 
religious schism. There is in us that which was 
destined to carry us up through the pains of chang- 
ing social conditions to more satisfactory relations 
between the husband and the wife and society. 


In our efforts to attain our ideals we are using 
many local laws. The British Isles have three: 
English, Scottish, and Irish. If the Channel 
Islands and the Isle of Man were considered, there 
would be six. Besides this, members of the royal 
family are subject to special restrictions. New- 
foundland and New Zealand have marriage laws of 
their own. Canada has eleven, the Union of South 
Africa has four, and Australia six. 1 In the United 
States there are forty-eight. This makes a total 
of seventy -four sets of laws in the seven self- 
governing nations regarding who may marry and 
divorce and how. 

These seventy-four different sets are not, how- 
ever, strange and dissimilar. As in the case of 
suffrage, each one has many points identical with 
many others, and the range of variation is small. 
All are monogamous ; all allow freedom of choice 
to the marrying parties ; all hold marriage and 
divorce to be civil matters, and consider ministers 
and priests of religious denominations as civil 
officials for the legalizing of marriages. All prohibit 
marriage within certain degrees of relationship, the 
tendency being not to include among them the 
relationship -by -marriage impediments surviving 
from mediaeval practice, such as the various deceased 
spouse's brother or sister laws. The majority allow 
divorce, although in some, like Newfoundland and 
South Carolina, marriage is by law indissoluble. 
The trend at present seems to be towards safe- 
guarding marriage, but to make easier the means 
of divorce. Men and women are coming more 

1 Eversley and Craies, Marriage Laws of the British Empire, 
London, 1910, pp. 6l, 173, 192, 70, 239-392. 


nearly to an equality before the law. Such enact- 
ments as that of New South Wales permitting a 
husband and wife to contract financially with each 
other shows the trend of our beliefs in the rights 
of any individual to be a distinct personality. 

The sacred beauty of the marriage tie no people 
hold higher than do the Pan- Angles. With them 
it is not a status imposed from without, but the 
voluntary union of two individuals. John Stuart 
Mill voiced an aspiration of the entire Pan-Angle 
civilization when he wrote : " What marriage 
may be in the case of two persons of cultivated 
faculties, identical in opinions and purposes, 
between whom there exists that best kind of 
equality, similarity of powers and capacities with 
reciprocal superiority in them — so that each can 
enjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and 
can have alternately the pleasure of leading and 
of being led in the path of development — I will 
not attempt to describe. To those who can 
conceive it, there is no need ; to those who cannot, 
it would appear the dream of an enthusiast. But 
I maintain, with the profoundest conviction, that 
this, and this only, is the ideal of marriage ; . . ." * 

In no sphere is the individualism of the Pan- 
Angle more rampant than in matters of religion. 
Liberty of conscience to him is as necessary as 
liberty of body, and he has struggled to obtain 
it with the same persistency. 

Once the status of nationality carried with it 

1 John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, London, 1906, 
p. 123. 


automatic inclusion in the national church. A 
diversity of faiths in one nation was unthinkable. 
Any who refused to conform, in semblance at 
least, were considered by the group as outsiders 
and enemies, to be harried and pillaged, perhaps 
slaughtered. Later, though leave to live was 
granted to those of minority creeds, they were 
debarred from the exercise of certain civil privileges. 
In the British Isles, not until 1858 were Jews 
able to take oaths as members of the Houses 
of Parliament. Still later, though all might 
share equally in the duties and rights of citizenship, 
all -were compelled to contribute directly or 
indirectly to the support of the state church, 
and, unless openly avowing otherwise, were pre- 
sumed to belong to it. Some Pan- Angles still 
linger in this stage — those, for example, who 
reside in Quebec or England. This is the 
significance of the state church to-day. 

To the majority of the Pan- Angles, however, 
religion is a private matter — not a public matter. 
In short, it is a concern in which the majority are 
not to interfere with the minority and in which 
the minority are not asked to acquiesce in the 
feelings of the majority. This is a condition not 
easily achieved. Migration from the British Isles 
by no means ended all contention. " Everywhere, 
indeed, that British settlers went this strife of 
sects went with them." 1 Six out of the seven 
nations were founded after our British predecessors 
had begun the battle for religious freedom. All 
six have known state churches in one form or 

1 United Empire, London, January 1914, A. W. Tilby, 
(t Christianity and the Empire," p. 57. 


another, sometimes with attendant persecutions. 
To-day five thrive without state churches. Even 
in Quebec and England taxation for the benefit 
of one's neighbour's church is the only penalty 
against free worshipping. Elsewhere, throughout 
the Pan-Angle world, one may hold any creed 
he will, and the state does not ask him to 
contribute to any church, nor does the state assist 
or recognize one creed above another. 

In certain places, notably portions of the United 
States, individualism in religion goes to extremes. 
In 1906 there were estimated to be in that country 
one hundred and eighty-six different kinds of 
Protestant churches, 1 some of them approaching 
the bizarre in character, others so like one another 
that the differences which divided them were 
scarcely discernible. Certain denominations were 
known only in very circumscribed areas. 2 There 
may be a certain extravagance in maintaining the 
large amount of equipment necessary for so many 
establishments. Apart from that, however, there 
seems to be no objection to the multitudinousness 
of American faiths that is not more than balanced 
by the benefits to the individual from free 

" After God had carried us safe to New England, 
and wee had builded our houses, provided necessaries 
for our livelihood, rear'd convenient places for 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. xxvii. p. 638. 

2 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Special Reports of the Census : 
Religious Bodies : 1906, Washington, D.C., 1910, pt. ii., pp. 225, 
508, 626, 635, 659. 


Gods worship, and setled the Civill Government : 
One of the next things we longed for, and looked 
after was to advance Learning and perpetuate it 
to Posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate 
Ministery to the Churches, when our present 
Ministers shall lie in the Dust." 1 So runs an 
account of the founding of one of the Pan- Angle 
universities as it was written in 1643. In a 
near-by city a public library was later established. 
On the building that shelters it to-day are inscribed 
these sentences: "The Commonwealth requires 
the education of the people as the safeguard of 
order and liberty," and " Built by the people and 
dedicated to the advancement of learning." Over 
the door are the words : " Free to all." 

Here is evidenced the attitude of one early 
colony toward education, and it is typical of all. 
Education, education free to all, education com- 
pulsory on all, is the ideal in each of the six new 
nations. Free instruction is in some places offered 
to a child from the age of three, when he enters 
kindergarten, to any age at which he wishes to 
attend the university. For certain years, very 
generally six to fourteen, attendance at school is 
compulsory. There is no discrimination in regard 
to sex, and the classes are frequently co-educational. 
Parents are in the main allowed to send children 
to private and church schools when these are of 
satisfactory excellence ; though in many places no 
such exist, and no stigma is in any way attached 
to the acceptance of free education. In many 
places no other sort has ever been dreamed of. 

The British Isles meanwhile have not been 

1 New Englands First Fruits, London, 1 643, p. 1 2. 


insensible to the same impulses. If popular educa- 
tion there has seemed to lag behind that of the 
younger nations, it is because the British Isles had 
not so free a field for change. There, a more 
complex social structure, and a tradition that 
envelops every department of life, interfere with 
the movement that would cast aside the old and 
adopt the new. Reforms must go slowly under 
such conditions, but the opportunity for education 
for all is there now an accomplished fact. In 1832 
began the history of state education in the British 
Isles. 1 To-day elementary education is compulsory 
between the ages of five and fourteen, 2 and free, if 
one desires to take it so. Since 1902 public grants 
to secondary schools have opened their doors to 
certain numbers of non-paying pupils. The differ- 
ences between the educational systems of the 
British Isles and those of the other English-speaking 
nations can now be said to be differences of method 
or degree only, but not of spirit. 

Throughout our civilization, education opens the 
way to achievement, "the only real patent of 
nobility in the modern world." 3 The success or 
failure of the group is known to depend on the 
individual. He holds the ballot, makes the laws, 
enforces them; his religion is part of the faith 
of the land and determines the character of its 
composite ; his ideals of marriage are expressed 
in the practice of the race. Organization and a 
few picked men do not control our destinies. To 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. viii. p. 971. 

2 Whitakers Almanack, London, 1913, p. 489- 

3 Woodrow Wilson, The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, 
p. 18. 


ensure the future of the group we educate our 
citizens. We " advance Learning and perpetuate 
it to Posterity " so that wisdom may be heard in 
our councils, and that ballots may register con- 
sidered judgments. 

As individualists the Pan- Angles have come to 
their present state. As individualists they must 
continue to work out their destiny. The right 
they prize most is the right to develop further in 
individualism. That right will be secured to Pan- 
Angles only when they have cause to fear no 
human power. 



"The representatives of the great nations across 
the seas." 

A British Colonial Secretary used these 
words 1 in a speech welcoming to the Imperial 
Conference of 1902 the Prime Ministers of the 
other Britannic governments. This should be 
enough to permit the terminology to any Pan- 
Angle, when he refers to New Zealand, Australia, 
South Africa, Newfoundland or Canada, and the 
men who govern them. These "great nations 
across the seas " are themselves conscious of nation- 
hood on a parity with that of the British Isles. 
A representative of one of them in the same 
year thus spoke of his country and its fellow 
nations : " The British Empire ... a galaxy of 
independent nations . . . There is not in Canada 
at the present moment a single British soldier 
to maintain British supremacy — moreover it is 
Canadian soldiers who are today garrisoning 
Halifax . . . The whole Australian continent 

1 Richard Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, 1905, 
p. 137. 


has now been moulded into another nation under 
the flag . . . and I can see dawning in South 
Africa the day when there will be another Con- 
federation . . , wl Eleven years later in that 
South Africa another national Prime Minister 
spoke of his country and his countrymen. " Their 
country was part of the British Empire. They 
could not get away from it ; it was their Con- 
stitution ; and yet they were as free as if they 
were their own State, and they took up the posi- 
tion — he had said so in England — that they were 
not a subject State, but part of the British 
Empire, and were on an equality. They were a 
sister State of England." 2 

When throughout these lands writers similarly 
use the word " nation," the student of Pan- Angle 
affairs need proceed to no further investigation, 
though he may be unable to justify the word by 
current dictionary definition. Enough if he notes 
its political significance. In the same class are 
such words as "independent," "self-governing," 
and "autonomous": subject to the same theo- 
retical queries but established by the same prac- 
tical usage. Anyone who would question such 
usage is silenced by the recognition that it only 
conforms to facts. On such facts is based the 
thesis of these pages. 

The seven units of the Pan-Angle world differ 

1 Sir Wilfrid Laurier at the Dominion Day Banquet, 1902 ; 
quoted Richard J ebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, 
1905, p. 1. 

2 General Botha at South African Nationalist Congress, 
November 24, 1913; quoted in The Times Weekly Edition, 
London, November 28, 1913. 



both in size and density of population. 1 Hence it 
might be objected that to classify according to 
these divisions is to neglect the relative strength 
and importance of the various political groups. 
Newfoundland is not as important in population or 
wealth as the British Isles ; while near Canada, 
it cannot be considered a part of Canada. New 
Zealand is two-thirds as far from Australia as 
Newfoundland is from Scotland, and emphatically 
is no part of its huge neighbour. 2 One of its 
citizens writes : " Although one thousand miles 
distant from Australia at the nearest point, 
although situated in a different climate and in- 
evitably destined to display a different national tem- 
perament, although already possessed of a national 


Area in 
sq. miles. 

Per cent. 

of total 





Per cent. 

of total 


New Zealand 
Australia . 
South Africa 
British Isles 
United States 









33 34 




















In comparison with the above figures, England contains 50,890 
square miles and 34,045,2.90 population. United States and 
South Africa contain 9,828,294 and 4,697,152 respectively of 
negroes, which together with other non- whites are excluded 
from the figures in the above table. These figures are based on 
Whitakers Almanack, London, 1913, pp. 584, 603, 660-667 ; and 
Britannica Year Book, London, 1913, pp. 680, 682, 663, 678, 699, 
703, 714, 557. 

2 Auckland to Sydney, 1264; Wellington to Sydney, 1233; 
Bluff to Hobart, 940 ; and St. John's to Glasgow, 1859 miles. 



character, national aspirations and national pecu- 
liarities, — although already served by Imperial 
affiliation much better than it could be served by 
any mere local federation, the Australian Prime 
Minister has no deeper insight than to predict the 
sinking of New Zealand into the status of a petty 
and subordinate Australian State. . . . before New 
Zealand denies its independence under the Empire, 
and seeks shelter under the mantle of the [Austra- 
lian] Federal Parliament, there will be a new poli- 
tical heaven and a new political earth. At the 
present time the proposal is simply absurd." 1 

Some might prefer to treat the Pan- Angle world 
as made up of two groups, those under the British 
and American flags respectively. This, however, 
fails to give the true character of the five younger 
Britannic nations, and might suggest erroneously 
that they bear a position to the British Parliament 
similar to the position of the American states to 
the Congress of the United States. Some American 
may resent the implied insignificance of the forty- 
eight states, some of which are larger in size or 
population, or both, than certain of the Britannic 
nations. Texas is over twice as large as either the 
British Isles or New Zealand, and has a population 
about four times that of New Zealand, or somewhat 
less than that of Australia. Similarly, it may occur 
to an Australian, or a Canadian, or a South African, 
that the states of the first, or the provinces of the 
two latter nations should receive more prominence. 
Others again might consider that the yet undivided 
areas of the British Isles, which may some time be 

1 Round Table, London, September 1912, p. 753, quoting New 
Zealand Herald. Auckland. 


organized under a federal system, or else the 
ancient historical parts as they were before the 
days of union, should be among the basic units of 
this discussion. 

To all these questionings the same answer 
applies. It is not easy to generalize in a system 
which, like ours, is the result of growth and adapta- 
tion. There are many local peculiarities of govern- 
ments and grades of autonomy which, significant 
in themselves, are immaterial to the question of 
Pan- Angle federation, and which for simplicity's 
sake are here ignored. The classification here used 
does not forbid others. Each reader may consider 
these people according to any scheme of which he 
approves. The seven nations here designated are 
entities. Their pride of personality is in most 
cases very great. This is reason enough, in spite 
of huge discrepancies in size and population, for 
utilizing a classification based on existing national 

The British Isles 1 and the United States 2 are 

1 The British Isles is here used in preference to United 
Kingdom. None of the other Pan- Angle nations are "king- 
doms " ; and the term is applicable only historically to that 
democratic group of people of which England contains the 
largest portion. For a modern Pan-Angle attitude, see W. H. 
Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2nd ed., 
Melbourne, 1910, p. 66, where he says concerning the naming 
of a nation: "'Kingdom of Australia' would be acceptable 
to none." 

2 Ency. Brit, vol. xxvii. p. 612 : "The United States, the 
short title usually given to the great federal republic which had 
its origin in the revolt of the British colonies in North America, 
when, in the Declaration of Independence, they described 
themselves as 'The Thirteen United States of America.' 
Officially the name is ' The United States of America,' but ' The 


entirely independent of each other and of all other 
powers. Neither recognizes the right of anyone 
to dictate to it in any matter, except by war or its 
threat. The other five of the Pan- Angle nations 
do not yet perhaps go so far. 

In the past certainly the British government 
legislated for them as it saw fit. The abolition of 
slavery under the British flag early in the nine- 
teenth century serves as an example. This outside 
interference while humane was even then con- 
sidered arbitrary. 

In South Africa " what mainly angered the 
Cape colonists was the inadequacy of the com- 
pensation which was awarded in their case. The 
value of the slaves on Dec. 1, 1834, when the 
Emancipation Act came into effect, was estim- 
ated by the commissioners specially appointed for 
the purpose at three million sterling. The sum 
allotted by the Imperial Government was no more 
than one and a quarter million, payable, not in 
South Africa, but in London, and with a deduction 
of any expenses incurred in carrying out the work 
of emancipation. The result was to impoverish 
the former slave owners, and to awaken in them 
a bitter feeling of resentment against the govern- 
ment which had deprived them of their property, 
and against the philanthropists by whom the policy 
of emancipation had been inspired." 1 This step 
had been taken without the consent of the governed, 

United States ' (used as a singular and not as a plural) has 
become accepted as the name of the country ; and pre-eminent 
usage has now made its citizens ' Americans/ in distinction from 
the other inhabitants of North and South America." 

1 C. P. Lucas, Historical Geography of the British Colonies, 
vol. iv., South Africa, Oxford, 1913, pt. i., pp. 146-147. 


the slave-holding communities having no represen- 
tation in the Parliament that enacted the law. 

Theoretically the same right exists to-day. 1 
" In granting self-government to the British 
Dominions Britain did not change her constitu- 
tion. Conscious that the British Government 
could not rule great communities in America, 
Australasia, and Africa, . . . Britain has agreed 
that they shall manage their own affairs. But 
she has never undertaken, and could not under- 
take, a clear division of functions, nor could she 
in theory explicitly divest herself of final responsi- 
bility in any sphere of government. The British 
North America Act is a constitution by which the 
relations of the Federal Government of Canada 
with the Provincial Governments are fully regu- 
lated and defined ; but it is not a constitution by 
which the relations of that Federal Government 
with the Imperial Government are fully regulated 
or defined. . . . Any constitutional powers vested 
in the English Government before the grant of 
self-government to the Dominions are in theory 
still vested in that Government today." 2 

In practice this theoretical right has yielded to 
the stronger claim of self-government. " My 
vindication of the preference policy was given 
not at Ottawa or on Canadian soil, but in the 
heart of the Empire at London, at the Colonial 
Conference, when 1 declared to the Empire that 

1 An Analysis of the System of Government throughout the British 
Empire, London, 1912, p. 58: "It should be remembered that 
in theory there is nothing to prevent the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom legislating for the internal affairs of a self- 
governing colony or even imposing taxation on such a colony." 

2 Round Table, London, September 1913, pp. 588-589. 


I and my colleagues of the Government were 
ready to make a trade treaty. We said, ' we are 
ready to discuss with you articles on which we 
can give you a preference, and articles on which 
you can give us a preference. We are ready to 
make with you a treaty of trade.' Mark those 
words coming from a colony to the mother 
country without offence being given or taken." 1 
" What has never been questioned since the War 
of Independence is that a democracy pretending 
to a sovereignty over other democracies is either 
a phantom or the most intolerable of all oppres- 
sions." 2 "Nobody dreams in these days of the 
British Parliament making laws for Canada or 
Australia. Such an idea is alien to all thinking 

In sum, the government of the British Isles no 
longer dictates to the "great nations across the 
seas." All that is now apparent of its former 
right of interference consists of appeals from the 
courts of these younger nations to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council of the British 
Isles, and the seldom used veto power of the 
governors sent out from the British Isles to these 
younger nations. The appeal power, though of 
great theoretical importance, is of such limited 
practical use that a British writer has overlooked 
its existence in the following description : " The 

1 Sir Wilfrid Laurier at Sorel, September 28, 1904, quoted 
in Richard Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, 1905, 
p. 151. 

2 F. S. Oliver, Alexander Hamilton : An Essay on American 
Union, London, 1906, p. 448. 

3 Lord Milner, November 3, 1908, at Canadian Club, Montreal, 
in Lord Milner, The Nation and the Empire, London, 1913, p. 362. 


Governor is the only link between the Home 
Government and the Colonial, and in all of them 
his powers are limited to the exercise of the veto. 
Even this is circumscribed. It is tacitly under- 
stood that the veto will be resorted to only when 
the foreign relations of the empire are affected, 
or when some Act is passed which the Secretary 
of State decides to be incompatible with existent 
Imperial legislation." 1 

In place of the former parental-filial attitude 
between the British Isles and the five younger 
nations there is growing up a sympathetic and 
sentimental friendship. The younger nations as 
yet have no representatives chosen by their voters 
to sit in a common legislature with Britishers, but 
claim, nevertheless, to act with the British Isles as 
equal partners in the Britannic world. This claim 
is acknowledged by the British Isles government. 
In the words of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain at Glas- 
gow, October 6, 1903 : " And when I speak of our 
colonies, it is an expression ; they are not ours — 
they are not ours in a possessory sense. They are 
sister States, able to treat with us from an equal 
position, able to hold to us, willing to hold to us, 
but also able to break with us." 2 

In the light of the foregoing testimony, the 
exact political status of New Zealand, Australia, 
Newfoundland, Canada, and South Africa becomes 
increasingly difficult to define. It seems, on the 
whole, more nearly accurate to regard them as 

1 Alfred Caldecott, English Colonization and Empire, London, 
1891, p. 134. 

2 Richard Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, 1905, 
p. 272. 


independent and autonomous with certain limita- 
tions, than to consider them as dependent with 
excessive liberties. Accordingly, each of the seven 
Pan- Angle nations is here considered to be the 
equal of each of the other six. 

The collective Britannic nations have often been 
styled Greater Britain, or the Britannic Empire. 
The word empire, though constantly used for lack 
of a better term, is a misnomer. As Seeley says : 
" Greater Britain is not in the ordinary sense an 
Empire at all." 1 Another authority says: "The 
British Empire is not an Empire in the ordinary 
meaning of the word. It is a system of govern- 
ment." 2 "There is no Imperial Government." 3 

Men speak of an Imperial Parliament, but in 
reality no such thing exists. It is an ambitious 
name applied sometimes to the Parliament of the 
British Isles which has no members from the other 
nations, and whose power to enforce its legislation 
in the other Britannic nations is denied. " By a 
fine tradition it has the full dignity of sovereignty ; 
but in reality it is as impotent as the Continental 
Congress, and only less ridiculous because it has 
learned from experience the timid wisdom not to 
court rebuffs. " 4 

Downing Street is often referred to. Downing 
Street is a term used to sum up the six administra- 
tive departments of the British Isles government: the 
Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the India Office, 

1 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion oj England, London, 1883, 
p. 296. 

2 Round Table, London, May 1911, p. 232. 

3 Ibid., February 1911, p. 1 67. 

4 F. S. Oliver, Alexander Hamilton : An Essay on American Union, 
London, 1906, p. 449. 


the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Board of 
Trade. Of these the India Office does not enter into 
the matters here discussed, and the Colonial Office 
" in its present relations with the Dominions, . . . 
is in reality little more than a clearing house of 
information and correspondence." 1 The remaining 
four, i.e. the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the 
War Office, and the Board of Trade have their 
normal administrative functions in the government 
of the British Isles. They are filled by the 
ministry of the day, and hence are responsible to 
the majority of the House of Commons and 
ultimately to the British people. They are in no 
way representative of, nor responsible to, the other 
five self-governing nations. Through the theo- 
retical veto of the governors sent out from the 
British Isles, Downing Street is supposed to wield 
its power and to prevent legislation in the five 
younger nations that in matters touching foreign 
affairs is contrary to the will of the British Parlia- 
ment. As a matter of fact, this veto is rarely 
exercised. Its exercise would be, " in plain words, 
the tyranny of one Parliament over another — of 
one democracy over another." 2 " The theory of 
the British Constitution is, as it stands, clearly 
intolerable except in disuse. The powers which 
are imagined to exist in it would never stand the 
strain of being put in force." 2 What does happen 
when a veto appears called for by Britannic safety 
is that the Parliament of the younger nation is 
induced to reconsider matters in the light of what- 

1 Round Table, London, September 1913, p. 590. 

2 F. S. Oliver, Alexander\Hamilton : An Essay on American Union, 
London, 1906, p. 449. 


ever argument Downing Street has at hand. 
Here, obviously, are not officials who as executives 
and legislators are part of any common government. 
They are part of only one government, viz. that of 
the British Isles. Certain matters in government 
must proceed from a single source. In the United 
States the federal government, which represents 
all the people and each state, has this in its charge 
and has machinery by which to enforce its power. 
Among the Britannic nations, the government of 
one of them controls these matters with no other 
machinery than persuasion to enforce its often 
debated authority. 

A member of the British Ministry of 1913 is 
quoted as saying that "the only political organisa- 
tions common to the whole Empire, ... are the 
Crown, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
and the Committee of Imperial Defence, but not one 
of them has any executive or legislative power." 1 
By " the Crown " is meant the power of Downing 
Street just discussed. The Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council of the British Isles is the supreme 
appellate court for courts under the British flag 
outside the British Isles. A like function is per- 
formed for British Isles courts by the House of 
Lords. There is no single court of appeal for the 
six Britannic nations. 2 Consequently, the Judicial 

1 United Empire, London, January 1914, p. 1. 

2 United Empire, London, October 1913, p. 767: "... there 
is no ultimate court of appeal for the Empire as a whole. A 
proposal to create one, by fusing the judicial functions of the 
House of Lords, which hears United Kingdom appeals, and the 
Privy Council, which hears appeals from oversea, has long been 
favoured by Australian statesmen." Cf. The Times Weekly Edition, 
London, August 22, 1913, "An Imperial Court of Appeals." 


Committee of the Privy Council can hardly be 
called an institution common to all these nations, 
even were its activity not so limited as to be 
negligible. As to the Committee of Imperial 
Defence, in it " the Dominion representatives are 
guests and not constituents." 1 

All this is to say that through certain makeshifts 
and survivals, whose forms and functions are no- 
where clearly defined, the governments of the six 
Britannic nations come in occasional contact with 
each other. 

Such is the complexity of the English-speaking 
world control, and such is its lack of uniformity of 
classification and naming, that it is not safe to say 
the five new nations and the British Isles and the 
United States are the only English-speaking auto- 
nomous groups. " The British Empire exhibits 
forms and methods of Government in almost ex- 
uberant variety." 2 For example, the Isle of Man 
and the Channel Islands and such outposts of Pan- 
Angle civilization as Pitcairn and Tristan da Cunha 
might well be considered self-governing. These 
areas are omitted from enumeration in this discus- 
sion, not by reason of any lack of appreciation of 
their worth, but because the inclusion of these many 
assets and liabilities of the Pan- Angle concern 
would unduly expand this discussion. These 
groups have their respective positions with the 
several Pan -Angle nations to which they are to a 
greater or less degree connected. On the con- 
tinued career of the seven Pan-Angle nations 

1 United Empire, London, January 1914, p. 1. 

2 Alfred Caldecott, English Colonization and Empire, London, 
1891, p. 121. 


depend the political existences of a multitude of 
these smaller Pan- Angle localities. 

Moreover, no direct discussion of the politics 
of any of the many dependencies is here made. 
Their needs are not for their own solving. Our 
control we try to make materially beneficial to 
their inhabitants by " giving them only what is 
good for them, not always what they want." 1 Our 
control of ourselves is based on the entirely oppo- 
site theorem of taking what we want, not neces- 
sarily what someone else thinks is good for us. In 
short, we govern our dependencies in one way, 
ourselves in quite another. The dependent coun- 
tries which "belong to" the several nations may 
present many problems to the Pan- Angles, but these 
form no "part of" the Pan- Angle problem. This 
is no place to question whether Seeley was justified 
in his doubt as to the value of India to the British 
Isles. 2 Enough here to acknowledge that our 
present economic policy leads many of our seven 
nations to believe that the holding of dependencies, 
especially in the tropics, is of value. To enumerate 
all these dependencies would be tedious and need- 
less. It is only to distinguish the dependent from 
the independent that space is here given to the 

A united government over and between these 
seven Pan-Angle nations would be unaffected by 
the existence of these possessions. At the present 

1 W. C. Forbes, lately Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands, 
Address concerning the Philippines, before Boston City Club, 
November 20, 1913, quoted in Boston City Club Bulletin, Boston, 
January 1, 1914, p. 40. 

2 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, London, 1883, 
p. 11. 


time New Zealand and Australia hold dependencies. 
This in no way interferes with their being somehow, 
as they believe, parts of a political entity with the 
British Isles. Similarly, in case of the uniting of 
the seven Pan- Angle nations, New Zealand and 
Australia could each retain its dependencies, and 
the United States could retain its dependencies, 
without impairing the success of a Pan -Angle 
government. The history of our civilization shows 
that such a complicated procedure is the way of 
natural growth among Pan -Angle peoples. 

" Empire," from its long association with states 
builded of conquered peoples, is no fit word to use 
for a voluntary combination of Pan- Angles. Nor 
would any form of government be acceptable that 
blotted out the individuality that each of the seven 
nations has established. They are members of a 
great civilization, each to - day practically self- 
supreme. Whatever arrangement they may choose 
to enter upon to protect themselves and their 
civilization, they will wish to continue always 


The seven Pan- Angle nations are similar in their 
forms of government. This similarity is often 
obvious, but even where differences of procedure 
seem to exist the foundations of government are 
still the same. 

In each of the nations the people rule. In each 
they follow in governing three practices : ultimate 
control on all questions is in the voters ; immediate 
legislative control is in legislatures composed of 
representatives who act on behalf of the voters, 
and subject to restrictions, if any, by the voters 
only ; and executive or administrative control is in 
charge of elected persons. If " a country where a 
large portion of the people has some considerable 
share in the supreme power would be a constitu- 
tional country," l then these seven nations are more 
than constitutional countries, for in them the people 
not only have " some considerable share," but are 
the final judges on any matters which they desire 
to adjudicate. As such these nations meet Burke's 
definition of a free government : "If any man asks 
me what a free government is, 1 answer, that, for 
any practical purpose, it is what the people think 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. vii. p. 15. 


so, — and that they, and not I, are the natural, 
lawful, and competent judges of the matter. 


Ultimate control in all these nations is secured 
to the voters by elections and referenda. By these 
two means the voters choose their representatives 
and sometimes actively participate in legislation. 
Often, too, they state the forms under which their 
representatives shall work and limit the work they 
shall be allowed to perform. In the British Isles 
there is no formal limitation on the power of the 
representatives elected to the House of Commons. 
In the other six nations the elected representatives 
are empowered to act only in certain fields. Their 
power is conveyed to them through written instru- 
ments or constitutions which are beyond their 
control. All power in either case lies ultimately 
in the voters, whether through the ballot and their 
ability to defeat at the polls alone, or through this 
plus a written constitution. Accordingly, as already 
stated, all seven of our nations have constitutional 
governments. Outside the British Isles they are, 
in a sense, doubly constitutional, because not only is 
this power of election in the voters, but the frame- 
work, or written constitution, of each government 
under which the representatives must act is likewise 
in the control of the voters. 

The word constitution 2 is variously used in Pan- 

1 Quoted in Woodrow Wilson, Mere Literature, Boston, 1900, 
p. 105. 

2 Ency. Brit., vol. vii. p. 1 5 : " The ideas associated with consti- 
tution and constitutionalism are thus, it will be seen, mainly of 
modern and European origin. They are wholly inapplicable to 


Angle parlance, and it may be well here to discuss 
some of its meanings. 

The Constitution of the British Isles consists 
partly of laws, determining the form of government, 
which have been passed at various times and are 
still in force. To this extent it is written. The 
bulk of the Constitution, however, lies in a mass 
of tradition, and depends for its force upon the 
respect in which Parliament holds that tradition. 
For this reason the British Constitution is fre- 
quently called "unwritten." "In one important 
respect England differs conspicuously from most 
other countries. Her constitution is to a large 
extent unwritten, using the word in much the same 
sense as when we speak of unwritten law. Its 
rules can be found in no written document, but 
depend, as so much of English law does, on pre- 
cedent modified by a constant process of interpreta- 

the primitive and simple societies of the present or of the former 
times. The discussion of forms of government occupies a large 
space in the writings of the Greek philosophers, — a fact which is 
to be explained by the existence among the Greeks of many 
independent political communities, variously organized, and more 
or less democratic in character. Between the political problems 
of the smaller societies and those of the great European nations 
there is no useful parallel to be drawn, although the predomin- 
ance of classical learning made it the fashion for a long time to 
apply Greek speculations on the nature of monarchy, aristocracy, 
and democracy to public questions in modern Europe. Repre- 
sentation . . . the characteristic principle of European constitu- 
tions, has, of course, no place in societies which were not too 
large to admit of every free citizen participating personally in 
the business of government. Nor is there much in the politics 
or the political literature of the Romans to compare with the 
constitutions of modern states. Their political system, almost 
from the beginning of the empire, was ruled absolutely by a 
small assembly or by one man." 


tion. Many rules of the constitution have in fact 
a purely legal history, that is to say, they have 
been developed by the law courts, as part of the 
general body of the common law. Others have in 
a similar way been developed by the practice of 
parliament. Both Houses, in fact, have exhibited 
the same spirit of adherence to precedent, coupled 
with a power of modifying precedent to suit circum- 
stances, which distinguishes the judicial tribunals. 
In a constitutional crisis the House of Commons 
appoints a committee to ' search its journals for 
precedents,' just as the court of king's bench would 
examine the records of its own decisions. And 
just as the law, while professing to remain the 
same, is in process of constant change, so, too, the 
unwritten constitution is, without any acknowledg- 
ment of the fact, constantly taking up new 
ground." 1 " ' Constitutional law,' as the expression 
is used in England, both by the public and by 
authoritative writers, consists of two elements. 
The one element, which I have called the 'law 
of the constitution ' is a body of undoubted law ; the 
other element, which I have called the ' conven- 
tions of the constitution,' consists of maxims and 
practices which, though they regulate the ordinary 
conduct of the Crown and of Ministers and of 
others under the constitution, are not in strictness 
laws at all." 2 It must be borne in mind that 
Parliament, and Parliament alone, can change these 
laws of the Constitution, and that the change can 
occur whenever a majority of Parliament so decides. 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. vii. p. 15. 

2 A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, London, 1885, 
p. 25. 


What these traditions are changes from year to 
year and even from day to day — in fact, it is diffi- 
cult to find two Britishers who will agree on what 
is the Constitution at a given date, so greatly are 
these traditions a matter of personal, not national, 

In each of the other Pan-Angle countries the 
Constitution consists of laws and traditions similar 
to those in the British Isles, plus a written docu- 
ment (or documents) which is a power of attorney 
limiting in certain ways the power of the national 
representatives — be they executive, judicial, or 
legislative. These written documents are either 
enactments of the Parliament of the British Isles, 
or successors to such enactments. The Canadian 
Constitution was drafted in London by delegates 
from the Canadian colonies and various British 
officials, 1 and was passed by the British Isles 
Parliament, March 29, 1867, to take effect July 1. 
It was never submitted to the people, 2 although it 
was pleaded that the general election which ensued 
was "virtual ratification." The Australian Con- 
stitution, drafted by Australians in a national con- 
stitutional convention, ratified by referenda in each 
colony, 3 now to become a " state," was altered by 
the British Isles Parliament only in reference to 
the clause which prohibited appeals to the King in 
Council, and was passed by that Parliament July 9, 
1900, to take effect January 1, 1901. The South 

1 H. E. Egerton, Federations and Unions within the British 
Empire, Oxford, 1911, p. 33. 

2 Gold win Smith, " Canada, England, and the States," in 
Contemporary Review, London, March 1907, p. 351. 

3 Ency. Brit., vol. ii. p. 966. 


African Constitution was drafted in South Africa 
by South Africans in a national constitutional 
convention, ratified by the legislatures in three of 
the South African provinces, and in Natal by a 
referendum of the voters, was altered by the British 
Isles Parliament only in reference to matters affect- 
ing " natives " and " Asiatics," and was passed by 
that Parliament September 20, 1909, to take effect 
May 31, 1910. 1 The Constitutions of New Zealand 
and Newfoundland are to be found in the charters 
and enactments framed in London for their govern- 
ment, and are historically similar in composition to 
the constitutions of the thirteen American colonies. 
The American Constitution was based on the 
previous experience of the race, especially as 
acquired under various colonial charters. It was 
drafted at a national convention, and was subse- 
quently ratified by state representative conventions 
successively. The work of the National Convention 
" was a work of selection, not a work of creation, 
. . . the success of their work was not a success of 
invention, always most dangerous in government, 
but a success of judgment, of selective wisdom, 
of practical sagacity, — the only sort of success in 
politics which can ever be made permanent." 2 The 
American people changed governmental responsi- 
bility from the British Isles to themselves, but did 
not and could not change the source of their ideas. 
Such written documents are so often referred to 
as " The Constitution " that citizens of some of the 

1 W. B. Worsfold, The Union of South Africa, London, 1912, 
p. 128. 

2 Woodrow Wilson, The State, 1897, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, 
p. 462. 


six younger nations often assume that " The 
Constitution" is the whole Constitution of their 
respective governments. The first such written 
power of attorney to the legislators, and as such an 
expression of the views then held by a certain body 
politic, was signed aboard the Mayflower in 1620. 1 
This Constitution by which the forty-one signers 
"solemnly and mutually . . . covenant and com- 
bine ourselves together into a civil body politic, for 
our better ordering and preservation and furtherance 
of the ends aforesaid ; and by virtue hereof to 
enact, constitute and frame — [laws] — unto which 
we promise all due submission and obedience," 2 
did not, however, supersede all other, including 
unwritten, governmental traditions of that body 
politic. Constitutions written later have similarly 
left for their respective groups much continuing 
tradition, that has been respected and has been 
enlarged upon. We have written down that which 
we felt strongly about, but we have also continued 
other customs. Written " constitutions " have 
been expressions of public belief as to the form of 
framework of any given body politic, but for in- 
terpretation they have had to rely on unwritten 
or previously written tradition, as developed to 
meet arising needs. The mere writing has not 
arrested our constitutional growth nor rendered 
inflexible our governmental forms. 

The American Constitution consists really of 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. xvii. p. 858: "Finding themselves without 
warrant in a region beyond their patent, . . . they drew up and 
signed before landing a democratic compact of government which 
is accounted the earliest written constitution in history. " 

2 Ibid., vol. xvii. p. 858. 


two portions, the written and the unwritten. The 
tenacity with which the nation clings to certain tra- 
ditions never put in writing or even at variance with 
the spirit of the writing, makes it advisable, if not 
absolutely necessary, so to consider it. Lord Bryce, 
familiar with the nature of the British Constitution, 
calls the usages that have grown up apart from the 
written Constitution " parts of the actual or (so to 
speak) * working ' Constitution " * of America. As 
illustrative of the latter he mentions certain 
American customs : " The president practically is 
limited to two continuous terms of office. The 
presidential electors are expected to vote for the 
candidate of the party which has chosen them, 
exercising no free will of their own. The Senate 
always confirms the nominations to a cabinet office 
made by the President." 2 These instances, of what 
he calls the American working Constitution, are 
supported by the same force that maintains the 
entire British Constitution — public opinion. 

To the Britisher, this point of view is thoroughly 
natural. He has at home a Constitution which is 
also compounded of written and unwritten parts. 
To the American this phraseology may sound 
strange, for he has long been accustomed to think 
the " Constitution " refers to a particular written 
document and the judicial decisions thereunder. 
For the unwritten or working basis of his govern- 
ment he has had no word. 

The real difference in the two Constitutions must 
be sought in the amending power. To the amending 
of the unwritten portions of either there is no check 
on Parliament or on Congress, other than public 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. xxvii. p. 658. 2 Ibid. 


opinion. To the amending of the written portion 
of the British Constitution, there is likewise no 
check other than public opinion. Parliament 
amends the written and unwritten portions of the 
Constitution, — at the will of a majority of the 
House of Commons. Congress cannot so amend 
the written portions of the American Constitution ; 
that is a prerogative of the voters alone. Therein 
lies the mystery of the alleged respective " flexity " 
and "rigidity" of the two. But the mystery is 
less, and the distinctions of flexity and rigidity grow 
of uncertain value when it is realized that both 
Constitutions are being constantly changed by the 
genius of our race. As in the case of our laws, our 
Constitutions are being steadily interpreted in 
accord with the will of the voters. That we do 
not change more suddenly is due to the conservative, 
yet discreet, action of our representatives, sanctioned 
by the voters. 

An enactment of Parliament at variance with 
the British Constitution changes that Constitution. 
An enactment of Congress at variance with the 
written portion of the American Constitution does 
not change the Constitution but remains at variance 
with it. To uphold the written Constitution in 
such a case and to insist on the priority of its terms 
over the acts performed by representatives acting 
under it, early became the self-imposed duty of the 
American courts. " But this, although, as we may 
well think, a sound conclusion, was not a necessary 
one ; and it was long denied by able statesmen, 
judges, and lawyers." 1 This function of the courts 
was for years a unique feature of the United 

1 J. B. Thayer, John Marshall, Boston, 1901, p. 63 


States government. " The right to deal thus with 
their legislatures had already been asserted in the 
States, and once or twice it had really been 
exercised. Had the question related to a conflict 
between that [federal written] Constitution and the 
enactment of a State, it would have been a simpler 
matter. These two questions, under European 
written constitutions, are regarded as different ones. 
It is almost necessary to the working of a federal 
system that the general government, and each of 
its departments, should be free to disregard acts of 
any departments of the local states which may be 
inconsistent with the federal constitution. And so 
in Switzerland and Germany the federal courts 
thus treat local enactments. But there is not 
under any written constitution in Europe a country 
where a court deals in this way with the acts of its 
coordinate legislature." 1 

Because the power to amend the written Con- 
stitution is not in Congress, it has come about that 
courts see to it that the will of the popular power 
so expressed shall not be ignored or vitiated by 
those who are the servants of that popular power. 
Because the power to amend the written portions 
of the British Constitution is in Parliament, there 
can be no clash between the wishes of Parliament 
and its Constitution. What Parliament does is the 
final test of what the Constitution is. 

From the different powers of Parliament and 
Congress in regard to their respective national 
Constitutions comes the ambiguity of Pan- Angle 
usage of the word "unconstitutional." 

In the British Isles " unconstitutional " referring 

1 J. B. Thayer, John Marshall, Boston, 1901, p. 6l. 


to parliamentary action means that someone con- 
siders it not consistent with established British 
political customs. Yet, if the British Parliament 
enacts any legislation it must be constitutional, 
because the legislation by its mere enactment is 
proved not inconsistent with the views of the 
temporary majority in Parliament. Various British 
kings have been elected by the Witan and by 
Parliament ; one king was beheaded by the same 
popular authority; at various dates the duties of 
kingship have been altered. All these acts were 
constitutional the day they were voted. It was 
therefore correct to say in 1910 that the British 
Constitution " can be torn up by the mere vote of 
a temporary majority in the two houses of Parlia- 
ment." 1 Since 1911 it would be equally correct to 
say that such power is now in one House — the 
House of Commons. It is evident that, " This 
arrangement, while it makes for flexibility, may 
be a source of grave danger in the hands of an 
unscrupulous majority." 2 

That forces other than parliamentary majorities 
may come to exercise more direct control over the 
British Constitution is not impossible. In the 
excitement of discussing the place of the House 
of Lords in the government of the British Isles, 
the party leaders in 1910, after the death of 
Edward VII., held a conference. Although they 
failed to find a consensus of opinion on the best 
framework for the British Isles government, 
" The significance of the Conference lies in the 
precedent it creates for the alteration of the national 

1 Round Table, London, November 1910, p. 62. 

2 Ibid., p. 62. 


constitution by the expedient of conference and 
compromise, instead of by the steam-rolling of a 
party machine." * Concerning this same conference 
another writer observes, " whether in itself it be 
a development of our Constitution, as some people 
affirm, or an encroachment on our Constitution, 
which is the complaint of others, it has at any rate 
affected our Constitution very materially, simply 
by its existence." 2 If such a conference after 
deliberating were to lay its conclusions before the 
people for ratification, it would be analogous to the 
national constitutional conventions which since the 
early American experiments have been familiar to 
the Fan- Angle world. From this the British Isles 
might come to have a " written constitution " in 
the same sense that the Constitutions of the United 
States, Canada, and Australia are written. 

For the present, the plan of parliamentary govern- 
ment control which is the British Constitution while 
successful is, as the above quotations evidence, hazy. 
And in the British Isles it is fair to consider that 
" unconstitutional " means " unusual." 3 

With Americans the word " unconstitutional " 
never in popular practice has the comprehensive and 
indefinite British meaning. As Americans have 
no term in common use to denote the unwritten 
part of their Constitution, so they have none at 
all with which to refer to an infraction of it. The 

1 Round Table, London^, November 1910, p. 62. 

2 " Pacificus," Federalism and Home Rule, London, 1910, p. 2. 

3 Ency. Brit., vol. vii. p. 15 : "Again, as a term of party 
politics, constitutional has come to mean, in England, not 
obedience to constitutional rules , . . but adherence to the 
existing type of the constitution or to some conspicuous portions 
thereof, — in other words, conservative." 


expression has yet to be coined for the American 
public to employ should the Electoral College act 
as it did in Washington's day, viz. each elector 
exercise his individual discretion in voting for a 
president, or should a president be elected for a 
third term, whether or not consecutive. In either 
of these instances the change could not be uncon- 
stitutional in the American sense, though it would 
be unconstitutional in the British sense. In the 
former case, the procedure would be a return to 
what was once entirely usual in the American 
practice, and called for by the one-time working 
interpretation of the written Constitution. In the 
latter case, it would be a change to what has never 
been forbidden by the American written Consti- 
tution, but to what is now forbidden by the un- 
written Constitution. In either of these cases, what 
would the American courts decide ? They would 
find no violation of the written Constitution, but 
only of the present unwritten or working Con- 
stitution. The American can console himself in 
his ignorance by the oft-quoted remark : " The 
Supreme Court has the last guess." The word 
" unconstitutional " refers to an enactment in such 
conflict with the written Constitution and decisions 
thereunder, that American courts will not consider 
it legal. When legislation beyond the powers con- 
ferred by the written Constitution is attempted 
and a case, for whose decision it is necessary to 
decide the power of Congress so to enact, is brought 
to the courts, they will declare the attempted 
legislation void. The courts, and they alone, have 
this power. Hence the word " unconstitutional " 
in America means illegal. 


In 1913 occurred a modification of the American 
unwritten or working Constitution which may or 
may not pass into a permanent change. George 
Washington and John Adams addressed Congress 
orally on public affairs. Thomas Jefferson, the 
third president, being a poor speaker, changed this 
part of the working Constitution by addressing 
Congress through written messages. This custom 
remained as a revision of the working Constitution 
until 1913. Of this tradition Wilson wrote in 
1898 : " Hence a sacred rule of constitutional 
action I" 1 In 1913 he, as president, reverted from 
this " sacred rule " to the oral custom of Washing- 
ton, and the country's comment was largely com- 
mendatory. In this instance it is likely that the 
Supreme Court may not guess at all ! 

Illustrative of the British significance of " uncon- 
stitutional " is quoted the following, written in 1910 : 
" It is an undoubted rule of the English constitu- 
tion that the king shall not refuse his assent to a 
bill which has passed both Houses of Parliament, 
but it is certainly not a law. Should the king 
veto such a bill his action would be unconstitu- 
tional, but not illegal." 2 A corresponding Ameri- 
can example might be furnished by the action of 
an American president in issuing an order, without 
being authorized thereto by Congress, temporarily 
repealing part of a tariff bill. Such an act being 
outside of the scope of a president's authority 
would, if reviewed by a court as part of the ratio 
decidendi of a case, be held unconstitutional and 
therefore illegal. 

1 Woodrow Wilson, The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, 
p. 378. 2 Ency. Brit., vol. vii. p. 14. 


These British and American usages of " constitu- 
tion " and " unconstitutional " are reflected in the 
five other Pan- Angle nations. It consequently 
behoves one to use either of these words with 
careful attention to the meaning desired. But of 
each of the seven nations it may be said : that it is 
governed under a constitution ; that some part of 
its constitution is written ; and that through its 
constitution, however amendable, ultimate control 
of all questions is in the voters. 

Immediate legislative control of these seven 
nations is in legislatures composed of representa- 
tives who act on behalf of the voters, and subject 
to restrictions, if any, by the voters only. Until 
1911, one nation, the British Isles, afforded an 
exception to this, as its legislative power was 
shared by persons who owed their position to their 
birth. This instance of presentation in a national 
legislature which was composed otherwise of elected 
representatives expired before 1911. Since that 
date the House of Lords exists, not as a part of the 
legislature, but as a consultative body subservient 
to the will of the House of Commons. To-day 
the legislatures of the Pan- Angle nations are in all 
cases representative, and the representatives, how- 
ever elected or appointed, act on behalf of the 
voters. 1 Those that are considered appointed are 

1 The fact that so-called " governors " are sent out from the 
British Isles to the five newer Britannic nations does not affect 
the statements in this paragraph. Such "governors" do not 
share in legislation, but acquiesce in legislation formulated by 
others. Such " governors " are best considered as ambassadors 
with peculiar local recognition, who act under orders from and 


in reality chosen by a method of indirect election. 
For example, in Canada and in New Zealand the 
representatives who form the upper houses are 
chosen by the majority in the lower houses at 
the time of their election. The fact that these 
legislators may, in the Canadian case, hold office 
for life does not affect the fact that they are 
elected, but concerns only their terms of office. In 
New Zealand the terms of office of some members 
of the upper house is for life, whereas more 
recent members have been chosen for a period of 
years. In the United States, according to the pro- 
visions of the Federal Constitution, the members 
of the upper house were formerly chosen by the 
state legislatures. They are now, by the pro- 
visions of the Constitution, elected directly. 1 In 
Australia the upper house members are chosen 
by the voters organized in voting districts larger 
than those electing representatives. This last is 
the method toward which the choice of upper 
house members seems in Pan- Angle nations to be 
approaching. The discontent in New Zealand and 

in behalf of the government of the British Isles, and act also 
wherever possible in behalf of all six of the Britannic nations 
and their dependencies. Cf. ante, p. 89. 

1 The Seventeenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, 
initiated by Congress in 1912, requiring the direct election of 
senators by the voters of each state, came into force May 31, 
1913. The practical effects of direct election were, however, 
previously obtained in some states, the legislatures electing 
as senators candidates already designated by the voters. This 
instance, in which the working Constitution violated the spirit of 
the written Constitution, is interesting as evidence of the flexity 
of the American Constitution and of the strength of the spirit 
of local self-government. Cf. Britannica Year Book, London, 
1913, pp. 744-745. 


Canada at their present methods and the recent 
change in America indicate this trend. This ten- 
dency emphasizes the insistence of the voters that 
representatives are responsible only to the voters. 

That such representatives are subject to restric- 
tions, if any, by the voters only, is a statement 
qualified solely by the technical exception that 
some of the Britannic nations act under Con- 
stitutions enacted for them by another nation, 
viz. the British Isles. This exception is more 
true in theory than in reality. If in some of the 
Britannic nations, such as New Zealand and New- 
foundland, there have been no ratifications of their 
respective frameworks of government, nevertheless 
the whole spirit of the people in these countries, as 
well as in Canada, where a like state of affairs 
exists, and in Australia and South Africa where rati- 
fications have occurred on what is in each case sub- 
stantially their present Constitution, makes evident 
the tendency of each one of these nations to regard 
its Constitution as its own act. 1 Consequently, it 
is fair to say that acting under authority of the 
voters, representatives carry out the national will 
in each of the seven Pan- Angle nations. 

That executive or administrative control is in 
charge of elected persons is true without exception 

1 That Australia may change its Constitution regardless of 
the wishes of the British Isles, cf. Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act, chapter viii. paragraph 128, and comments 
thereon in C. P. Lucas, A Historical Geography of the British 
Colonies, vol. vi., Australasia, by A. D. Rogers, Oxford, 1907, 
pt. i., p. 289- 


in these seven nations. The methods of choosing 
who shall so administer, may be designated 
respectively as the British and the American. 
Under both plans the executive is chosen by 
indirect popular election. The British system 
produces a prime minister elected by a majority 
of the more popular (in the British Isles the sole) 
chamber of the legislature. This prime minister 
associates about himself certain other men from 
the same chamber to carry on the government for 
a certain time, which may be a shorter and therefore 
an uncertain time. In the American system the 
people elect representatives, called the electors, to 
carry out the election of a president. This forlorn 
novelty, the Electoral College, shows the futility 
among Pan- Angles of new-fangled institutions. 
In all other ideas, the framers of the American 
Constitution of 1787 followed the evolved and 
known usages of the race. " It was only when they 
came to construct the machinery for the election 
of the President that they left the field of American 
experience and English example and devised an 
arrangement which was so original that it was 
destined to break down almost as soon as it was 
put in operation." 1 The true election is no longer 
by the electors, but by the people of each state 
using their allotted number of electors as so many 
counts in favour of one candidate. 2 The president 
associates about himself a group of men chosen 
from the nation at large. These men act as 

1 Woodrow Wilson, The State, 1 898, Boston, rev. ed., 191 1, p. 462. 

2 Concerning the alteration in procedure of the American 
Electoral College whereby presidential electors are pledged 
before their election, cf. Ency. Brit., vol. xxvii. p. 655. 


secretaries to administer departments in behalf of 
the president, and have no seat in the legislative 
branch of the government. These two systems 
are the types used as models throughout the Pan- 
Angle self-governing areas. 

In the two plans we have popular election with 
virtual similarity. This is remarked in the follow- 
ing comment on the choice, in 1841, of a British 
national executive : " But the Reform Act of 1832 
introduced a new order of things. In 1835 the 
result of a general election was for the first time the 
direct cause of a change of ministry, and in 1841 a 
House of Commons was elected, for the express pur- 
pose of bringing a particular statesman into power. 
The electorate voted for Sir Robert Peel, and it 
would have been as impossible for the house then 
elected to deny him their support as it would be 
for the college of electors in the United States to 
exercise their private judgment in the selection of 
a president." * The results of parliamentary general 
elections in the British Isles are announced on news- 
paper bulletin boards in terms of votes for the 
leaders of the opposing parties, just as in America 
the state vote is credited directly to the presidential 

Adherence to either the American or British 
type of executive does not connote a corresponding 
similarity in other governmental respects. Australia 
has a British style executive in connection with an 
American style legislature. Moreover, Australia's 
written Constitution has been left unfixed in certain 
matters, so that, if after trial the British system of 
executive is found wanting, and some modification 

1 Ency. Brit. , vol. xx. p. 845. 


shall seem better, a change may be made without 
the need of constitutional amendment. 1 

While representatives are elected to carry out 
the executive will of the voters under both the 
British and the American systems, the methods of 
discharging that duty present differences. These 
may be summed up in the statement that 
the British executives take the form of a re- 
sponsible cabinet; and the American executives, 
both federal and state, take the form of a cabinet 
which is not in the same sense responsible. An 
explanation lies in the race's experience with 

The Teuton executive was in the form of an 
elected king who carried out the wishes of the 
majority which elected him. He could be and 
was deposed at the will of his constituents. In 
short, he was a spokesman. As the nationality of 
the British Isles crystallized, this spokesman as- 
sumed his powers were not subject to recall by his 

1 Cf W. H. Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2nd ed., Melbourne, 1910, p. 297: "Further, the 
Constitution recognizes, if it does not establish, the Cabinet 
system in the Commonwealth, and the responsibilities of the 
Executive extend to the consideration of the subjects committed 
to Parliament, and, if need be, to the initiation of legislation 
upon them." Also B. R. Wise, The Commonwealth of Australia, 
London, 1909, pp- 193-194- : "At the same time, the provisions 
which enable its [responsible government] continuance are 
sufficiently wide to allow of other systems, should this one prove 
unsuited to a Federation. Except that Ministers must sit in 
Parliament, there seems no limit to the changes which might 
be made with the acquiescence of the Governor-General, in 
the method of appointment, tenure of office, or function." Cf. 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, chapter i., part i., 
paragraph 5. 



fellow-citizens ; considered his office hereditary ; 
and undertook to extend his functions in his own 
right, not by right of being the spokesman of a 
majority to whom he was responsible. 

At the time of the American Revolution the 
executive office in the British Isles was held in a 
way quite unlike the Teuton ideal, and local self- 
government had, owing to economic changes, sunk 
to a low level. The king and a few of the landed 
gentry controlled Parliament and the election of a 
large proportion of its members. 1 When, therefore, 
the Americans framed their system of government, 
they had before them an executive example on 
which they wished to improve. They accordingly 
created a king who could not initiate or prevent 
legislation ; who was automatically recalled every 
four years ; and who, in common with all other 
citizens, held no title that could be inherited. 
Most of the state governments, affected by the 
same ideas, have gone further. They have even 
taken from the executive the appointment of 
judges, making them also elective, though a few 
states and the national government continue the 
system of appointing the judiciary through the 
executive. Further checks to the president's power 
were devised in making his appointments to the 
executive and judicial services as well as his 
negotiations of treaties subject to confirmation by 
the Senate. Thus the American president is a 
modified eighteenth- century British king. 

After America had become independent and had 

1 Woodrow Wilson, The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, 
p. 389, gives this lack of local self-government as one of the 
causes of the American Revolution. 


framed its federal government, the British Isles 
electorate gradually reasserted its power, and took 
back into the keeping of its elected representatives 
the control of executive affairs. 1 That return to 
earlier ideas has produced a spokesman who is 
elected for five years but may be, and usually is, 
recalled before the expiration of this term, — by the 
shifting opinion of the voters manifested in the 
votes of their representatives in Parliament. This 
spokesman is no longer called a king but a prime 
minister. " The imperial sovereignty which is 
exercised in the name of the King actually 
resides in the British Prime Minister, a gentle- 
man who holds his office at the pleasure of the 
majority of the British House of Commons." 2 
He and his associates, chosen from the members 
of Parliament, constitute a ministry, of which 
a portion is called the cabinet. It is this cabinet, 
this managing committee, that both executes the 
laws of the British Isles and takes charge of 
the legislation desired, supposedly, by a majority 
of the British voters. As the voters elect the 
members of Parliament and the latter elect the 
ministry, and as the ministry cannot continue in 
office in the face of an opposing majority in 
Parliament, this cabinet executive control is 
called a " responsible government," i.e. responsible 
directly to the people. 

1 Cf. Ency, Brit., vol. xx. pp. 845-849 ; and Britannica Year 
Book, London, 1913, pp. 491-497 and 480-482. 

2 F. S. Oliver, Alexander Hamilton : An Essay on American Union, 
London, 1906, p. 447. Students who are mystified by allusions 
to the "Crown," the "King in Council," and the "King has 
graciously consented," etc., should find the sentence above 
quoted a valuable explanation. 


In re-attaining the ideal of the Teuton spokes- 
man, America has made slight progress in theory, 
however much the American president has stood 
ready to take such position and however much he 
may have tried, despite the conservative form of 
constitution he works under, to perform the duties 
of such an office. Consequently, the American 
executive stands apart from the legislative power 
as the British executive stands near, and is part of, 
the legislative power. To the American executive 
and his cabinet, chosen not from Congress but 
from the country at large, is the explicit duty of 
administering, not of making, laws, except in so far 
as the veto power gives the president some share 
in checking legislation. But the instinct of the 
race still calls on the president, as though he were 
the spokesman of his nation, to assist the other 
representatives in making as well as executing the 
laws. Signs are not wanting that this same insist- 
ence of the voters may bring the American exec- 
utive back to the executive-legislative functions 
of the race's early spokesmen. At present the 
president can interpret the manner in which laws 
shall be administered, but if his interpretation 
conflicts with the wishes of Congress, it can pass 
new enactments not susceptible to such interpreta- 
tion. Hence, practically the president can influence 
legislation only by his personal force working on 
Congress, or by his use of the patronage to induce 
congressmen to take action in accord with his 
opinion of the national will. There results a 
possibility of the use of patronage disastrous to 
the administrative efficiency of the nation. To 
meet this disastrous use of the patronage, American 


public opinion has demanded the " merit system " 
of appointment of all administrative officials of less 
station than those political agents who must be in 
sympathy with the political ideas from time to time 
in the ascendant, as expressed by political parties. 
Recognizing this need for efficiency in administra- 
tive subordinates, American presidents find it 
difficult to utilize the merit system of appointment 
and at the same time forward desired legislation. 
The personal power of the president backed by 
popular opinion is, however, still a force to be 
reckoned with by Congress. Through this power 
he is able to carry out in part at least the de- 
mand made by these political descendants of 
the Teutons that their spokesman, and all other 
representatives, shall carry out the legislation the 
voters require. 

Although Alexander Hamilton was unable to 
obtain a realization of his desires to see the 
cabinet officers entitled to seats in Congress, the 
president is called on by the written Constitution 
to report to Congress on " the state of the Union, 
and recommend to their consideration such measures 
as he shall judge necessary and expedient." 1 In 
reality he does more, and in accordance with the work- 
ing Constitution actually furthers the legislative pro- 
gramme called for by his party's majority. He may, 
if the instincts of American public opinion demand 
it, easily evolve into a responsible spokesman with 
other administrative officers about him, much after 
the similitude of a British responsible cabinet 
ministry. How this may occur by change in 
either the working or the written Constitution, 

1 Constitution of the United States,, art. ii. sec. 3. 


or both, it is unnecessary here to elaborate. 
Enough to show that this present difference in 
the American and British executives is a result of 
historical conditions working in both branches of 
the race. 

The representatives who carry out the political 
will of a Pan-Angle nation are called in America 
the Administration and in the other six nations 
the Government. This diversity of terminology 
may produce misunderstanding, as in the case 
of " constitution " — the more so as " government " 
has another meaning common to all Pan-Angles, 
viz. control of peoples. 1 A proverbial Irishman 
landed in America is asked with which party he 
sympathizes, and retorts that he is " against the 
Government." He means probably that he is 
opposed to the ministry of the day in the British 
Isles — in short, sympathizes with some Opposition 
ideas. The American hearer, unaccustomed to 
the word in this specialized sense, may be astonished 
at what seems an outburst of anarchy. Later our 
Irishman, become an American, would reply to 
the same question about his politics, that he was, 
or was not, in favour of the Administration. But 
whichever term is used, Administration or Govern- 
ment, it refers alike to those elected representatives 
who, by the use of their own discretion, or following 
the instruction of their voters, or by a combination 

1 Woodrow Wilson, The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, 
p. 572: "Government, in its last analysis, is organized 
force. . . . The machinery of government necessary to such 
an organization consists of instrumentalities fitted to enforce 
in the conduct of the common affairs of the community the will 
of the sovereign men : the sovereign minority, or the sovereign 


of both methods, conduct the executive business 
of their nation. 

Because the seven Pan-Angle nations are similar 
in their forms of government they are in a position 
to establish a common government. All take for 
granted the same theories and practically the same 
procedures. Because these theories and procedures 
work successfully as they are applied to the 
government of each nation, Pan- Angles will be 
predisposed to believe that they will work when 
applied to a government of the whole race. 



Danger may arise to menace the Pan- Angle 
civilization from three sources : from within any 
of the seven groups ; from between any of the 
groups ; or from outside civilizations. 

The first of these sources exists in every body 
politic. Civil discord whenever it becomes active 
must be cured as it develops — from within. The 
soundness of a nation lies in its ability to cope 
with internal disorder and still maintain its integ- 
rity before the world. Any interference, however 
kindly meant, only exasperates those on the spot. 
No Britisher, for example, can improve the situa- 
tion in South Africa by sympathizing with 
" Hindus " that South Africa does not want. 1 
And especially is it true among Pan- Angles to 
whom local self-government is instinctive, that 

1 The Times, London, November 28, 1913, Cape Town 
despatch concerning Lord Hardinge's speech at Madras, 
November 26, in reference to treatment of Indians in South 
Africa states : " After criticizing severely several passages in 
the speech, the Cape Times, referring to the suggestion that the 
Imperial Government should intervene in South Africa, utters 
the warning that this way madness lies." 


each political entity must look to the order of its 
own household. 

The second source of danger is more grave. 
As long as the seven nations remain in real 
or hazily defined independence of each other 
frictions are bound to arise. These frictions 
may grow from the competitions of commerce. 
They may cause reprisals of commerce. Com- 
merce affords the quickest attack on a nation's 
standard of living. Those who abhor war often 
overlook the fact that trade reprisal may also 
produce similar inexpressible suffering. The 
frictions of commerce in the thirteen American 
nations in the eighteenth century, the similar 
discords in Australia before 1900, and in South 
Africa before 1910, point the same lesson — an 
adequate central government to adjust such differ- 
ences. While lacking such an adequate central 
government for the seven Pan-Angle nations, our 
only recourse when interests conflict is to our 
mutual forbearance. 

Within a nation a government hales offenders 
before a court empowered to enforce its decisions. 
Between nations there is no such tribunal. A 
court is " a body in the government to which the 
public administration of justice is delegated." 1 
This presupposes in the court power to bring 
parties before it ; a law governing the case ; and 
power to enforce a decision. The Hague Tribunal 
or any other existing so-called " international 

1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawle's revision, Boston, 1897, 


arbitration court " has no one of these three attri- 
butes. It is no court at all. Any body of pre- 
sumably well-intentioned persons anywhere can 
listen to a dispute and give advice. This is all 
the Hague Tribunal, for all its name, can do. 
The contending parties can take the advice or not 
as they like. No parties can be compelled to 
appear before this non-governmental body ; no one 
can know beforehand, except by frangible mutual 
agreement with his opponents and with the 
" court," what rules are to govern the decision ; 
and on no party can a decision be enforced. " In 
international affairs the primitive rule, that * might 
is right ' still holds good, for either side to a quarrel 
can insist on a resort to force. In the outer void 
of world politics there is no reign of law, for there 
is no law-maker ; there is no assured justice, for 
there is no judge ; there is no safety for the 
weak, for there are no police to whom they can 

" Why is this ? It is because no nation is 
willing to submit its destinies to a tribunal over 
which it has no control, or to surrender its arma- 
ments to a world authority which will use them 
to enforce some international code of its own 
creation. " 1 

Inter-Pan- Angle frictions in the past have been 
numerous, the American Revolution being merely 
the most disastrous. Troubles that have arisen 

1 Round Table, London, February 1911, pp. 107-108; cf. also 
Round Table, December 1912, p. 29: "Arbitration is no cure 
for war so long as there is no agreement between nations to 
substitute arbitration for war, and no power strong enough to 
enforce such an agreement if made." 


between the British Isles and Canada and between 
the British Isles and the United States since the 
peace of 1814 may be passed over because more 
happily terminated. 1 Other of the nations have 
likewise had their family quarrels with the British 
Isles. Three years before the Boer War, a South 
African wrote : " The most powerful factor which 
makes for disunion at present is the interference 
of the British Government in the internal affairs 
of South Africa. . . . England's periods of active 
interference in South Africa have always been 
disastrous to herself and to South Africa — indeed 
the present troubles may all be traced directly to 
Lord Carnarvon's attempt to force his policy on 
South Africa." 2 Twelve years later, the Boer War 
being over, and the union of the four South African 
provinces being not yet accomplished, another 
South African wrote : " Directly after [after the 
Chinese indentured labourers in the Transvaal were 
1 freed ' by the British Isles Government] 3 came 
the Zulu rebellion in Natal, and so enraged were 
the South African colonies, so bitter and so angry 
with the Home Government, that, had it been 
possible, they would have broken away. Given 
another crisis of the kind in more prosperous times, 
and the British will go solid with the Dutch for 
independence and a Republic." 4 The same dangers 
lurked in the recent suggestion that the British 

1 For an account of some of these discords, cf H. C. Lodge, 
One Hundred Years of Peace, New York, 1913 ; also Round Table, 
London, December 1913, pp. 106-122. 

2 P. A. Molteno, A Federal South Africa, London, 1 896, p. viii. 

3 Concerning these Chinese coolies, cf. Ency. Brit., vol. xxv. 
p. 481. 

4 M. C. Bruce, The New Transvaal, London, 1908, p. 111. 


Isles should interfere in South Africa in reference 
to Asiatic Indians in Natal. 

Nor is it alone in the realms of legislation and 
administration where partisan politics may be 
factors that such frictions arise. The Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council of the British 
Isles is still, however rarely used, the supreme 
appellate court for the five over-seas Britannic 
nations. Against its fitness for the position, the 
Court of Appeal of New Zealand in 1903 passed 
formal and deliberate resolutions — reading, in part, 
as follows : " That the decisions of this Court 
should continue to be subject to review by a 
higher Court is of the utmost importance. The 
knowledge that a decision can be reviewed is good 
alike for Judges and litigants. Whether, however, 
they should be reviewed by the Judicial Committee 
as at present constituted is a question worthy of 
consideration. That Court, by its imputations in 
the present case, by the ignorance it has shown in 
this and other cases of our history, of our legisla- 
tion and of our practice, and by its long-delayed 
judgments, has displayed every characteristic of an 
alien tribunal. If we have spoken strongly it is 
because we feel deeply. And we speak under 
grievous and unexampled provocation." 1 It is 
inevitable that different political groups without 

1 (t Proceedings in the Court of Appeal of New Zealand with 
reference to comments made upon that Court by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Wall is and 
Others, Appellants, and His Majesty's Solicitor-General for the 
Colony of New Zealand, Respondent. Together with the Judg- 
ments of the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council in the same 
Case," Dunedin [New Zealand], 1903, p. 28. 


more adequate cohesion than sentiment and shift- 
ing political desires should have had such family 
quarrels. It is unnecessary here to quote other 
instances from the past. 

To-day's inter-Pan- Angle frictions are the inevit- 
able results of the inter-national conflicts of local 
national policies. Some of them are trivial ; others, 
vital. And from even trivial questions improperly 
handled grow wars. "A White Australia," " No 
Indians for the Transvaal," " No Hindus for British 
Columbia," * are familiar slogans suggesting all sorts 
of possible disagreements for the settlement of 
which there is no court in existence. The ques- 
tions of Asiatic migrations are not trivial to the six 
nations exasperated thereby. Yet even if all these 
questions were removed, there would remain many 
opportunities for discord still unadjusted. For the 
six Britannic nations Downing Street is the only 
medium for adjusting such discords. And the lack 
of power behind the decrees of Downing Street 
results in an accumulation of makeshifts that is 
provocative of future troubles. 

Between the United States and the British Isles 
the Monroe Doctrine has at times bulked large as 
a possible source of disagreement. The question 
of Panama Canal tolls has recently rasped these 
nations' amiability. It is worth while to examine 
into these trouble breeders and to see how the situ- 
ations would be altered if the two countries were 

1 " Hindus" (an unfortunate application of a religious creed- 
name to a people) who had been admitted to the Philippines 
and who sailed from Manila to San Francisco were debarred 
entrance to United States, according to Springfield (Massa- 
chusetts) Weekly Republican, December 11, 1913. 


treating not as independent units but as parties to 
a huge federation. 

The Monroe Doctrine was dictated to American 
statesmen by the fear of Europe. To the people 
of the United States its maintenance has meant 
safety from aggression. It has lived by their sanc- 
tion alone. " It would have been forgotten within 
60 days after President Monroe first formulated 
it in a presidential message if it had not met with a 
response in popular feeling. . . . the popular feel- 
ing existed long before Monroe was president, for 
Jefferson stated principles of foreign policy which 
embodied the ideas associated now for 90 years 
with Monroe's name. ... And thus America has 
always, down to the present crisis with Mexico, 
followed the national instinct concerning entangle- 
ments on its own part in Europe's affairs, and 
interferences on Europe's part in the affairs of this 
hemisphere." ..." Whenever a specific issue arises 
in our relations with Latin- America, a practical test 
of what the public feeling in this country amounts 
to is offered. Our history for the past dozen years 
abounds in ' incidents ' that revealed the public 
temper. It is certain that whenever such a test 
has been made in the Latin-American states around 
the Caribbean Sea, the fear of the jealousy of Euro- 
pean encroachment manifests itself instantly and 
warns the administration of the day what the 
people expect the government to do. The Monroe 
doctrine, or the idea, feeling or instinct upon which 
it is based, thus is repeatedly referred to the people 
for a fresh expression of their sentiment, and there 
is no prospect that it will become an obsolete 
feature of our foreign policy so long as these re- 


current tests find the people vitally interested in 
its preservation." 1 

The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, what- 
ever it may mean, is to the American voter what 
the maintenance of a Big Fleet, whatever the size 
may be, is to the British voter. A Britannic 
authority thus expresses the feelings of the average 
Britisher : " Our ' man on the omnibus ' has never 
failed as yet to respond to an agitation on behalf 
of the Fleet. He did so instantly in 1909, and he 
will always do so again. Given a serious division 
between the parties on the naval question, there 
can be no doubt which will win. . . . Whenever 
the controversy is taken to the country, the country 
decides for the larger Fleet." 2 The American 
Monroe Doctrine and the British Big Fleet are the 
outcome of the instinctive fears Pan- Angles hold 
towards Europe. 

The Monroe Doctrine was not designed as a 
weapon against the British Isles any more than the 
Big Fleet is built to fight American ships. The 
older country was in hearty agreement with 
President Monroe's original pronouncement. " In- 
deed it was Canning's policy, summed up three 
years later by his famous reference to the necessity 
of calling the New World into existence to restore 
the balance of the Old." 3 As long, however, as 
the British Isles remains an outsider it falls within 
the definition of "any European power" of the 
message, just as there is nothing to prevent the 

1 Springjield (Massachusetts) Weekly Republican, November 27, 
1913 : "The Monroe Doctrine Today." 

2 Round Table, London, September 1913, p. 680. 

3 Cf. Ency. Brit., vol. xviii. p. 739. 


United States, as long as it remains an outsider, 
from suffering from the strength of the Big 

The two countries are independent now and 
must in the last resort each protect itself from 
the other, however much they may prefer friend- 
ship. As members of a federation each would 
be spared the necessity of self-protection against 
the other. In such event the Monroe Doctrine 
would apply to non-Pan-Angles only and the 
Fleet would be the instrument by which it was 

The question of Canal tolls to many Americans 
to-day is a matter of only national, not international, 
politics. They believe tolls should be paid for 
Canal privileges. They also, however, seek a means 
of lowering transcontinental freight rates. As 
only American ships are allowed by law to engage 
in American coastwise trade, these are the only 
competitors of the railroads. To free such ships 
from Canal tolls might be a means toward lowering 
transcontinental freight rates. Those Americans 
who so believe are pleased if the Hay-Pauncefoote 
treaty seems to allow an interpretation favourable 
to their purpose. Other Americans believe no 
such interpretation possible, whatever the problems 
of national economics. To both, however, outside 
criticism of " violation of treaty " may induce 
merely the exasperation that leads to refusal to 
discuss the question. 

The difficulty, as our nations are now organized, 
is that a question of mutual interest is decided by 
the majority in power in one of the nations. In 
the present instance it was the United States that 


controlled the situation. The United States de- 
cided. Afterwards the British Isles might, if it 
wished, protest in terms of whatever mildness or 
vigour its public policy dictated. The British 
Government has shown itself forbearing. It pro- 
tested but did not press its claims in terms in- 
compatible with peaceful relations. The American 
government, unantagonized, was left in a mood to 
review the matter and, as seems probable, to alter 
its previous decision. In some other matter the 
tables may be reversed. The British Isles may 
hold in its power the solution of some question of 
interest to the United States. And the United 
States may have only the opportunity to remon- 
strate in its turn against what it considers an " un- 
fair " interpretation of a treaty. Such remonstrance 
is apt to be tinged with hostility, the thing we wish 
most of all to avoid. Having no common govern- 
ment, the two nations have no court to decide the 
case. Were they members of a federation, such 
machinery would be established and in constant 
working order. 

Separate political existences of seven Pan- Angle 
nations do not make for peace. If for us is coming 
the great millennium, so sweetly dreamed of by so 
many, it will not come the sooner by perpetuating 
opportunities for discord. A common government 
over Pan- Angles would be copying what we have 
already done successfully in smaller " closer unions." 
Before the formation of one of these, it was stated : 
" Three choices therefore lie before the people of 
South Africa. The make-shift regime of the High 
Commissioner, the jarring separation of the States 
of South America, the noble union of the States of 



North America." 1 This might be paraphrased. 
Three choices lie before the Pan- Angles : the 
make-shift regime of Downing Street and the 
gambling uncertainties of arbitration boards, the 
jarring separation we have known in our past, the 
noble method of union which our race has evolved, 
tested, and in four separate nations adopted. By 
solving our inter-national differences of opinion in 
a federal government we can husband our strength 
for self-defence as a united power against other 

Despite our self-esteem we are not the only 
civilization in the world. There are others who 
need land for their children, as much or more than 
we do. These others wish to see the world 
" bettered " by their ideas. If we are wise we shall 
recognize these foreign aspirations to be as normal 
as our own. As we have progressed other civiliza- 
tions have progressed, even though differently. 
And difference does not mean inferiority. Once 
we could believe that our rivals, personal, national, 
or racial, were bad because different ; but nowadays 
we cannot call it wrong when others, less favourably 
situated than we in the sunshine of this world, 
strive like ourselves for comfort. " The tragedy 
of history is not the conflict between right and 
wrong, but the conflict between right and right." 
Each civilization knows it is right. Each is right 

1 A Review of the Present Mutual Relations of the British South 
African Colonies, to which is appended a Memorandum on South 
African Railway Unification, " Printed by Authority " [Johannes- 
burg, 1907]; Lord Selborne's letter of January 1, 1907, p. viii. 


till another civilization is proved to be not only 
right, but better. A civilization is better than 
ours if it shall prove its people able to conquer our 
people — through cutting off our food by more re- 
sourceful trading, thriftier living, or war. As it has 
always been since the Pan-Angles were a people, 
the world is now an inter-civilization competition 
selecting the fittest to survive. 

Four nations of men, white like ourselves and 
holding some of the same ideals, have been in the 
past our life and death rivals. Spain, Portugal, 
Holland, and France all were great before we were. 
They discovered and pre-empted a large part of 
the world. To the shores of almost every one of 
the seven Pan-Angle nations their keels have come 
with intent to seize land. Our rivals often suc- 
ceeded and held the land for a time until we grew 
strong enough to take it from them. Our struggles 
against these out-run powers make thrilling stories, 
for they tested the courage, the resources, and the 
tenacity of the Pan- Angle victors. 

Portugal and Spain once shared between them 
the seas of the world — according to a Pope's decree. 
They raced in opposite directions to see which first 
should reach the Antipodes. Macao and Manila, 
lying opposite each other, show where the two 
routes terminated. To-day Spain holds no land 
outside of Europe except the Canaries and odd 
inconsequential bits of Africa. From before the 
days of the Armada to the conclusion of the 
Spanish -American War, Pan -Angles have been 
plundering Spain. Some of the spoils they kept 
for themselves, some they gave away. The 
Ladrones in a recent division were allotted to 


Germany. Portugal holds more extensive re- 
minders of its former empire. The Azores, the 
Cape Verdes, Timor and Goa, and strips of East 
and West Africa show where that nation was once 
supreme. Both the African areas are bordered by 
Pan- Angle and German holdings, and it requires 
no shrewd forecasting to predict their future. 1 

Holland holds the Dutch East Indies — a 
dependency huge in extent and population as 
compared to the tiny European state, 2 but small 
compared to the lands adapted for true coloniza- 
tion, long ago relinquished. Holland holds also 
certain remnants in the Western Hemisphere, 
as Spain and Portugal do not. But like Spain 
and Portugal, Holland holds these dependencies 
not by virtue of its own strength, but by 
virtue of the matched strength of others, the 
balance of power leaving Holland for the present 

France, the most recent of these four rivals of 
the Pan-Angles, to-day holds dependencies of 

1 Sir Harry H. Johnston in Nineteenth Century, London, March 
1912, questions the appropriateness of leaving these dependencies 
in the care of Portugal. CJ., thirteen months later, Springjleld 
(Massachusetts) Weekly Republican, June 12, 1913: " That some- 
thing is brewing in the way of a partition of Portuguese Africa 
seems likely despite official disclaimers, and the London Spectator 
now sketches a hypothetical division. ..." Cf. Transvaal Leader, 
Johannesburg, December 5, 1912, for an account of Lourenco 
Marques' ' ' warning against the neglectful attitude of the Home 
[Lisbon] Government toward this Colony." 

2 The ratio of the population of British India to the British 
Isles is approximately 7 to 1. A like ratio exists between the 
populations of the Dutch Indies and Holland. CJ. A. Cabaton, 
Java, Sumatra, and the other Islands of the Dutch East Indies, trans. 
Bernard Miall, London, 19 H, p. 26, 


greater area than those of the three other rivals 
combined. 1 Over lands on, or islands near, every 
continent, the French flag flies. Only the flags of 
the British Isles and of Russia are to-day further 
flung. No one feels confident of despoiling France 
at will, and the British Isles regards its late rival as 
an effective ally. Yet the French hold no true 
colonies, lands in which France grows again in a 
new life. Canada and Louisiana are now the 
nurseries of a vigorous Pan-Angle stock. 

Towards these four out-run powers we harbour 
no unfriendly sentiments. They, alone or com- 
bined, can no longer hurt us. We have grown so 
large and control so vast an area and population 
that we forget that these rivals once threatened 
our existence. The place-names they gave and 
many of their words, now part of the English 
language, hardly recall the old struggles. So 
thoroughly have we taken the lands they claimed, 
that with our own history we associate such names 
as Columbus, Da Gama, Magellan, Van Diemen, 
Tasman, Champlain, and La Salle. With our 
former competitors we can make alliances, if we 
wish, for the sake of guarding them and ourselves 
from the powers that loom out of the future. 

But because of such friendly alliances we must 
not lose sight of the truth. Our present supremacy 
we hold not by the courtesy of these our former 
rivals, but by the might of our forefathers, who 
by their strength procured lands for us. The past 
secured to us the present. The visible method 
was war. " Between the [English] Revolution and 

1 George Philip & Son Ltd., Chamber of Commerce Atlas, 
London, 1912, p. 32. 


the Battle of Waterloo, it may be reckoned that 
we waged seven great wars, of which the shortest 
lasted seven years and the longest about twelve. 
Out of a hundred and twenty-six years, sixty-four 
years, or more than half, were spent in war." 1 At 
the end of these wars the Pan-Angles had outrun 
their rivals. 2 That century and a quarter witnessed 
the steady extension of the Pan- Angle control in 
North America. " The struggle was literally world- 
wide. Red men scalped each other by the Great 
Lakes of North America, and black men fought in 
Senegal in Africa ; while Frenchmen and English- 
men grappled in India as well as in Germany, and 
their fleets engaged on every sea. The most tre- 
mendous and showy battles took place in Germany ; 
and, though the real importance of the struggle lay 
outside Europe, still the European conflict in the 
main decided the wider results. William Pitt, the 
English minister, who was working to build up the 
great British empire, declared that in Germany 
he would conquer America from France. He did 
so." 3 Taxation in Massachusetts during one of 
the years of this war was equivalent to an income 
tax of 66 per cent. 4 After Waterloo for over half 
a century this extension continued. In this 
struggle for our world domination, in which 
American and Britannic Pan-Angles each did their 
share, we showed we were fighters. We fought to 
win. We won. 

1 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, London, 1883, p. 20. 

2 CJ. W. M. West, Modern History, Boston, rev. ed., 1907, 
pp. 300-301. 

3 Ibid., pp. 294, 295. 

4 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, p. 95. 
This was as of 1758. 


During and after our struggles with these four 
white nations, we have had lesser struggles with 
peoples of other colours. Our successes in these 
struggles have added to our self-satisfaction. Thus 
far our efforts against the red, brown, and black 
have not been too great for us. In America the 
red man had land we needed ; we drove him out. 
In New Zealand the brown man's country was one 
we could thrive in ; we installed ourselves there. 
In India and through the East the brown man had 
rich territories ; we subdued him, we helped him 
to increase in numbers, we sold him more of our 
goods. The same can be said of the blacks in 
various tropical regions. In Australia the black 
man had lands suitable for whites, and we occupied 
them. In South Africa we have done the same, 
and, though the possession of the whites is hardly 
as yet undisputed, we bear there as elsewhere a 
mien of self-reliant superiority. 

Our successes have brought us the material 
benefits we see in the well-fed prosperity of our 
peoples. The non-material benefits it is difficult 
to estimate. So naturally do we accept both, that 
the thoughtless among us assume such comfort to 
be the normal lot of good people such as we are. 
We are content with our present portion — the 
best the world provides — and would counsel others 
to be content with theirs. We think we are a 
peaceful people, and deprecate as bad form the 
huge expenditures made by European nations for 
military and naval preparations. Some Americans 
contemplate their small army as though their 
nation were by that proved virtuous, much as 
though the learned Babu, contemplating the fur- 


clad Eskimo, should pride himself on his own 
tropical attire. Like the sons of wealthy shop- 
keepers who disdain to demean themselves by 
trading, we Pan- Angles forget sometimes on what 
harsh foundations was laid our present exemption 
from harshness. 

Apart from its short- visioned inconsistency, this 
attitude may betray us into dangers. The English- 
speaking peoples have fallen into a sense of security, 
assuming the continuance of our present peace as 
the normal condition of affairs. We pride our- 
selves that we mind our own business with success. 
And from minding it for so long, and with so slight 
a chance of having it disarranged by outsiders, we 
have grown accustomed to pursue without doubts 
our way to greater individual freedom. We are 
oblivious sometimes of the fact that all our efforts 
for greater individual freedom are of no avail if 
some other nation may deprive us of the where- 
withal to individualize : — our land, our trade, and 
our political system. " To live well a people must 
first live ; and an ideal that ignores the primary 
conditions of national existence is a castle in the 
air." 1 

Since the throes of the eighteenth century, North 
America has been developed and Australia and 
New Zealand have prepared themselves for large 
populations — all undisturbed by fear of invasions. 
In these newer countries have been nurtured many 
of the ideals of the race. There, have been tested 
not only the federal idea, but also many political 
and social reforms, such as those whose names are 
associated with Australasia, but which find a con- 

1 Round Table, London, June2l913,£p/485. 


genial habitat in other branches of the race. In 
peace we have thus been aiding each other, as we 
have so often in war. And it is well for us that 
this reign of peace has continued so long, not merely 
because peace is to be desired, but because of the 
strength it allows to accumulate for struggles to 
come. That this long peace is unusual, that 
struggles will come, history teaches. 

Tacitus tells us of a Teuton tribe, "just and 
upright." " Unmolested by their neighbors, they 
enjoyed the sweets of peace, forgetting that amidst 
powerful and ambitious neighbors the repose, 
which you enjoy, serves only to lull you into a 
calm, always pleasing, but deceitful in the end. 
When the sword is drawn, and the power of the 
strongest is to decide, you talk in vain of equity 
and moderation : those virtues always belong to the 
conqueror. Thus it happened to the Cheruscans : 
they were formerly just and upright; at present 
they are called fools and cowards." 1 

We, unmolested by our neighbours, are now 
enjoying " the sweets of peace." Is there anything 
we are forgetting ? Are we backing the Pax 
Britannica and the Pax Americana with sufficient 
power to ensure their maintenance ? Shall we con- 
tinue to be called "just and upright " ? 

We still have land to which to extend our popu- 
lation. Our prosperity is still undimmed. No one 
is our proved superior in civilization. Recent wars 
have not contributed to our military reputation, 
but our faith in our naval superiority has not been 
shaken and our pride of race intensifies. 

1 Arthur Murphy, The Works of Cornelius Tacitus, London, 1793, 
vol. iv. p. 35. 


Yet slowly a consciousness is creeping over us 
by way now of London, now of Brisbane, now of 
Durban, or again of Vancouver or San Francisco, 
that all is not as safe for us as it once was. Once 
we could afford to squabble a bit in the family ; 
now we feel we must stop such silly behaviour. 
To all of us has come this feeling. It is not merely 
the appearance of Germany in the North Sea or 
the South Pacific, nor the desire of Asiatic Indian 
coolies for entrance to the Transvaal, nor the 
willingness of these and other Asiatics to share with 
us the wealth of North America. These are but 
signs. They forebode coming dangers whose extent 
we cannot foresee. 

Out of the future loom menacing forms, hardly 
more tangible and comprehensible to us than were 
the Teutonic hordes to the Romans. What latent 
energies lie hidden in the north and east we can 
only fearfully surmise. There, perhaps, are peoples 
multitudinous in numbers and unmeasured in 
resources. Their faiths and ideals are not ours. 
To be subject to them would be no illusion. 

Across the north of Europe and Asia stretches 
Russia — a land of eight and one-half million square 
miles, 1 larger than all the Pan- Angle area were 
either Australia, Canada or the United States 
omitted from the total. 2 Its population of 
163,000,000 s outnumbers the Pan- Angle whites 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. xxiii. p. 870 : " The Russian empire stretches 
over a vast territory in E. Europe and N. Asia, with an area ex- 
ceeding 8,660,000 sq. m., or one-sixth of the land surface of the 
globe. ..." 

2 Cf. ante, p. 81, note 1. 

3 H. P. Kennard, comp. and ed., The Russian Yearbook for 
1912, London, 1912, p. 46. This is as of 1 910 census. 


by 22,000,000/ Russia is self-supporting in that 
within its borders are food and fuel for years to 
come. In Siberia are ample coal and iron fields. 
Petroleum, of such growing importance in these 
days of aerial navigation, Russia has in plenty. The 
growth of the Russian power has been practically 
simultaneous with that of the Pan- Angles, for in 
1913 was celebrated the third centenary of Romanoff 
rule. What was once the small state of Muscovy 
has extended its borders and pushed back its frontier, 
until now it presents by far the largest stretch of 
contiguous territory under one rule in the world. 
It has, moreover, room for internal development. 
Only the fighting edges of Siberia are filled with 
settlers, most of them ex-soldiers and their 
families. The interior is scantily populated against 
the time when the advance of the frontier shall 
be checked. 

The significance of this growth has not been 
ignored in Europe. Statesmen have acted or have 
feared to act according to their conjectures of 
Russian desires and powers. For years Russia has 
been, and indeed still is, the bugbear of the British 
on the Indian and Persian frontiers. Urged by 
the British Isles, Japan, fighting for its very 
existence, checked Russia. The resulting loss to 
that country was insignificant. It could receive 
many such checks and still be a formidable rival. 
Russia's success against Pan-Angles would mean 
not only to them the material loss of lands and 
food, but to the whole world the loss of some 
measure of individual liberty, for the unity and 
strength of that great country are founded on 

1 Cf. ante, p. 81, note 1. 


characteristics the antitheses of those which make 
the Pan- Angles great. 

But a danger greater than Russia has thrown its 
shadow in our path. The white race once felt 
assured that it was the chosen race among mankind. 
It met the red, brown, and black races never to its 
own ultimate disadvantage, and often, it was con- 
vinced, for their good. It felt a similar destiny 
toward the yellow races. It insisted that they 
open their doors to the white man's trade and took 
them to school in the white man's ways. Now the 
white race apprehensively wonders if it has made 
a mistake, if destiny is at last on the other side. 

China is the wonder of history, both ancient and 
modern. Civilization after civilization has battered 
at its gates, taken some trifle only to lose it, and 
has departed. Chinese civilization has continued 
unharmed by its transient rivals. Each of these 
rivals has pondered over China's strangeness, and 
has failed to impress foreign ideals on its people. 
The Arab, Malay, Portuguese, Dutch, French, 
English, American, German, and now the Japanese 
and the Russian people, have taken trifles. Of 
these Macao, French Cochin- China, Hong Kong, 
Shanghai, Kiaochow, Wei-Hai- Wei, Formosa, and 
Tibet are modern examples. How long it will be 
before these land-takings revert to the Celestial 
Empire remains to be seen. "The old negative, 
anti-foreign prejudice is giving way to a positive 
sentiment of national ambition. With a population 
— according to the last census — of over 430,000,000 
of the cheapest and most industrious workers in 
the world, China is bound sooner or later to 
dominate the East, unless she becomes divided 


against herself. And this the pressure from the 
greedy competition of foreign powers seems certain 
to prevent." x 

To-day China is perhaps to become definitely 
a republic. No one knows what China can or will 
do. The white race realizes that its problem now 
is no longer how to distribute among its nations 
the lands of the yellow races, but how to prevent 
the yellow races from distributing its lands among 
themselves. Men who can endure arctic cold and 
tropical heat with like fortitude and profit, may 
soon become a factor in the defensive problem of 
the Pan- Angles. 

" The history of China, ancient and modern, is 
an eternal series of paroxysms ; its keynote is 
bloodshed and famine, with periods of peace and 
prosperity purchased by the slaughter of countless 
innocents. Its splendid civilization, based on an 
unassailable moral philosophy and the canons of 
the Sages, has ever proved powerless against the 
inexorable laws of nature, the pitiless cruelty of the 
struggle for life. . . . " 2 It seems not impossible that 
the Chinese may seek to ameliorate their condition, 
to lessen "the pitiless cruelty of the struggle for 
life" by overflowing into the lands now held by 
the Pan- Angles. By what means could we save 
ourselves from being crushed before the advance 
of a people our superiors in thrift and industry and 
in ability to render the soil productive, and who are 
three times our number ? 

1 Bound Table, London, February 19H> p. 140. 

2 E. Backhouse and J. O. P. Bland, "Secret Annals of the 
Manchu Court," in Atlantic Monthly, Boston, December 1913, 
p. 767. 


Russia and China may be the active foes of our 
children. We can bequeath them only such aid in 
their struggle as our foresight dictates. Meanwhile 
we have problems of our own demanding more 
immediate solution. 

Russia and China are the rivals of to-morrow. 

Japan and Germany are the rivals of to-day. 

To Japan the Pan- Angles should doff their hats 
as to their peers. Radically different, they are 
not our inferiors. Japan has forged ahead materi- 
ally at a rate that Pan- Angles have never in their 
history approached. In 1853, when the American 
Pan- Angle Admiral Perry forced foreign commerce 
on Japan, the land was a feudal area given over 
to devastating civil wars. The privileges that the 
white races after 1853 exacted have been gradually 
and entirely taken back. Japan now stands as 
a world power. Its people are increasing rapidly. 
It builds its own ships. The three fastest merchant 
steamers on the Pacific to-day are Japanese. 1 No 
one forgets, and it is hoped that no Pan- Angle 
underestimates, the medical ability and the discipline 
that backed the bravery and the patriotic spirit of 
the Japanese in their life-and-death struggle against 
Russia. The Japanese have taken Formosa and 
Korea from China, and have held the last-named 
acquisition against Russia, taking also from Russia 
the southern half of Sakhalin. As Scotland, 
Wales, and England have been called Great 
Britain, so the Japanese have called their home 
group " Dai Nippon," Great Japan. 

Japan, the Dai Nippon group of islands, has a 

1 Toyo Kisen Kaisha (Oriental Steamship Company) boats 
Shinyo Maru, Chiyo Maru, and Tenyo Maru. 


geographical area of about 150,000 square miles, 
or three-quarters the size of Germany, or slightly- 
greater than the area of the British Isles. Its 
population of forty-nine millions is three-quarters 
that of Germany, or about one-ninth more than 
that of the British Isles, or five-sixths that of the 
whites of the Britannic nations, or over one-third 
the white population of the Pan-Angle world. 
Although Formosa and Korea, and possible 
portions of Manchuria, are to be considered 
to-day as dependencies of Japan, the fact remains 
that Great Japan as a power, despite slight 
differences of dialect, contains a homogeneous 
people actuated by the same spirit. The population 
is now overburdening the land of Japan. Japan 
must have either more land or more trade in order 
to feed its people, or it must reduce its standard 
of living — or lesson the population by emigration. 

In Japan's search for more land, Asia offers few 
inducements. 1 From Japan to the west lies 
China, full to overflowing with people. From 
Japan to the north and north-west lies Russia- 
in-Asia under various names. Outside of Asia 
the allurements increase. From Japan to the 
southward lie the Philippines, now a Pan- Angle 
dependency, and the islands of the East Indies, — 
mostly Dutch, some German, one Portuguese, 
some French, and some Pan- Angle. This network 
of islands paves the route from Japan to almost 
empty Australia and fertile New Zealand. To 
the eastward, across the Pacific, lie the Hawaiian 
Islands, the key of the Pacific, containing 80,000 
Japanese, which is 45 per cent, of a population 

1 Cf. Round Table, London, May 1911, pp. 263-269. 


of which only a small per cent, are white. 1 Further 
to the eastward lie Alaska, British Columbia, and 
the Pacific Slope of America — all comparatively 
empty. Mexico contains Japanese to await there 
the tide of international events. South of the 
Panama Canal is a whole continent with its many 
open places. The Japanese are not a tropical 
people. They want temperate, arable lands. The 
best lands for Japan to annex are controlled by 
Pan- Angles. 

Preliminary to annexation in past histories has 
often gone occupation. But even if annexation 
by a foreign power is not to follow the occupation 
of our lands by any considerable number of aliens, 
who remain aliens loyal to a foreign power, our 
integrity and welfare are thereby seriously disturbed. 
Several of our groups are awakening to this fact. 
Alaska, British Columbia, and the Pacific Slope 
states on one side of the ocean, New Zealand and 
Australia on the other, and the Hawaiian Islands 
between, all find the problem of Japanese migration 
a live topic of practical politics. In every one of 
these places legislation has been enacted to dis- 
criminate against the Japanese. To both New 
Zealand and Australia, the nearness of Japan 
has been a stimulus toward undertaking means 
of self-protection, naval and military, since these 
countries have come to feel that the British navy 
does not furnish adequate protection to their 
exposed shores. He who looks into the conditions 
of exclusion of the Japanese from these Britannic 
and American shores will note the fact that the 

1 Cf. Springfield (Massachusetts) Weekly Republican, June 26, 
1913 ; and Britannica Year Book, London, 1913, p. 941. 


action of British Columbia, California, New 
Zealand, and Australia has at one time or 
another been in conflict with the treaties made 
by the larger political entity of which each 
respectively is a part. He will see how Australia 
and New Zealand have changed their legislation 
to accord with the letter, but not the spirit, of 
the Anglo - Japanese treaty, and how British 
Columbia and California have insisted on protecting 
themselves. 1 

As new areas of the Pan- Angle world are 
affected by the problem, such comment as the 
following appears : " A brisk controversy is going 
on in the South over the proposed colonization of 
Japanese in Florida. The newspapers of that state 
ridicule the alarm shown by Representative Clark ; 
the three or four Japanese seen in Jacksonville, 
says the Times-Union of that city, appear to be 
perfectly tame, and the editor concludes : 'It is 
not at all probable that many Japanese will ever 
wish to come to Florida, and we are willing that 
all who wish to come should come.' The New 
Orleans Times-Democrat is more pessimistic, and 
remarks : ' That, it will be remembered, was 
California's attitude not many years ago.'" 2 

In the solution of this problem, which relates 
not only to the Pacific but which is a problem of a 
civilization, we are aided by the Pan- Angle indi- 
vidualistic habit of each locality controlling its 
own local questions. " ' No one,' said the Premier 
of British Columbia the other day ... 'no one 

1 Cf. Round Table, London, February 1911, pp. 123-153. 

2 Springfield (Massachusetts) Weekly Republican, November 27, 



can question the supreme authority of the Legis- 
lature of British Columbia to deal with oriental 
immigration."' 1 In cases where no one does 
question such authority, the matter is promptly 
settled according to the wishes of the locality 
affected. If, on the other hand, any one does 
question such authority, the locality has, at least, 
by its insistence warned the whole race of its perils. 
Each such insistence offends the Asiatics. To 
those Pan- Angles concerned, it is becoming in- 
creasingly understood that the struggle has only 
just begun. 

The anti- Asiatic feeling has been expressed from 
Vancouver to Hobart, and from Auckland to 
Durban. Its utterance has been earnest and 
measured, bitter and extravagant, loud and long. 
A whole race would not in various corners of the 
earth so talk and act for no reason. It would be 
tedious here to catalogue the phrases ranging from 
mild to execrative. Nor can the credit be given 
to any special one of the Pan- Angle nations 
involved for moderation of statement or care in 
analysis of the problem. 

Enough here to quote a statement of one 2 who 
is known throughout the Pan- Angle world : " The 
question discussed ... is based . . . upon the 
Alien Land Bill recently passed by the California 
Legislature. Upon that particular measure I have 
no comment to make ; it is in fitter hands than 
mine. It is to ' the ultimate issue involved,' . . . 

1 Round Table, London, September 1913, p. 602. 

2 A. T. Mahan, "Japan among the Nations," a letter to 
the editor of The Times, in The Times Weekly Edition, London, 
June 27, 1913. 


that I direct my remarks. 'The ultimate issue 
involved ' . . . ' is whether Japan, who has made 
good her title to be treated on a footing of com- 
plete equality as one of the Great Powers of the 
world, is not also entitled to rank among the 
civilized nations whose citizens the American 
Republic is ready to welcome, subject to a few 
well-defined exceptions, within its fold whenever 
they are prepared to transfer their allegiance to it.' 
In brief, this means, I apprehend, whether the 
attainment by Japan of the position of a Great 
Power entitles her to claim for her citizens free 
immigration into the territories of any other Great 
Power, with accompanying naturalization. 

"... In my own appreciation there is no 
necessary connexion between a nation's status as 
a Great Power and her right to receive for her 
people the privileges of immigration and naturaliza- 
tion in the territory of another State ; and the 
reasonings adduced in support of the proposition 
seem to me defective, both in some of their asser- 
tions and still more so in ignoring certain con- 
spicuous facts. 

"Primary among these facts is that of the 
popular will, upon which, in the fundamental 
conceptions of both British and American govern- 
ment, the policy of a nation must rest. Be the 
causes what they may — economical, industrial, 
social, racial, or all four ; and if there be any other 
motives — the will of the people is the law of the 
Government. So far as that will has been 
expressed in America and in Canada it is distinctly 
contrary to the concession of such immigration. 
With the question of immigration that of naturali- 


zation is inextricably involved. There cannot be 
naturalization without immigration ; while immi- 
gration without concession of naturalization, though 
conceivable and possible, is contrary to the genius 
of American institutions, which, as a general pro- 
position, do not favour inhabitancy without right 
to citizenship. 

"Another tacit assumption is that changes of 
governmental methods change also natural char- 
acteristics, to such an extent as to affect radically 
those qualities which make for beneficial citizen- 
ship in a foreign country. Stated concretely, this 
means that the adoption of Western methods by 
Japan has in two generations so changed the 
Japanese racial characteristics as to make them 
readily assimilable with Europeans, so as to be 
easily absorbed. This the Japanese in their just 
pride of race would be the first to deny. It 
ignores also the whole background of European 
history, and the fact that European civilization 
(which includes America) grew up for untold 
centuries under influences of which Eastern Asia 
— including therein Japan — experienced nothing. 
The ' Foundations of the Twentieth Century,' are 
not only a succession of facts, or combination of 
factors. They are to be found chiefly in the 
moulding of character, national and individual, 
through sixty-odd generations. 

" It is, I conceive, this deep impress of prolonged 
common experience which constitutes the possibility 
of assimilation, even among the unhappy, poverty- 
stricken mass often coming to us, . . . Un- 
doubtedly they constitute a problem, but one 
with which the immense assimilative force of 


English institutions, especially when Americanized, 
has been able so far to deal successfully, and I 
believe will continue able. But there are those 
who greatly doubt whether, in view of the very 
different foundations of the Japanese 20th century, 
and of the recognized strength and tenacity of 
character of the Japanese people emphasized by 
strong racial marks, they could be so assimilated. 
We who so think — I am one — cordially recognize 
the great progresses of Japan and admire her 
achievements of the past half century, both civil 
and military ; but we do not perceive in them the 
promise of ready adaptability to the spirit of our 
own institutions which would render naturalization 
expedient ; and immigration, as I have said, with 
us implies naturalization. Whatever our doubts as 
to the effect upon national welfare of the presence 
of an unassimilable multitude of naturalized aliens, 
the presence of a like number of unnaturalized 
foreigners of the same type would be even worse. 

" The question is fundamentally that of assimila- 
tion, though it is idle to ignore that clear superficial 
evidences of difference, which inevitably sautent 
aux yeuoc, due to marked racial types, do exasperate 
the difficulty. Personally, I entirely reject any 
assumption or belief that my race is superior to the 
Chinese, or to the Japanese. My own suits me 
better, probably because I am used to it ; but I 
wholly disclaim, as unworthy of myself and of 
them, any thought of superiority. But with equal 
clearness I see and avow the difficulties of assimila- 
tion due to formative influences of divergent pasts 
and to race. . . . 

" Let me say here that ... is mistaken in the 


statement that the United States ' within living 
memory waged the greatest civil war of modern 
times in order to establish the claim of American 
negroes to equal right of citizenship with the white 
population.' With the statement falls necessarily 
his inference from it, that ' a colour bar cannot 
be logically pleaded as prohibitive.' The United 
States did not wage the War of Secession even for 
the abolition of slavery, still less for equal rights 
of citizenship. Gold win Smith, as a contemporary, 
held against us that the war, not being for abolition, 
was one of conquest. Lincoln said distinctly : — ' I 
will restore the union with slavery or without 
slavery, as best can be.' Myself a contemporary 
and partaker, I can affirm this as a general tone, 
though there was a strong minority of abolition 
sentiment. The abolition proclamation came 
18 months after the war began, and purely as a 
measure of policy. The full rights of citizenship 
came after the war ended, as a party political 
measure, though doubtless with this mingled much 
humanitarian feeling. Concerning this legislation 
a very acute American thinker, himself in the war, 
said to me within the past two years, * The great 
mistake of the men of that day was the unconscious 
assumption that the negro was a white man, with 
the accident of a black skin.' That is, the question 
was not one of colour, but of assimilation as involved 
in race character. Now, while recognizing what 
I clearly see to be the great superiority of the 
Japanese, as of the white over the negro, it appears 
to me reasonable that a great number of my fellow- 
citizens, knowing the problem we have in the 
coloured race among us, should dread the introduc- 


tion of what they believe will constitute another 
race problem ; and one much more difficult, because 
the virile qualities of the Japanese will still more 
successfully withstand assimilation, constituting a 
homogeneous foreign mass, naturally acting together 
irrespective of the national welfare, and so will 
be a perennial cause of friction with Japan, even 
more dangerous than at present. . . . 

[Here follows a personal appreciation of the 
Japanese as Admiral Mahan had known them for 
forty years, and to which most thoughtful Pan- 
Angles would gladly subscribe. He then con- 
cludes :] 

"... Despite gigantic success up to the pre- 
sent in assimilative processes — due to English 
institutions inherited and Americanized, and to 
the prevalence among the children of our com- 
munity of the common English tongue over all 
other idioms — America doubts her power to 
digest and assimilate the strong national and 
racial characteristics which distinguish the Japanese, 
which are the secret of much of their success, 
and which, if I am not mistaken, would constitute 
them continually a solid homogeneous body, essen- 
tially and unchangingly foreign." 

If there are, as Admiral Mahan suggests, good 
reasons why the Japanese should not be allowed 
to settle in Pan- Angle countries, those certainly 
form the best of reasons why the Pan- Angles 
should not allow themselves to occupy a position 
where Japan could demand of them this privilege 
for its subjects. 

But while Japanese immigration, for the present 
peaceful except in the field of economics, has been 


agitating the nations that border the Pacific, half 
way round the world other Pan- Angles have had 
nightmares of a military invasion. " Within 
twelve hours' steam of Essex and Lincolnshire 
is the port of Emden, recently adapted for the 
embarkation of large bodies of troops." 1 "The 
past need not concern us here. However serious 
the old scares may have been, at least they came 
and went, leaving a clear sky behind them when 
they had gone. But now the sky refuses to clear. 
The 'scare' of 1909, launched on that March 
afternoon when Sir Edward Grey told the House 
of Commons that, in view of German competition, 
the whole British Fleet would have to be rebuilt 
in Dreadnought form, has left a permanent mark 
upon the public mind." 2 

There, at England's door, has been growing 
a nation small in geographical area but with a 
population of 65,000,000 whites, 3 which, though 
less than the number of whites of the United 
States, is more than the number of whites of the 
six Britannic nations. Roughly stated, Germany 
has about one-half as many whites as have all 
the Pan- Angle nations combined. 4 In many 
respects Germany's position is not unlike Japan's. 
Both nations have had a victorious rise based on 
military efficiency, and there is no proof that their 
naval efficiency is not similarly high. Both nations 

1 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, Supple- 
ment, p. 51. 

2 Round Table, London, September 1913, p. 675. 

3 Statesman s Yearbook, London, 1913, p. 857: 19 10 population 
of Germany 64,925,993, which is 310*4 per square mile. 

4 Germany 65,000,000; Japan 49,000,000; America 81,000,000; 
and all the seven Pan- Angle nations 141,000,000. 


have, relatively speaking, but a small subject 
population to control. Both nations must neces- 
sarily be warlike on account of the pressure of 
population about them, and both have birth-rates 
which are already crowding their lands more than 
the Pan- Angles are crowding theirs. 

Practically all the non-European areas of the 
world which the white race can occupy are held 
by the seven Pan- Angle nations, or protected by 
one of them, or are in the hands of their out-run 
rivals, or in the control of Japan, Russia, or China. 
The same is true of lands unsuited for white 
occupation, but desirable as dependencies. Ger- 
many arrived on the scene so recently that it 
shared practically only the last divisions of the 
lands of the blacks. Consequently, the only lands 
available for Germany are those now held by the 
white and yellow races. 

Under such circumstances, if Germany is to take 
land from whites, Pan- Angle common-sense sug- 
gests that such land should not be ours. In ac- 
cord with such policy is Sir Harry H. Johnston's 
suggestion that Portugal's African dependencies 
be divided between the British Isles and Ger- 
many. 1 If Germany should, however, show a 
preference for Pan- Angle lands and should ask 
for those lands on which we now depend for our 
life and comfort, common-sense equally suggests 
that we be in a position to refuse. We could not 
expect the Germans to starve themselves and 
their children, or even to reduce their standard 
of living out of respect for claims we could no 
longer uphold. We did not so respect the claims 

1 Cf. ante, p. 132, note 1. 


of Portugal or Spain, Holland or France. Epi- 
sodes in our own history ought to point plain the 
only road to security of possession. 

The rise of the German Empire might by Pan- 
Angles be regarded with antagonism, if Japan, 
Russia, and China offered no dangers. The old 
and lasting fear that Pan- Angles have for centuries 
held toward Europe was the fear that called for 
the naval supremacy of the British Isles and for 
the Monroe Doctrine of America. Antagonism 
toward Germany might seem justified were it not 
that the fear of these other three powers, so 
different in civilization from us, makes Germany 
our natural and civilization ally. The victory of 
Germany over any portion of the Britannic world 
would be a Pan- Angle calamity. The fall of 
modern Germany would be hardly less of a Pan- 
Angle calamity. Any thought of the whites 
weakening each other, and especially of weakening 
their chance for developing their individualism, 
should be abhorrent to every Pan- Angle or 
German who can see further than the mass of 
his fellows. 

International politenesses often verge towards 
the extravagant. But certainly, if human relation- 
ships can be ascribed to nations, Germany is our 
near of kin. German blood has enriched ours 
for fifteen hundred years. Pan- Angle ideals of 
religious and political freedom came originally 
from Germany. Pan- Angle language, Pan-Angle 
law, and many of the qualities of which we are 
most proud had the same source. Individualism 
has developed more highly among the Pan-Angles 
— at least in matters of government. This is 


demonstrated by Pan-Angle and German ideas 
regarding civil officers. " Of course, in every 
nation its affairs are, and must be, conducted 
by officials. That is as true of America as of 
Germany. The fundamental difference is that 
with us these official persons are executive officers 
only, the real captain is the people ; while in 
Germany these official persons are the real 
governors of the people, subject to the commands 
of one who repeatedly and publicly asserts that his 
commission is from God and not from the people." * 
Contrast with this the utterance of an American 
" official " : " The people have not transferred 
their government to us. They still retain owner- 
ship and all the rights and powers of ownership. 
We are merely their temporary agents in perform- 
ing duties which they have delegated to us." 2 The 
German point of view would be intolerable to a 
Pan- Angle, but there is no reason for assuming 
that this bureaucratic country may not develop a 
truly representative form of government. 3 

To prevent a conflict with Germany should be 
not merely a matter of Pan- Angle sentiment, but 
of Pan- Angle business. If the Pan- Angles were 
so strong that Germany was no longer a source of 
danger to any one of their nations, Germany would 
be changed from a dangerous rival to a political 
ally. It would be the buffer state for the Pan- 

1 Price Collier, Germany and the Germans, New York, 1913, 
p. 190. 

2 Inaugural message of Governor David I. Walsh of Massa- 
chusetts to the State Legislature, January 8, 1914. 

3 Note the effort, December 1913, of the lower house of the 
German Parliament to make the Chancellor responsible not to 
the Emperor but to the lower -house. 


Angles against Russia, indeed against all Europe, 
providing thus greater security for itself as well 
as for us. We now realize the world has already 
been staked off by the white and yellow races. 
While the British Isles and Germany are making 
extraordinary efforts to build navies, Japan, Russia, 
and China are growing unmolested. Germany 
should be the nation with which all Europe and 
all Pan- Angles should unite to neutralize Japanese 
and other Asiatic questions that press for solution, 
and the nation with which all other whites should 
rally if this test of strength ever has to come. 
Properly understood in reference to the economic 
and political struggle between the white and 
yellow races, a Pan- Angle federation should be 
welcomed by every German. 

The Pan- Angles are responsible for large subject 
populations, which they both control and protect. 
This requires a greater or less military effort accord- 
ing to local circumstance and the fluctuating make- 
up of the international situation. Fortunately, from 
a military point of view, these Pan- Angle depen- 
dencies are widely scattered over the earth, and of 
such diverse languages that no combination among 
them has thus far appeared probable. But in case 
of any conflict with a foreign power they must 
always be regarded as an element of weakness to 
us. The Pan- Angles are not a military people. 
In each of our recent wars we have had to make 
ready an army after hostilities began — even though 
we were not taken unawares. In this regard we 
are at a disadvantage with those powers who keep 


their military force in constant readiness. In the 
past we have been willing to forego a fighting effi- 
ciency, if thereby we could be free of a possibly 
tyrannical system and obtain greater play for our 
individualism. We may continue of this mind for 
the future. But if we choose to disregard the 
usual national precaution of military safety, we 
must make doubly sure of other strength as its 

The Pan-Angles do not occupy a contiguous 
land area. They are scattered over the globe, and 
are exposed not only on their many shores but 
throughout the length of their lines of sea com- 
munication. The oceans sever them from each 
other and sever some of them from their food. 
One answer to the problems which arise from this 
wide separation is sea power. On this depends the 
very daily existence of some of our groups. 

Until recently six of our nations have relied 
almost entirely upon the taxing power and efforts 
of the British Isles to maintain a navy for them. 

The burden on the British Isles has been heavy, 
and is growing steadily heavier. To defend the 
British Isles from Germany the British navy was 
withdrawn to European waters. Since 1910 this 
concentration has been practically a defence of the 
North Sea shores of the British Isles. How long 
can the British Isles alone bear the strain of its own 
naval defence ? And who is to defend the other five 
Britannic nations ? " We have made great efforts, as 
in the past, but we are realizing that even so our 
efforts, in Great Britain alone, may before long 
fall short of what Imperial security requires. And 
this increasing anxiety is not due solely to a narrow 


apprehension of German aims. It is due to the 
rate of naval expansion everywhere." * " It is quite 
clear that external pressure is already more severe 
than it has been for nearly a hundred years, and 
that it will probably become even greater in the 
future." 2 

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have now 
taken steps towards maintaining their own navies 
to co-operate with the British navy, but it is still 
true that, " Once the command of the sea is lost 
by the [British] Empire no local system of defence, 
naval or military, could secure Australia's auto- 
nomy, and she would become the prey of the 
strongest maritime power." 3 A like statement 
could be made of the other younger Britannic 
nations. And while the American navy is not to 
be disregarded as a possible aid, it is not wise for 
either the Britannic or American people to assume 
that navies under separate governments will act 
with that promptness possible under a single control. 

In comparison with some of their competitors 
now rising to the stage of active rivalry, all the 
seven Pan- Angle nations are collectively only one 
first-class world-power. Each Pan- Angle nation is 
naturally more solicitous for its own welfare than 
for that of its fellow nations. The Englander is 
exasperated that the other Britannic nations take 
so little interest in the German peril. Australia 
and South Africa block the immigration of Asiatics 
from British dependencies. Canada dallies over 

1 Round Table, London, September 1913, p. 675. 

2 Ibid., May 19H,p. 244. 

3 Admiral Henderson in " Report to Australian Government," 
quoted in Round Table, London, May 1911, p. 258. 


the merits or demerits of a naval appropriation bill. 
The United States fortifies its Canal. Our co-op- 
eration is still uncertain, for we are still divided 
into seven different nations. Neither New Zealand, 
nor Australia, nor Newfoundland, nor Canada, nor 
South Africa, nor the British Isles, nor the United 
States would care to try to stand alone against the 
possible combinations that might be brought against 
it ; sentiments of warmest friendship, or even trea- 
ties, are a poor substitute for a machinery of 
government tried and tested before the crash comes. 
As they now are, the seven Pan- Angle nations 
offer the maximum of inducements for inter-Pan- 
Angle friction and extra-Pan-Angle aggressions. 
Together the Pan- Angles could ensure the peace 
of the world. 



The future of the Pan- Angles must flow out of 
their past. The course it will take is indicated by 
our history if, following Seeley's admonition, the 
investigator turns " narrative into problems." " For 
in history everything depends upon turning narrative 
into problems. So long as you think of history as 
a mere chronological narrative, so long you are in 
the old literary groove which leads to no trust- 
worthy knowledge, but only to that pompous con- 
ventional romancing of which all serious men are 
tired. Break the drowsy spell of narrative ; ask 
yourself questions ; set yourself problems ; your 
mind will at once take up a new attitude ; you 
will become an investigator ; you will cease to be 
solemn and begin to be serious." 1 

The events of Pan-Angle history reveal three 
tendencies. These may be designated as : spread- 
ing, separating, and converging. They are to be 
noted both in the various national growths and in 
the collective growth of the entire civilization. 
Without discussing seriatim these three tendencies 
in each one of the seven nations, or the singular 

1 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, London, 1883, 
pp. 174-175. 


similarities exemplified in the histories of the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa, con- 
sideration is here given only to the aggregate swing 
or movement in the whole civilization. 

The spreading, starting with the days that saw 
the discovery of Newfoundland, continued and 
made the whole of North America Pan-Angle 
land. If the impulse had produced nothing more 
than this, its work would have been stupendous. 
Yet the spreading was so effective in other parts 
of the world that a large proportion of the Southern 
Hemisphere also became Pan- Angle land. To-day 
we control thirty per cent, of the world's land 
surface. 1 

The tendency to separate is stimulated whenever 
the imperative Pan- Angle need of exercising self- 
government is improperly checked. If this need is 
satisfied, separation is prevented. If the need is 
denied satisfaction, it grows more and more acute 
to the point of rupture. 

The story of separations among us began with 
the failure to recognize this principle of local 
autonomy, and the many interferences which 
slowly exasperated the "American Englishmen" 
to rebel. Thus was destroyed the first Britannic 
Empire. Thus were embittered against each other 
the Americans and the British of three generations. 
The American Revolution, aptly called the 
Imperial Civil War, started migrations. Loyalists 
from the thirteen new nations took Pan-Angle 
ideals into Canada. " It has been estimated, 
apparently on good authority, that in the two 
provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 

1 Cf. ante, p. 16. 



alone, the Loyalist emigrants and their families 
amounted to not less than 35,000 persons, and the 
total number of refugees cannot have been much 
less than 100,000." 1 This is the principal reason 
why Canada to-day is Pan-Angle rather than 
French. 2 It is the reason, too, why in some parts 
of Canada there is a feeling grounded on inherited 
prejudice against the United States. 

So little were the causes of the phenomenon of 
separating understood by the rulers of the British 
Isles, that Canada, in turn, came to the verge of a 
revolt which " was in fact a war of nationality in 
the British Empire, though it wore the disguise of 
a war of liberty." 3 "The settlement of the diffi- 
culty was effected by means not very commonly 
in high favour. For once systematic thought was 
brought to bear upon politics. ... a young peer 
of considerable promise, Lord Durham, was sent 
out as Governor in 1838 ; he issued a famous 
report, due to the pen of Charles Buller, in which 
the Radical philosophers' principles were vigorously 
applied . . . and in 1840 Parliament was persuaded 
to give effect to the proposals made in the report ; 
. . . the main point was that the Executive branch 
of government was brought under the control of the 
colonists. . . . The year 184-1 is therefore the year 
of the inauguration of modern Colonial govern- 
ment ." 4 The year 1841, therefore, inaugurated the 

1 Jones, History of New York, ii. pp. 259, 268, 500, 509, quoted 
by G. F. Parkin, Imperial Federation, London, 1892, note, p. 124. 

2 Cf. G. R. Parkin, Imperial Federation, London, 1892, 
pp. 127, 153. 

3 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, London, 1883, p. 48. 

4 Alfred Caldecott, English Colonization and Empire, London, 
1891, pp. 131-133. 


policies that were in time to check the separating 

Not only was separation the desire of certain of 
the younger groups, but it was to some extent the 
desire and foregone conclusion of one group from 
which separation might take place. The attitude 
of the British public concerning those portions of 
the British world where English-speaking white 
men were claiming increasingly the right to govern 
themselves was in itself more than an invitation to 
these " colonies " to separate themselves from the 
Mother Country. Comparison was made to a tree 
whose ripened fruit in due season detaches itself 
from the parent stem. The loss of the richest area 
in whose conquest the British government ever 
shared had so impressed statesmen that such men 
as Gladstone could desire the separation from the 
British Isles of various Pan- Angle nations. 

" During the years which preceded the repeal of 
the Corn Laws in 1846 there was in this country 
[British Isles] a general indifference to the colonial 
question which did not cease till long afterwards. . . . 
After the Cobden era came that of Mr. Gladstone, 
who was in his zenith in the sixties and as purely 
insular and deficient in the power of Imperial 
thought as Cobden had been in the forties." 1 "A 
governor, leaving to take charge of an Australian 
colony, was told even from the Colonial Office that 
he would probably be the last representative of the 
Crown sent out from Britain. This tendency of 
official thought found its culmination when, in 
1866, a great journal frankly warned Canada, the 

1 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, Supple- 
ment, pp. 9, 10. 


greatest of all the colonies, that it was time to 
prepare for the separation from the mother-land 
that must needs come." 1 "Mr. Goldwin Smith 
... in his . . . Canada and the Canadian Ques- 
tion, which may fairly be supposed to condense 
all that can be said in favor of the separation of 
Canada from the Empire, and generally in support 
of that form of national disintegration which is 
involved in the great colonies becoming separate 
states or annexing themselves to other nations . . . 
is almost the last conspicuous representative of a 
school of thinkers which twenty-five or thirty years 
ago appeared likely to dominate English opinion 
on colonial affairs." 2 Only slowly were learned 
the lessons of the American Revolution, which a 
British historian in 1883 could truthfully say, 
" We have tacitly agreed to mention as seldom as 
we can." 3 

The tendency to separation is latent in every 
Pan- Angle community. It is only when local and 
central authority are properly balanced that it is 
quieted. In one it has never been quieted. The 
story of Ireland it is unnecessary and inexpedient 
here to narrate. 4 An Englander calls it "the 
greatest and most lamentable failure of the Pax 
Britannica." 5 It is merely the proof, again and 
again repeated, of the inability of Pan- Angles 

1 G. R. Parkin, Imperial Federation, London, 1 892, p. 8. 

2 Ibid., p. 163. 

8 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, London, 1883, p. 22. 

4 For a general account of Ireland in this connection, see 
Price Collier, England and the English, London, 191 1, pp. 230-262; 
and for a constitutional discussion, cf. Round Table, London, 
December 1913, pp. 1-67. 

5 H. S. Perris, Pax Britannica, London, 1913, p. 139- 


successfully to control the local affairs of other 
Pan- Angles. There is something in us, in our 
individualism, that forbids such success, and calls 
for separation, which leads to rebellion if opposed, 
or revolution if permitted. 

The Irish for generations have been leaving 
Ireland. They leave embittered against England. 
That bitterness they spread broadcast in the six 
younger Pan- Angle nations. Everywhere in these 
six nations the Irish find home rule. 1 The bitter- 
ness against government, as government, wears off. 
The Irishman becomes a citizen of a new and 
proud nation — he becomes a self-conscious Pan- 
Angle. But the Irish Question is no nearer 
solution than before. 

Contemporaneous with the separation sentiments 
among the Britannic peoples were the agitations 
in the United States that were to culminate in the 
secession movement. The dread of a strong 
central government had left in the southern 
portion of America a belief in state separateness 
that worked against the existence of a common 
government which, within the scope of its authority, 
could make decisions binding on all its component 
lands and people. From the end of the French- 
Pan- Angle struggle to the beginning of the 
American Civil War, the century of 1763-1861, 
the course of separation ran almost unchecked. 

As this separation tendency strengthened, the 
unity of the race and that of one of its component 
nations were exposed to disintegration. The out- 

1 As Home Rule, like other political terms, has been used to 
denote many theorems, its meaning in any statement depends 
somewhat on the particular instance. 


come appeared to forebode the end of Pan- Angle 
world control. A house divided against itself 
cannot stand. If this family was to split into 
national factions of increasingly smaller size, its 
end was apparent. Some other civilization would 
absorb the scattered bits of the once powerful race 
and another chapter of the struggles of successive 
civilizations would be concluded. 

Certain American states, desiring to loosen the 
tie by which they were bound, seceded from the 
Union. Other states declared their faith in the 
federal principle and took their stand against 
separation. The issue was befogged in many 
minds by other points of contention. But "the 
question submitted to the arbitrament of war was 
the right of secession." 1 Those who looked on 
could see that if success attended the secession 
movement, Pan- Angles would have to begin again 
their search for the means of preserving the balance 
between local and central government. "My 
paramount object is to save the Union and not 
either to save or destroy slavery," wrote Lincoln 
in 1862. 2 

Wilson characterizes the three great men of that 
struggle in terms of the question at stake. Of 
Lincoln he says : " The whole country is summed 
up in him : the rude Western strength, tempered 
with shrewdness and a broad and humane wit ; the 
Eastern conservatism, regardful of law and devoted 
to fixed standards of duty. He even understood 

1 W. H. Taft, Popular Government, New Haven, Connecticut, 
1913, p. 137. 

2 Ency. Brit., vol. xxiii. p. 178, Letter of Abraham Lincoln to 
Horace Greeley, August J 862. 


the South, as no other Northern man of his genera- 
tion did. He respected, because he comprehended, 
though he could not hold, its view of the Constitu- 
tion ; he appreciated the inexorable compulsions of 
its past in respect of slavery ; he would have secured 
it once more, and speedily if possible, in its right 
to self-government when the fight was fought 
out. . . . 

" Grant was Lincoln's suitable instrument, . . . 
A Western man, he had no thought of common- 
wealths politically separate, and was instinctively 
for the Union ; a man of the common people, he 
deemed himself always an instrument, never a 
master, and did his work, though ruthlessly, 
without malice; a sturdy, hard-willed, taciturn 
man, a sort of Lincoln the Silent in thought and 

On the opposite side Robert E. Lee fought " for 
a principle which is in a sense scarcely less American 
than the principle of Union. He represented the 
idea of the inherent — the essential — separateness 
of self-government. . . . Lee did not believe in 
secession, but he did believe in the local rootage of 
all government. This is at the bottom, no doubt, 
an English idea; but it has had a characteristic 
American development. It is the reverse side 
of the shield which bears upon its obverse the 
devices of the Union, 1 . . . Lee . . . could not 
conceive of the nation apart from the State : above 

1 Cf. W. H. Taft, Popular Government, New Haven, Connecticut, 
1913, p. 151 : " It is essential ... in the life of our dual govern- 
ment that the power and functions of the State governments 
be maintained in all the fulness that they were intended to 
have by the framers of the Constitution." 


all, he could not live in the nation divorced from 
his neighbors. His own community should decide 
his political destiny and duty." 1 

The outcome of the American Civil War, to 
those in the Pan- Angle world who were looking 
forward to an end of separatings — and this included 
many in the British Isles, — gave hope and inspira- 
tion. It demonstrated the reality of American 
nationhood and, more important still, it encouraged 
the race on its path towards convergence. It made 
natural the Canadian Constitution, otherwise known 
as the British North America Act of 1867. It 
made reasonable the foundation in London of the 
Royal Colonial Institute in 1868, whose motto is 
"United Empire." 2 It made comprehensible the 
theses of such books as Dilke's Greater Britain, 
1868, and Seeley's Expansion of England, 1883. 3 
Later were to come the convergences of the Austra- 
lian states in 1900 and the South African provinces 
in 1909. "For the idea of national unity the 
people of the United States twenty-five years ago 
made sacrifices of life and money without a parallel 
in modern history. No one now doubts that the 
end justified the enormous expenditure of national 
force. ' The Union must be preserved ' was the 
pregnant sentence into which Lincoln condensed 
the national duty of the moment, and to maintain 
this principle he was able to concentrate the national 
energy for a supreme effort. The strong man who 

1 Woodrow Wilson, Mere Literature, Boston, 1900, pp. 208-210. 

2 United Empire is also the title of the magazine published 
monthly by the Royal Colonial Institute, London. 

3 C. W. Dilke, Greater Britain, London, 1868; J. R. Seeley, 
The Expansion of England, London, 1883. 


saved the great republic from disruption takes his 
place, without a question, among the benefactors 
of mankind." 1 

Moreover, the outcome of the American Civil 
War tended to revise the attitudes of the British 
Isles and America toward each other. Up to this 
time, their attention had been fixed on the con- 
ditions of their separation. Hostility seized on 
various acts performed or permitted by the British 
government which, rightly or wrongly, the American 
people considered acts of unfriendliness. These, as 
the Americans realized, they were hardly in a posi- 
tion to resent while the Civil War was in progress, 
although at one time war was very nearly declared 
against the British Isles. 2 When the Civil War 
was over, retaliation might have been undertaken. 
The American government had at its disposal a 
navy of over seven hundred vessels, of which over 
seventy were ironclads. It had an army of over 
one million seasoned men. The opportunity sug- 
gested itself as a proper time to pay off American 
grudges against the British Isles by annexing 
Canada. This would have been holding Canada 
blamable for the doings of another nation. To 
the credit of the Pan -Angles, President Grant 
successfully opposed the scheme. 3 Not only did 
the decade 1860-1870 mark the rise of the con- 
verging movement in the United States and in 
Canada, but the same decade saw the culmination 
and abatement of separating tendencies between 

1 G. R. Parkin, Imperial Federation, London, 1892, p. 25. 

2 According to H. C. Lodge — One Hundred Years of Peace, 
New York, 1913, p. 108 — September 3, 186S, was the crucial day. 

3 Ibid., pp. 118-119- 


the two great powers of the Pan- Angle group, the 
British Isles and America. 

Since those days Pan- Angles have made progress 
in understanding the balance necessary between 
the separating and the converging impulses. Men 
have erred by emphasizing too strongly one side 
or the other. In America they cried out blindly 
for " centralization," or " states rights " — in ignor- 
ance that only by the complementary strengths of 
both central and local governments can our sort of 
people be governed in great masses. Among the 
Britannic peoples men favoured either British Isles 
ascendency, or colonial independence — ignorant 
that the first would as quickly destroy them as 
would the second. Either course would produce the 
independence of the younger nations and, through 
lack of strength to maintain that independence, the 
loss of it, possibly to some nation outside the Pan- 
Angle group. These American and Britannic 
extremists are now a diminishing minority. 

The growth of the idea of complementary 
functions in co-ordinate (not superior and inferior) 
governments has been instanced by many develop- 
ments in America. There was a time, many now 
alive can remember the days, when "centralization" 
and " states rights " were championed by opposing 
political parties. To-day it is recognized that the 
successful government of America rests on the 
proper use of both of these extremes. This is true, 
whether it refers to national versus state authorities, 
or state versus municipal authorities. With a 
strong central authority in America goes to-day 
greater recognition of the need of a concurrent 
local control. This local spirit has gone so far in 


some of the American states that state legislatures 
have authorized cities to draw up their own 
charters. 1 Moreover, American political experience 
within the states has adhered in many cases to the 
theorem that, on such questions as local taxation 
and the sale of liquor, the smaller subdivisions of 
the state should decide their own usages. 

Once it was assumed that the officers of the 
federal government in America should enlarge as 
much as possible their spheres of activity, even if 
they appeared to encroach upon state functions. 
It is now realized that the states should be 
encouraged to attend to their own affairs, and thus 
avoid increasing the burdens of the federal govern- 
ment. President Roosevelt in 1908 unofficially 
called together the American state governors to 
discuss " conservation," and since then yearly these 
state executives have met to discuss questions of 
state policy. These conferences not only tend to 
produce greater uniformity of Pan- Angle political 
action, but tend also to make that action the 
product of large experience. This Conference of 
the Governors 2 and other non-official bodies, the 

1 Cf. Ency. Brit., vol. xxvii. p. 651. 

2 The Outlook, New York, December 21, 1912, p. 843 : "The 
first Governors' Conference was called by President Roosevelt in 
1.908. It met at the White House to consider the subject of 
Conservation. So immediately evident was the desirability of 
co-operation that Governor Willson, of Kentucky, sprang to his 
feet at the close of one of the sessions and said, ' Gentlemen, let 
me detain you a moment.' He went to the platform and there 
unfolded a plan for a Conference of the Governors, to be called 
by themselves. This was held at Washington in 1909. The 
third meeting of the Governors occurred at Frankfort, Kentucky, 
Governor Willson's own capital, in 19 11, . . . The Governors' 


American Bar Association among them, are now 
encouraged by public opinion to remedy, in what- 
ever ways seem wise, undesirable discrepancies in 
the laws of the various states, not by seeking 
greater authority in the central government, but 
by agitating in the states themselves. 

The extent of our progress is shown strikingly 
by the change in Pan-Angle sentiment between 
the wars of 1861-1865 and 1899-1902. In South 
Africa the race was spared any repetition of the 
humiliating political corruption of the "carpet-bag" 
era of the American "reconstruction." 1 We have 
learned that whether it is in the United States or 
South Africa, in Canada 2 or in Ireland, white men 
must be made into self-governing Pan-Angles. 
Rhodes recognized this when he said even while 
the war was in progress, "... you cannot govern 
South Africa by trampling on the Dutch." 3 The 
impulses toward local autonomy and those toward 
a common group unity must be correlated. To 
favour either at the expense of the other is to 
court disaster. 

The spreading of the Pan- Angles is still going 
on, though in the multiplicity of affairs arising in 

Conference is apparently becoming something of a fixture in 
our political life." 

1 Ency. Brit., vol. xxv. pp. 480-481 : Peace signed at Pretoria, 
May 31, 1902; self-government decreed, December 12, lp06; 
elections held in Transvaal, February 1907. 

2 Cf. Alfred Caldecott, English Colonization and Empire, London, 
1891, p. 130 : a Canada was a conquered possession, not a settle- 
ment, it is true ; but the attempt to treat it as a conquest nearly 
ended in another catastrophe." 

3 W. T. Stead, The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John 
Rhodes, London, 1902, p. 113. 


the places we already occupy we often overlook 
the pioneer work of the present. The causes for 
separating have been understood and extensively 
removed. The converging tendency is now in the 
ascendant. The political evolution that accom- 
panies this convergence, though it seems slow to 
the impatient reformer, may, if understood and 
assisted by those who shape popular opinion, give 
Pan- Angles in the fulness of time an entity 

This converging tendency of the race, Americans 
have seen with satisfaction in their own land. As 
far as they have been conversant with it, they have 
approved of it in Britannic lands. A Canadian 
wrote in 1892 : " Among thinking native Americans 
I have found, as a rule, a genuine sympathy with 
the advocates of unity for British people, a sym- 
pathy perfectly natural in a nation which has 
suffered and sacrificed so much as the people of 
the United States have for a similar object." 1 
Since our knowledge of each other has grown in 
twenty odd years this might to-day be expressed 
even more strongly. Moreover, " English people," 
the same writer testifies, "now understand and 
respect the motives which actuated the resolute 
and successful struggle of the people of the United 
States against disruption." 2 

There is to-day a great drawing together of the 
whole Pan- Angle race. The desires of Franklin 
and his supporters are nearing realization. The 

1 G. R. Parkin, Imperial Federation, London, 1892, p. 253. 

2 Ibid., p. 254. 


errors which led to our separations have passed 
into the race experience. We can all profit by 
them. We have all profited by them. The 
tendency to convergence was never wholly in- 
operative. It survived the wrench of the American 
Revolution. Lord Shelburne, in conducting the 
British side of the peace negotiations of 1783, held 
to the ideal of restoring Pan- Angle unity, and 
thereafter worked for it in Parliament, hoping " that 
this would have been the beginning of the great 
Anglo-Saxon federation of which Chatham had 
dreamed ; . . , W1 

The power of this impulse drawing us together 
is evidenced in the peace that has endured among 
us. The century closing December 24, 1914, 
stands as witness. Within our whole civilization, 
this period has chronicled only two wars of white 
men on Pan- Angle soil— 1861-1865 and 1899- 
1902. These were devastating and deeply to be 
regretted. They remind us that peace is not to be 
taken for granted. Between the two entirely in- 
dependent sections of the Pan-Angles, and these 
are at the same time the most populous, no conflict 
of interests has been allowed to develop into war. 
Differences of opinion have arisen, as was inevitable. 
They have been settled through the exercise of 
forbearance, self-control, and concession, without 
recourse to arms. 

Needless to try to apportion the credit between 
the two nations. Canadians have sometimes felt 

1 Round Table, London, December 1913, p. 112. As to 
Chatham's plans for both Irish and American co-operation in 
Pan- Angle government, see A. L. Burt, Imperial Architects, 
Oxford, 1913, pp. 28-32. 


that their interests were being sacrificed on the 
altar of British- American friendship. " Those who 
study the history of the questions which have arisen 
from time to time since the Peace of 1813 between 
this country [British Isles] and the United States, 
can hardly fail to be struck by a difference in the 
habitual attitude of the two Powers. Great 
Britain has always been pliable as to such ques- 
tions ; having indeed every motive, both of senti- 
ment and of interest, for being and remaining on 
the best terms possible with the United States." 1 
Another Britannic critic not only denies that the 
British negotiators have been pliable, but claims 
that as envoys on Canada- America disputes they 
have been of a cleverness at least equal to that of 
the Americans. 2 

Whoever may have appreciated it more keenly, 
the fact is now evident that the community of 
interests which embraces all Pan-Angles is an affair 
of transcending importance. Our great men have 
understood this and given it repeated expression. 
Mr. Joseph Chamberlain said at Toronto in 1897 : 
" But I should think our patriotism was dwarfed and 
stunted indeed if it did not embrace the Greater 
Britain beyond the seas ; if it did not include the 
young and vigorous nations carrying throughout the 
globe the knowledge of the English tongue and the 
English love of liberty and law; and, gentlemen, with 

1 Roundell Palmer, Earl of Selborne, Memorials : Part II., 
Personal and Political, London, 1 898, vol. i. p. 202. 

2 Round Table, London, December 1913, pp. 106-122. This 
article should amuse all Pan- Angles by its fraternal frankness 
in describing the diplomacy of both British and American actors 
in these dramas. It also throws light on the usages of so-called 
"international arbitration." 


those feelings I refuse to think or speak of the United 
States of America as a foreign nation. We are all 
of the same race and blood. I refuse to make any 
distinction between the interests of Englishmen in 
England, in Canada, and in the United States." 1 
An Australian in 1912 wrote: "British interests 
in India or the East Indies would not be attacked 
if there were a large Australian fleet. The problems 
of defence in Canada, South Africa, Egypt, and 
United States [sic] would be distinctly easier with 
such a fleet." 2 Note that he makes no distinction 
which sets the United States aside from other Pan- 
Angles. Lord Bryce — and no American is more 
highly esteemed in the United States than he, — 3 
speaking in London in 1913, said : " Returning 
hither from America, I have two things to say to 
the British Pilgrims gathered here as friends of the 
American people. One is that you must not take too 
seriously the lurid pictures of American life drawn in 
some organs of the European press. In Washington 
I used to be struck by the dark view which the press 
news from England conveyed of British events and 
conditions, a view which I knew to be misleading. 
Here the same thing happens. Cable messages and 

1 Mr. Chamberlain at Toronto, December 30, 1 897, quoted by 
M. Victor Berard, British Imperialism and Commercial Supremacy, 
trans. H. W. Foskett, London, 1906, p. 200. 

2 Round Table, London, September 1912, p. 722. 

3 At a farewell dinner given to Mr. Bryce in New York City, 
former American Ambassador to the British Isles Joseph H. 
Choate turned to the guest of honour and stated : " England 
has sent, will send, many Ambassadors, but there's only one 
Bryce in the whole list. The American people from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific love and honour you, sir." See The Outlook, New 
York, May 10, 1913, p. 80. 


the vivid pens of correspondents inevitably heighten 
the colour. My other message is to assure you 
that the friendship you entertain for the people of 
the United States is reciprocated by them far more 
universally and heartily than ever before. There 
is a friendship of governments and a friendship of 
nations. The former may shift with the shifting 
of material interests or be affected by the relations 
of each power with other powers. But the latter 
rests on solid and permanent foundations. With 
our two peoples it is based on a community of 
speech, of literature, of institutions, of beliefs, of 
traditions from the past, of ideals for the future. 
In all these things the British and American peoples 
are closer than any two other peoples can be. 
Nature and history have meant them to be friends." 1 
Against this spirit of amity not a dissenting voice 
is raised. We rejoice in the peace of the years 
behind us and in the good feeling of the era at 
hand. We seek some means to perpetuate them. 

Political good feeling in its different degrees 
takes, according to Pan-Angle experience, three 
forms. These so merge, that it is difficult at times 
to define in terms of them. They may be known 
for purpose of study as : friendship, alliance, and 
common government. 

The relations between England and its American 
colonies started in the friendship stage. Later de- 
veloped a co-operation that can be fairly called 

1 Mr. Bryce before the Pilgrims Club in London, November 6, 
1913, quoted by Springjield (Massachusetts) Weekly Republican, 
November 7, 1913. 



alliance. In the French-Pan-Angle struggle for 
North America, the colonies contributed men and 
money, as did Great Britain. Together they won 
much of the territory now the United States and 
all that is now Canada. Together they did more 
than this. " The Seven Years War made England 
what she is. It crippled the commerce of her rival, 
ruined France in two continents, and blighted her 
as a colonial power. It gave England the control 
of the seas and the mastery of North America and 
India, made her the first of commercial nations, 
and prepared that vast colonial system that has 
planted new Englands in every part of the globe." 1 
Pownall, during his term as governor, saw Massa- 
chusetts raise at the requisition of the Crown not 
the 2300 men asked for, but 7000. 2 " Owners of 
property were paying in taxes two-thirds of their 
incomes." 3 Yet their legislature in 1759 voted 
funds for a monument to Lord Howe, who had 
fallen the previous summer at Ticonderoga. It 
stands in Westminster Abbey 4 to-day, a memorial 
as well of the men whose " affection to the mother 
country . . . zeal for the service," Pownall knew 
from experience. 5 Speaking in the British House 
of Commons, of which he was a member 1768-1780, 

1 Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, London, 1884, vol. i. 
p. 3. 

2 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, p. 157. 

3 Ibid., p. 95. This is as of 1758. 

4 Cf. ibid., p. 125. The monument is in the Belfry Tower, 
the north aisle of nave. Cf. Baedeker's London, 1911, p. 217. 
It was Lord Howe's brother, Sir William Howe, who on March 
17, 1776, evacuated Boston to abandon the city to these same 
American Englishmen — now rebels. 

5 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, p. 157. 


he describes their attitude during the Seven Years 
War. In case of a French invasion of England at 
that time, he testifies : " Those New England men 
would have been ready to come over at their own 
expense to the assistance of their native country — 
as they always hold England to be." 1 

After the pressure of war was removed, the 
alliance, instead of being carried to the stage of 
common government, was neglected. Friendship 
and co-operation became things of the past, and 
separation took place. Many then thought that 
this might have been avoided. Governor Pownall, 
for one, knew that there was " a certain good temper 
and right spirit which, if observed on both sides, 
might bring these matters of dispute to such a 
settlement as political truth and liberty are best 
established upon." 2 The " certain good temper" 
did not then prevail. To-day, in 1914, we see the 
advantage of acting in the " right spirit " which 
may bring all our affairs to such a settlement as is 
conducive to the welfare of all Pan- Angles. 

The United States in itself shows, perhaps most 
completely, the detailed history of the political 
growth of groups of Pan- Angles through the three 
stages. The defensive alliance of the American 
colonies fell apart after the successful outcome of 
the French War. The friendship between the 
thirteen nations survived, and common necessity 
with a common cause 3 produced the alliance 

1 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, p. 232. 

2 Ibid., p. 202. 

3 Woodrow Wilson, The State, 1897, rev. ed., Boston, 1911, 
p. 4>53: " Despite very considerable outward differences of 
social condition and many apparent divergencies of interest as 


which made successful the American Revolution. 
Thereafter came the critical period of American 
history. 1 The first attempt at common govern- 
ment in 1781 took the form of a strengthened 
alliance and failed, because alliance was at this 
juncture inadequate. Undaunted, the Americans 
framed another constitution for the potential 
nation. Here at last was a common government. 
It has survived so long that to-day the United 
States is the oldest republic in the world. It has 
endured the strain of both foreign and civil wars. 
It has permitted the assimilation of vast hordes of 
white people, who now cherish this government as 
their own. This government expresses the will of 
eighty-one millions of whites — a majority of the 
English-speaking people of the world. 2 

Of the six Britannic nations, Canada, Australia, 
and South Africa have travelled through friendship 
and alliance to common government. Canada, 
apparently divided by two languages, was the first 
thus to establish its nationhood. Australia was the 
second. More recently still, South Africa, in spite 
of a diversity of tongues, achieved the same result. 3 

between colony and colony, they one and all wanted the same 
revolution. . . . They did not so much make a common cause as 
have a common cause from the first." 

1 See John Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, 
1783-1789, Boston, 1898. 

2 Cf. ante, p. 81, note 1. 

3 P. A. Molteno's A Federal South Africa, London, 1896, 
written more than three years before the Boer War, compares the 
then condition of South Africa with the condition of the American 
thirteen nations in the days covered by Fiske's The Critical Period 
of American History, contains a prophecy now fulfilled, and is a 
valuable comment on many of the needs of the Pan- Angle world 
of to-day. 


There are those who maintain that the six 
Britannic nations have not yet arrived at the 
alliance stage. " Everything hangs on sentiment, 
influence, and management." 1 Some recommend 
that an alliance should be definitely entered into. 2 
Yet while it is true that the five younger Britannic 
entities are "nations, with a life, a pride, a con- 
sciousness of their own, with separate, divergent, 
and in some cases indeed conflicting interests," 3 
it seems also true that a friendly alliance does 
exist among them and between them and the 
British Isles. 

It is an alliance de facto if not de jure, its terms 
being unwritten, unstated, and unknown. In the 
Colonial Conference of 1902, "To Sir Wilfrid 
Laurier's famous challenge, ' If you want our aid, 
call us to your councils,' the Colonial Secretary 
[Chamberlain] made an emphatic response. 
1 Gentlemen, we do want your aid. We do want 
your assistance in the administration of the vast 
Empire which is yours as well as ours. The weary 
Titan staggers under the too vast orb of his fate. 
We have borne the burden for many years. We 
think it time that our children should assist us to 
support it, and whenever you make the request 
to us, be very sure that we shall hasten gladly to 
call you to our councils.'" 4 In the South African 

1 F. S. Oliver, Alexander Hamilton : An Essay on American 
Union, London, 1906, p. 447. 

2 Richard Jebb, The Britannic Question, London, 1913. 

3 Lord Milner, December 14, 1906, at Conservative Club, 
Manchester, England, in Lord Milner, The Nation and the Empire, 
London, 1913, p. 142. 

4 Richard Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, 1905, 
p. 138. 


War, and more recently in their efforts in behalf 
of greater naval strength, the six nations behaved 
as allies affording inspiring examples of what they 
can and may again do. Certainly the political good 
feeling between the Britannic nations cannot be 
said to have progressed further than to the alliance 
stage, since " any political arrangement in which 
powers are withheld, or granted upon terms, or are 
subject to revision at the will of any member of 
the confederacy, is not a real union, but only an 
alliance." 1 

Between the United States and the British Isles 
are treaties that bind them into an extraordinarily 
close alliance — treaties which are the strongest 
written expressions of international goodwill. 2 On 
the even closer " understanding " between the two 
nations, so that they are found acting in concert in 
every part of the globe, it is unnecessary to dwell. 

But between the United States and the younger 
Britannic nations, what is the relation ? They are 
undoubtedly friendly, but where is the formal 
evidence of such friendliness ? The five younger 
nations can hardly be considered partners to the 
alliance between the United States and the British 
Isles, as in making this alliance these five had no 
share. To form an alliance between the United 
States and the Britannic power, inclusive of the six 
Britannic nations, is now impossible, because such 

1 F. S. Oliver, Alexander Hamilton : An Essay on American 
Union, London, 1906, p. 452. 

2 For a history of the General Arbitration Treaty of 1911 
between America and the British Isles and its full text as 
proposed and as ratified, see H. S. Perris, Pax Britannica, London, 
1913, pp. 285-293, 301-307. 


a Britannic political entity able to ratify treaties is 
non-existent. Postulating an alliance among all 
the Britannic nations, the United States through 
its alliance with the British Isles may perhaps be 
considered as allied to the allies of its ally. As we 
are now organized, this is as far as we have been 
able to progress. It is just beyond the friendship 

The seven Pan- Angle nations are to-day bound 
together by friendship and, in some cases, alliance. 
They are united by sentiment only, whether it be 
unwritten or written. At this stage many of our 
groups have found themselves in the past. It has 
held for them two possibilities. Sentiment was 
the bond between Pan- Angles after the French 
War which ended in 1763. The bond failed to 
hold and separation followed. Sentiment in alliance 
form was tried in the Articles of Confederation 
in 1781. It failed ; and on its ruins was built a 
common government. It is of no moment that 
sentiment in the first case was unwritten, and in 
the second case, written. Sentiment is not govern- 
ment. Need other cases of failure be mentioned ? 
It is for us to determine whether, when our present 
relationships change, they give way to separation 
and weakness, or develop by convergence into the 
strength of a common government. The motto of 
our youngest nation points out the hope of our 
future, " Ex unitate vires." 



Who, first of all, dreamed of closer union between 
England (or Great Britain) and its colonies we 
do not know. As early as 1652 there came from 
Barbados a suggestion. It was in no way followed 
up. Colonel Thomas Modyford " desires, although 
it may seem immodest, that two representatives 
should be chosen by the island to sit and vote in 
the English parliament." 1 

In the following century Benjamin Franklin 
devised a scheme of union and laboured to com- 
mend it to the makers of Pan- Angle history. In 
June 1754 he attended a conference of eleven 
of the colonies met at Albany to consider defence 
against the Indians. That matter disposed of, 
Franklin submitted a plan for the union of the 

1 A. L. Burt, Imperial Architects, Oxford, 1913, p. 14; cf. 
pp. 14-1 6: "In all likelihood it was but a chance suggestion 
without any serious purpose behind it, for, in his subsequent 
career as Governor, though he erected an assembly which was 
not ratified by the King, he did not, as far as can be ascertained, 
once recur to this idea. 

" It is doubtful when, or by whom, in the eighteenth century, 
the first suggestion of American representatives in the British 
Parliament was made. Though Franklin was perhaps not the 
first, yet his proposal is the earliest extant." 


colonies. 1 Later in the year he wrote as follows to 
Shirley, Royal Governor of Massachusetts : " Since 
the conversation your Excellency was pleased to 
honor me with, on the subject of uniting the 
colonies more intimately with Great Britain, by 
allowing them representatives in Parliament, I 
have something further considered that matter, 
and am of opinion that such a union would be 
very acceptable to the colonies, provided they had 
a reasonable number of representatives allowed 
them ; . . . 

" I should hope, too, that by such a union the 
people of Great Britain and the people of the 
colonies would learn to consider themselves as not 
belonging to different communities with different 
interests, but to one community with one interest ; 
which I imagine would contribute to strengthen 
the whole, and greatly lessen the danger of future 
separations. . . . 

" Now, I look on the colonies as so many coun- 
tries gained to Great Britain, and more advantage- 
ous to it than if they had been gained out of the 
seas around its coasts and joined to its lands ; . . . 
and since they are all included in the British empire, 
which has only extended itself by their means, and 
the strength and wealth of the parts are the strength 
and wealth of the whole, what imports it to the 
general state whether a merchant, a smith, or a 
hatter grows rich in Old or New England ? . . . 
And if there be any difference, those who have 
most contributed to enlarge Britain's empire and 
commerce, increase her strength, her wealth, and 

1 John Bigelow, The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin, 
New York, 1887, vol. ii. pp. 343-375, gives the plan in full. 


the numbers of her people, at the risk of their own 
lives and private fortunes in new and strange 
countries, methinks ought rather to expect some 
preference." 1 

The Albany scheme failed of adoption. The 
race was not ripe for Franklin's foresight. 2 Years 
afterwards he wrote : " The different and contrary- 
reasons of dislike to my plan make me suspect 
that it was really the true medium ; and I am 
still of opinion that it would have been happy 
for both sides if it had been adopted. The 
Colonies so united would have been sufficiently 
strong to have defended themselves. There would 
then have been no need of troops from England. 
Of course, the consequent pretext for taxing 
America and the bloody contest it occasioned 
would have been avoided. But such mistakes 
are not new ; history is full of the errors of 
states and princes. Those who govern, having 
much business on their hands, do not generally 
like to take the trouble of considering and carrying 
into execution new projects. The best public 
measures are therefore seldom adopted from 
previous wisdom but forced by the occasion." 3 

1 John Bigelow, The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin, New 
York, 1887 : " Letter of Franklin to Shirley, December 22, 1754/' 
vol. ii. p. 384. 

2 Ency. Brit., vol. i. p. 832 : " In him [Franklin] was the focus 
of the federating impulses of the time. . . . He was, first of 
men, broadly interested in all the colonies, and in his mind the 
future began to be comprehended in its true perspective and 
scale ; and for these reasons to him properly belongs the title of 
'the first American.' " 

3 H. E. Egerton, Federations and Unions within the British 
Empire, Oxford, 1911, p. 16. 


But Franklin's idea did not die. Thomas 
Pownall, just out from England, a man later 
appointed Downing Street's Governor of Massa- 
chusetts, attended the Albany Colonial Conference. 
He heard the deliberations and talked with the 
commissioners and, as he himself wrote later, 
then "first conceived the idea and saw the 
necessity of a general British union." 1 The 
acquaintance he made there with Franklin grew 
into closest friendship. Both men wrote in favour 
of colonial representation ; 2 and present in many 
ways an adequate epitome of the best thought of 
each branch of their civilization. 

Pownall recognized that the race would outgrow 
its London capital. In 1766 he wrote that repre- 
sentatives of the colonies, if apportioned according 
to population, would in time outnumber those of 
Great Britain, and " the centre of power instead of 
remaining fixed as it is now in Great Britain will, 
as the magnitude and interest of the colonies 
increases, be drawn out from these islands by the 
same laws of nature, analogous in all cases, by 
which the centre of gravity, now near the face of 
the sun, would, by an increase of the quantity of 

1 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, pp. 50-51. 

2 Ibid., p. 204, and ante, p. 186, note 1. One of Franklin's 
cleverest hoaxes was, "An Edict of the King of Prussia," 1773, 
proclaiming that the island of Britain was a colony of Prussia, 
having been settled by Angles and Saxons, having been 
protected by Prussia, having been defended by Prussia against 
France in the war just passed, and never having been definitely 
freed from Prussia's rule ; and that, therefore, Great Britain 
should now submit to certain taxes laid by Prussia — the taxes 
being identical with those laid upon American colonies by Great 
Britain. Cf. Ency. Brit., vol. xi. p. 26. 


matter in the planets, be drawn out beyond that 
surface." 1 This result, he thought, might be 
guarded against by stipulating that the colonial 
members were always to come to England. 2 A 
present-day Englander makes no such stipulation. 
Lord Milner in Johannesburg in 1904 stated : 
" I am an Imperialist out-and-out — and by an 
Imperialist I don't mean that which is commonly 
supposed to be indicated by the word. It is not 
the domination of Great Britain over the other 
parts of the Empire that is in my mind when I 
call myself an Imperialist out-and-out. I am an 
Englishman, but I am an Imperialist more than 
an Englishman, and I am prepared to see the 
Federal Council of the Empire sitting in Ottawa, 
in Sydney, in South Africa — sitting anywhere 
within the Empire — if in the great future we can 
only all hold together." 3 

About another objection Pownall consulted 
Franklin. " He had been told that if the colonists 
were to pay the same taxes as people in England 
and, like them, to send members to Parliament, 
equal powers of trade must be conceded. When 
that was done the Atlantic commerce might after- 
wards centre in New York or Boston, and power 
be transferred there from England. ' Which con- 
sequence, however it may suit a citizen of the 
world, must be folly and madness to a Briton.' 

1 Thomas Pownall, The Administration of the Colonies, 3rd ed. 
(1766), quoted by C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 
1908, p. 187. 

2 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, p. 187. 

3 Lord Milner, May 28, 1904, at Navy League Meeting, 
Johannesburg, in Lord Milner, The Nation and the Empire, 
London, 1913, p. 67. 


So exclaimed the Englishman who wrote to his 
colonial friend for a solution of the difficulty. 
The American-born Franklin took quite another 
view. He saw no difficulty at all; he replied 
that the fallacy lay in supposing that gain to a 
British Colony was loss to Britain. He main- 
tained that the whole Empire gained if any part 
of it developed a particular trade, and he pre- 
dicted that without a complete union, by which 
full and equal rights were given, the existing 
system of government could not long be retained. 
Assuming Pownall's premises to be correct he 
inquired, * which is best — to have a total separation 
or a change of the seat of government ? '" 1 

Soon it was too late to answer Franklin's ques- 
tion. A separation took place, and two supreme 
governments divided the responsibility of safe- 
guarding the English-speaking whites. As time 
passed, each portion of the Pan- Angles founded 
colonies. The American colonies were held to 
the American " home " states by means of a federal 
government. The British Isles colonies have, in 
some instances, federated among themselves, so 
that to-day the Britannic power consists of six 
nations. And now all seven nations are appreci- 
ating how superficial are these political separations. 
To-day we have seven central seats of government, 
and after a century of peace, a new question arises 
— whether we should re-form our relations. 

One hundred and twenty-three years after 
Franklin and Pownall so discussed the migration of 
the seat of government of the English-speaking 

1 C. A. W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, London, 1908, pp. 199- 


peoples, another Colonial and another Englander 
corresponded on the same subject. Cecil John 
Rhodes wrote to William T. Stead : " What an 
awful thought it is that if we had not lost America, 
or if even now we could arrange with the present 
members of the United States Assembly and our 
House of Commons, the peace of the world is 
secured for all eternity ! We could hold your 
federal parliament five years at Washington and 
five at London." 1 Stead has recorded a conversa- 
tion of the same year in which Rhodes " expressed 
his readiness to adopt the course from which he 
had at first recoiled — viz. that of securing the unity 
of the English-speaking race by consenting to the 
absorption of the British Empire in the American 
Union if it could not be secured in any other way. 
In his first dream he clung passionately to the 
idea of British ascendancy — this was in 1877 — in 
the English-speaking union of which he then 
thought John Bull was to be the predominant 
partner. But in 1891, abandoning in no whit his 
devotion to his own country, he expressed his 
deliberate conviction that English-speaking re- 
union was so great an end in itself as to justify 
even the sacrifice of the monarchical features and 
isolated existence of the British Empire . . . and 
from that moment the ideal of English-speaking 
reunion assumed its natural and final place as the 
centre of his political aspirations." 2 

As Franklin and Pownall foresaw, the race 

1 W. T. Stead, The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John 
Rhodes, London, 1902, p. 73 : "Letter of Cecil J. Rhodes dated 
August 19 and September 3, 1891, to William T. Stead." 

2 Ibid., p. 102. 


centre moved out of England. Emerson in 1856 
realized that in America " is the seat and centre of 
the British race," * a statement strengthened since 
by the growth of Canada. North America is now 
the centre of Pan- Angle civilization, and Canada 
is the key of the Britannic world. 

The impulse to closer union has never been long 
quiescent. It has been active again and again 
in the minds of men. A century after Franklin 
presented his Albany plan for the race, Joseph 
Howe " looked upon the attainment of complete 
independence of local government in the colonies 
as but a stepping-stone to the assertion of still 
higher national rights, to the acceptance of still 
higher responsibilities ; to some form of substantial 
union among British people, based on considera- 
tions of equal citizenship and the defence of common 
interests. As far back as 1854 he delivered in the 
Nova Scotia Legislature an address, since published 
. . . under the name of the ' Organization of the 
Empire ' which . . . embodies most of what has 
since been said by the advocates of national unity. 
Twelve years later, when on a visit to England, 
he published in pamphlet form an essay bearing 
the same title, and giving his more fully matured 
views upon the question. If the genesis and 
enunciation of the Imperial Federation idea in its 
modern form is to be credited to any one, it must 
be assigned to Joseph Howe for this early and 
comprehensive statement of the main issues in- 
volved. The study of the utterances of this great 
colonist, this champion of colonial rights, may be 

1 R. W. Emerson, English Traits, 1856, Boston reprint, 1894, 
p. 261. 


commended to those shallow critics who profess to 
believe that the proposal for national unity is an 
outcome of Imperial selfishness, and that its opera- 
tion would tend to cramp colonial development." l 

Franklin and Pownall wrote in the days when 
the race knew only the English method of integra- 
tion — "absorptive, incorporative." 2 The various 
American colonies had been experimenting in 
effecting combinations on another principle, but 
their successes had hardly yet proved that the 
same principle in extended form could be applied to 
the desired union between all the governments of 
the English-speaking race. In 1787 was drawn up 
the Constitution of the United States of America, 
and the federal method of integration was put 
definitely to trial. In 1801 Ireland was united 
to Great Britain, but not by federation. Irish 
members were admitted to the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom much after the manner in which 
Franklin had suggested that American members 
should be admitted. In the century or more since 
has been proved the value of federation which 
means neither confederation 3 of groups bound by 
treaties whereby no adequate affirmative policy or 
common government would be possible, nor absorp- 
tion whereby local self-government would be 
obscured or blotted out, but an expedient com- 
bining both local freedom and central strength. 
The South African Colonial writing to the 

1 G. R. Parkin, Imperial Federation, London, 1892, pp. 71-72. 

2 Woodrow Wilson, The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, 
p. 454. 3 Ibid., p. 565. 


Englander who shared his vision takes for granted 
a " federal parliament." 

The forms Pan-Angle governments take are 
now two. One is the simple unitary form in which 
the central government is supreme within the 
sanction of the will of the voters expressed at the 
polls, any other government being a subordinate, 
i.e. a municipal government. The other form is 
not unitary, and the central government is supreme 
in the exercise of certain authority only, other 
governments being in all else supreme and auto- 
nomous partners. 

The states of America, for example, and those of 
Australia are unitary in government. Of the seven 
Pan-Angle nations, three, Newfoundland, New 
Zealand, and the British Isles, are unitary, the 
central government in each being supreme over 
every part and in every respect. 

Of the non-unitary governments there are four : 
the United States, Canada, Australia, and South 
Africa. By an accident of time and place America 
was the first to grapple with the problems which 
called for such a government. Thirteen states 
independent of each other and of any outside 
power found themselves in danger from inter-state 
contentions and external aggressions. Building 
for their very lives, they devised a form of govern- 
ment which has been called federal. In it each 
state kept most of its sovereign powers, but 
delegated certain others of them to a central 
legislature. The federation of the six Australian 
states followed much the same lines. In Canada 
and South Africa the states (in both cases called 

provinces) have retained less of their local auto- 



nomy. The central government in the former 
may with some legislative difficulty and delay 
assume any power it desires, while in the latter 
unrestricted power has been lodged from the 
beginning in the central government. In neither 
of these two nations, however, has the central 
government assumed the exercise of its full possible 
power. In both it co-exists at present with the 
provincial governments after a federal manner, 
obtaining thus the advantages of federation. 

For comparatively restricted areas within which 
problems and opinions are tolerably uniform, a 
unitary government satisfies Pan- Angles. States 
and provinces are such areas. Newfoundland and 
New Zealand are at present such areas. In New- 
foundland the population is very sparse and the 
local variations are slight. It will be many years 
probably before there arises a need and a desire for 
devolution * of power from the present legislature. 
In New Zealand conditions are not so uniform, and 
although a unitary government seems satisfactory 
to-day, the time may readily be imagined when 
a denser population and conflicting interests of 
different sections of the country may make feasible 
local legislatures, each, for its allotted tasks, 
supreme. The only attempt so far towards that 
end originated outside of New Zealand and was 
abandoned before being put into practice. 2 

1 When a federation is built from component parts, certain 
powers are delegated by the parts to the central government. 
When a federation is made by dividing a unitary government, 
certain powers are devoluted by the existing government to the 

2 P. A. Silburn, Governance of Empire, London, 1910, p. 210. 


The unitary method of government has never 
proved itself able successfully to integrate areas 
divided from each other by distance or interests. 
It failed to hold together the first Britannic growth ; 
it has been unable to bring into unity the second 
Britannic growth ; it is acknowledged to be in- 
adequate for such a task. Its weaknesses are 
evident in the British Isles. The British Isles, 
although no larger than many states and provinces, 
is composed of several sections divided by history, 
prejudice, and interest. These are now united into 
one government, in which one central legislature is 
supreme. Questions which may affect some one 
section alone are decided by the representatives of the 
country at large who are possibly both uninterested 
and uninformed. Scottish education, Welsh Church, 
and Irish land bills are dependent on the will of the 
whole British Isles, 1 and a multitude of strictly local 
affairs must wait for the attention of Parliament, 
since no other body has power to deal with them. 

The results of this condition are two : first, a 
congestion of business in Parliament incompatible 

1 Woodrow Wilson, The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, 
p. 473, points out that of the twelve greatest subjects of legisla- 
lation occupying the attention of the British Parliament during 
the last century — Catholic emancipation, parliamentary reform, 
the abolition of slavery, the amendment of the poor laws, the 
reform of municipal corporations, the repeal of the corn laws, the 
admission of the Jews to Parliament, the disestablishment of the 
Irish Church, the alteration of the Irish land laws, the establish- 
ment of national education, the introduction of the ballot, and 
the reform of the criminal law — only two (corn laws and slavery) 
would in America have been subjects for central (federal) 
government regulation. Prior to the American Civil War only 
one of these two, the former, would have been a subject for 
central (federal) government regulation. 


with efficient and intelligent action ; and, second, 
the violation of the principles of self-government 
producing discord between the several sections of 
the country. No one questions that Parliament 
to-day labours under the terrible disadvantage of 
having more to do than it possibly can accomplish. 
Needed and uncontended legislation is delayed for 
years, and such bills as are passed receive often 
inadequate consideration. 1 Though unity has up 
to now been preserved, the lack of local self- 
government has produced discords always more 
or less active. At times these have threatened to 
break out into violent disruption. 

To overcome these weaknesses — to relieve the 
burdens of Parliament and to check the tendency 
to separation — many thinkers and patriots in the 
British Isles are convinced that some devolution of 
power to local legislatures cannot be long delayed. 2 
There is talk of Irish, Scottish, and Welsh home 
rule. The present control of British Isles affairs 
by the Irish members of the House of Commons is 
teaching the desirability of home rule for England. 
Some would re-form the country into still smaller 
governmental sections. In the operation of any 
such plan a central Parliament is to be in control 
of certain nation - wide interests, among which 
would be foreign affairs and the army and navy. 

1 For a detailed account of the difficulties of the British Isles 
Parliament in this connection, cf. An Analysis of the System of 
Government throughout the British Empire, London, 1912, Introduc- 
tion, pp. xii-li. 

2 Cf "Pacificus," Federalism and Home Rule, London, 1910; 
also Arthur Ponsonby, u The Future Government of the United 
Kingdom," in Contemporary Review, London, November 1913. 


" Now, what the Federalist is anxious to set up 
in the United Kingdom is an arrangement upon 
the Canadian model, in which there will be a 
supreme and sovereign Parliament, as at present, 
for the United Kingdom, and under it a certain 
number of subordinate parliaments, to attend to 
local and domestic legislation and administration. 
. . . No Federalist has ever suggested that Ireland 
should be turned into a Canada, although this 
accusation has occasionally been made against 
him by persons who have read his proposals 
carelessly, and have, accordingly, misunderstood 
their nature." 1 

A British Cabinet Minister, speaking in Dundee 
on October 9, 1913, stated : " I am perhaps at an 
unfortunate age for making a prophecy. I am 
ceasing to belong to the young men who dream 
dreams, and I have not yet joined the ranks of 
the old men who see visions ; still I will run the 
risk of prophecy and tell you that the day will 
most certainly come — many of you will live to see 
it — when a federal system will be established in 
these Islands which will give Wales and Scotland 
the control within proper limits of their own 
Welsh and Scottish affairs, which will free the 
Imperial Parliament from the great congestion of 
business by which it is now pressed, and which 
will redound and conduce to the contentment and 
well-being of all our people." 2 

When some such re-formation of government is 
adopted by the British Isles, it will only be utiliz- 

1 " Pacificus/' Federalism and Home Rule, London, 1910, 
pp. xlviii-xlix. 

2 The Times, London, October 10, 1913. 


ing the fruits of the race's experience in other 
parts of our civilization. 

If the first steps to this " home rule all round " 
aimed at in the present (1914) legislation regarding 
Ireland prove defective, in that it concedes what 
is not needed, and denies what is needed, it is 
because the British Isles has not taken to heart 
the inwardness of the federal idea. Lord Dunraven 
pointed this out when he said that " there were only 
two principles on which Home Rule could be 
founded — the Federal system or absolute indepen- 
dence. The present Bill applied to neither and he 
could recognize in it no basis of settlement." 1 
In the following resolution, he indicated how 
the question of " home rule all round " should be 
attacked : " . . . ' The best means of arriving at 
a settlement by consent of the Irish political 
question and of the constitutional difficulties 
connected with it, and of securing the harmonious 
.working of any system of self-government in 
Ireland and the permanency of friendly relations 
between the two islands is to be found in a con- 
vention, or conference, representative of all 
nationalities and parties in the United Kingdom, 
and ... it is the duty of his Majesty's Govern- 
ment to take the initiative in inviting such con- 
vention or conference.'" 2 But the fact that a 
majority of the British Parliament has gone so 
far as to advocate any form of Home Rule is 
evidence of a sincere effort to meet the conditions 
of Pan- Angle individualism where longest sup- 

1 The Times, London, March 3, 1913. Account of meeting 
of delegates of All for Ireland League, Cork, March 1, 1913. 

2 Ibid. 


pressed, and thus hasten the harmonious self- 
government of the British Isles. 

Franklin, when he wrote to Shirley 1 in 1754 
about the need of colonial representation to the 
British Parliament in London, may or may not 
have realized how far the gaining of that desire 
would fail to satisfy. His plan would not have 
produced a federal government for Pan- Angles. 
It would have created a larger unitary govern- 
ment than then existed. There would not have 
been co-ordinated spheres of governmental control. 
The local affairs of Pennsylvania and England, of 
Scotland and New York, would together have been 
in the hands of a Parliament composed of repre- 
sentatives elected from the nation at large. This 
would have been unacceptable to the people of 
England, Pennsylvania, Scotland, and New York. 
They would have asked for something more. A 
lesson can be drawn from this by those who to-day 
urge Australian or Canadian representation in the 
present British Isles Parliament. Such represen- 
tation would subject Britishers to outside control 
of their local problems, just as to-day Englanders 
are affected by Irish representatives voting on 
local problems of England. Conversely, it would 
mean a continued interference in Australian and 
Canadian local problems by the local representa- 
tives of the British Isles — the very thing the 
peoples of the five new nations have already taken 
appropriate steps to obviate. The Irish question 
demonstrates that representation alone is not 
enough for Pan- Angles. The Irish are more than 

1 John Bigelow, The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin, 
New York, 1887, vol. ii. pp. 376-387. 


fairly represented in Parliament. Still they clamour 
for more. That something more desired by all 
Pan- Angles is local autonomy. 

To representation in a central legislature must 
be added the local control of local questions so 
dear to Pan- Angle individualism. This is what 
federalism accomplishes. 1 " Our Federal system 
is the only form of popular government that 
would be possible in a country like ours, with 
an enormous territory and 100,000,000 popula- 
tion. ... But for this safety valve by which 
people of one State can have such State govern- 
ment as they choose, we would never be able to 
keep the union of all the people so harmonious 
as we now have." 2 " The growth of the United 
States has widened political horizons. It has 
proved that immense territorial extent is not 
incompatible, under modern conditions, with that 
representative system of popular government which 
had its birth and development in England, and its 
most notable adaptation in America. It has shown 
that the spread of a nation over vast areas, includ- 
ing widely-separated states with diverse interests, 
need not prevent it from becoming strongly bound 
together in a political organism which combines 

1 As federation is used in these pages for combinations of 
self-governing groups, no allusion is here made to any plans for 
uniting dependencies for administrative purposes such as that 
contained in C. S. Salmon's The Caribbean Confederation, London, 
1888, or in the established grouping of dependent areas now 
styled "Federated Malay States" — concerning which latter, see 
Frank Swettenham, British Malaya, London, 1907. Such bear 
no comparison with self-governing federations. 

2 W. H. Taft, Popular Government, New Haven, Connecticut, 
1913, p. 145. 


the advantages of national greatness and unity of 
purpose with jealously guarded freedom of local 
self-government." x 

The indefinite governmental relationships be- 
tween the Britannic nations are to-day satis- 
factory to no one. Britannic closer union forms 
the thesis of much writing and speech making 
and the subject of much earnest study. 2 That 
the demands of the situation can be met ade- 
quately only by federation seems evident to many. 
This thought is thus expressed by Milner : "If, 
as I fervently hope, the present loose association 
of the self-governing states of the Empire grows 
in time into a regular partnership, it can only be, 
as it seems to me, by the development of a new 
organ of government representative of them all, 
and dealing exclusively with matters of common 
interest. Jt would only heighten confusion to 
bring representatives of the Dominions into the 
House of Commons. And if, as I think everyone 
would admit, it is impracticable to bring them into 
the House of Commons, they would certainly say, 
* Thank you for nothing ' if we were to offer them 
a few seats in the House of Lords." 3 

Mr. Winston Churchill continued in his speech 
at Dundee : " I tell you further that that system 
when erected and established will in itself be only 
the forerunner and nucleus of a general scheme of 
Imperial federation which will gather together in 

1 G. R. Parkin, Imperial Federation, London, 1892, p. 33. 

2 As an example, cf. Alexander Hamilton : An Essay on Ameri- 
can Union, by F. S. Oliver, London, 1 906. 

3 Lord Milner, April 28, 1910, at Compatriots' Club, London, 
in Lord Milner, The Nation and the Empire, London, 1913, p. 454. 


one indissoluble circle the British people here and 
beyond the seas." 1 Rhodes wrote over twenty 
years ago : " I will frankly add that my interest in 
the Irish question has been heightened by the fact 
that in it I see the possibility of the commencement 
of changes which will eventually mould and weld 
together all parts of the British Empire. 

" The English are a conservative people, and like 
to move slowly, and, as it were, experimentally. 
At present there can be no doubt that the time of 
Parliament is overcrowded with the discussion of 
trivial and local affairs. Imperial matters have to 
stand their chance of a hearing alongside of railway 
and tram bills. Evidently it must be a function 
of modern legislation to delegate an enormous 
number of questions which now occupy the time 
of Parliament, . . . 

" But side by side with the tendency of decen- 
tralisation for local affairs, there is growing up a 
feeling for the necessity of greater union in Im- 
perial matters. . . ." 2 

Not alone the federation of the Britannic nations, 
but the federation of the whole Pan- Angle people, 

1 The Times, London, October 10, 1913. Cf. ante, p. 197. 

2 Letter of Rhodes to Parnell, June 19, 1888, quoted in 
W. T. Stead, The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes, 
London, 1902, pp. 122-124. On p. 120, Stead states as to 
Rhodes' contribution to the Irish party : " The contract between 
the African and the Irishman was strictly limited to the conver- 
sion of Home Rule from a disruptive to a federative measure. 
It had no relation directly or indirectly to any of Mr Rhodes' 
Irish- African schemes. The whole story is told at length by 
' Vindex ' in an appendix to The Political Life and Speeches of Mr. 
Cecil Rhodes, from which I quote these letters." 


is the end to be sought. Behind Rhodes' " greater 
union in Imperial matters " lay his vision of a 
common government over all English-speaking 
people. 1 If we are to preserve our civilization and 
its benefits to our individual citizens, we must 
avoid frictions among ourselves and take a united 
stand before the world. Only a common govern- 
ment will ensure this. 

The four federations have been the results of 
similar practical impulses. The separate states and 
provinces realized their mutual need of co-operation 
to avoid conflict among themselves and to with- 
stand enemies, actual or possible, from without. 
In some cases one, in some cases the other, of 
these arguments was most pressing at the time of 
federation. American states were vexed by many 
custom houses and were endangered by European 
civilization and the savagery of the American 
Indians. Canada was split by two languages and 
feared the waxing strength of America. The 
Australian and South African internal contentions 
arising over customs and railway rivalries were 
overshadowed by ominous additions to German 
holdings in the South Pacific and in East and 
West Africa respectively. Similar reasons are 
adduced to-day in favour of the federation of the 
six Britannic nations. 

The union of the " United Collonyes of New 
England " in 1643 appears inadequate and impotent 
in the light of our subsequent "closer unions." 
But it was the first voluntary common government 
instituted by separate governments of English- 

1 W. T. Stead, The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John 
Rhodes, London, 1902, p. 102, pp. 51-77 and other pages. 


speaking people. 1 The reasons for this co-opera- 
tion are stated in terms worthy the attention and 
study of present-day Pan- Angles: "... and 
whereas in our settling (by a wise providence of 
God) we are further dispersed upon the sea-coasts 
and rivers then was at first intended, so thatt wee 
cannott (according to our desire) with conveniencie 
communicate in one government and jurisdiction ; 
and whereas we live incompassed with people of 
severall nations and strange languages which here- 
after may prove injurious to us and our posterity : 
and forasmuch as the natives have formerly com- 
mitted sundry insolencies and outrages upon 
severall plantations of the English and have of late 
combined against us and seeing, by reason of the 
sad distractions in England, which they have heard 
of, and by which they know we are hindered both 
from thatt humble way of seeking advice, and 
reaping those comfortable frutes of protection, 

1 P. A. Silburn, The Governance of Empire, London, 1910, 
p. 191 : "Haifa century before the union of England and Scot- 
land was brought about, a union of British colonies had been 
successfully achieved. It was in May 1643 that a convention of 
colonial representatives confederated the British colonies of 
Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven as the 
1 United Colonies of New England.' The negotiations leading 
up to this confederation had taken six years, but when once the 
union was effected its advantages were felt immediately. At 
this time England, engaged elsewhere, had neither the time nor 
the inclination to interfere with her American colonies. The 
newly-formed confederation enjoyed almost complete liberty. 
A year after the union we find this confederation negotiating 
treaties with the French and projecting defences against the 
Dutch. But this, the first union of colonies in the Empire, was 
not a legislative one, it was simply an agreement of ( offence and 
defence, advice and assistance.' " 


which att other times we might well expect, we 
therefore doe conceive itt our bounden dutye 
without delay to enter into a present consociation 
amongst ourselves for mutuall help and strength in 
all our future concernments, thatt ... we bee 
and continue one, according to the tennure and 
true meaning of the ensueing articles." 1 

Federation was evolved by our race. Though 
its use was only dimly understood in the years 
that followed 1643, its powers are now known to 
us. It has proved the means of welding many of 
our once jealous and discordant units into con- 
centrated and self-protective powers. Applied to 
all our nations, federation would produce that 
co-operation necessary for the survival of our 
civilization, yielding both the freedom we demand 
and the strength that is indispensable — that Pan- 
Angle paradox of flexity and firmness. 

1 H. E. Egerton, Federations and Unions within the British 
Empire, Oxford, 191 1, p. 103, "Articles of Confoederation betwixt 
the Plantations under the Government of the Massachusetts, the 
Plantations under the Government of New Plymouth, the 
Plantations under the Government of Conecticutt, and the 
Government of Newhaven, with the Plantations in combination 
with Itt." 



To maintain the individual liberty of its citizens 
from alien interference is the task before each of 
the seven Pan- Angle nations. Whether a closer 
union of the six units of the Britannic power is 
sufficient insurance of the safety of each, and 
whether the United States standing alone has 
sufficient margin of safety, are at least debatable 
questions. Some foreign power arguing in the 
negative might win. But that a closer union of 
the entire self-governing English-speaking race 
would be strong enough to protect each of its 
component nations is here assumed to be not a 
debatable question. It is here postulated that 
upwards of one hundred and forty- one million 
English-speaking whites are strong enough to hold 
their own against the forces of the world for con- 
siderable time to come. The problem resolves 
itself into a struggle for the supremacy, and finally 
for the survival, of the Pan- Angle civilization. 

We can federate. All our past history teaches 

The Britannic nations and America all contain 
an individualistic form of patriotism that lends 
itself to Pan-Angle federation. Just as the 


American Pan - Angle gives allegiance to the 
ideals behind the dull earth he calls his home, be 
it city, town, township or parish ; so he gives a 
larger allegiance to his state ; and a still more 
comprehensive loyalty to his nation of forty-eight 
states. Just as the Britannic Pan-Angle holds 
in affection his throbbing factory city, or sheep- 
trimmed shire, or township lush with ripening 
wheat ; so he holds in greater affection " That 
blessed plot, that earth, that realm, that England," 
or " that " New South Wales, or " that " Saskatche- 
wan ; and in still greater affection the British Isles, 
or Australia, or Canada. Among the Britannic 
Pan- Angles is now growing a further patriotism 
for the ideal of a Britannic whole of which each of 
the six nations would be a part. Throughout the 
Pan- Angle world let us add to these patriotisms 
for our dreamed-of Britannic whole and for our 
United States a still larger patriotism for our 
English - speaking civilization, our Pan - Angle 

Patriotism cannot attach itself to treaties or 
alliances, " The very nature of an arbitration board 
is negative." 1 Nor can it profess "loyalty ,; to a 
nation not its own. A Massachusetts man cannot 
be loyal to New York State, nor a Victorian to 
New South Wales, nor an Englander to Scotland. 
Nor can an American be loyal to New Zealand, 
an Australian to South Africa, nor a Britisher to 
Canada. But a Massachusetts man can be loyal 
to America, a Victorian to Australia, and an 
Englander to the British Isles. And all three of 
these men, when their nations are part of the 

1 A. L. Burt, Imperial Architects , Oxford, 1913, p. 86. 


federation of the English-speaking people, can be 
loyal Pan- Angles. 

Expressive of multiple patriotisms fly a multi- 
plicity of flags. Into battle alongside of the Stars 
and Stripes go the American state flags. They 
know no jealousy of the national banner. Its 
thirteen stripes stand for the thirteen independent 
nations that originally federated ; its stars, now in- 
creased to forty-eight, stand each for a state now 
bound into the Union. It is not forgotten how the 
men of the flag of the Maple Leaf and those of the 
Four-starred and Five-starred Southern Crosses 
fought in South Africa alongside the men under 
the Union Jack. There is as yet no Britannic flag. 
The Union Jack is the British flag. It is not, as 
often called, " the English flag " ; it never has 
been. It was formed of crosses, the emblems of 
three nations now united into one nation, the 
British Isles. As the Union Jack and the Stars 
and Stripes were made, so we can make a Pan- 
Angle flag which every English-speaking man will 
instinctively salute. Such a flag will subtract no 
glory from the cherished symbols of our local 
prides. Loyalty to our common race in no way 
forbids loyalty to our present local groups. All 
these our flags, our loyalties, our groups, are to 
protect and to be protected by all Pan-Angles. 

Federation can be accomplished by either of two 
procedures : the combination of the seven Pan- 
Angle nations directly, as seven independent units ; 
or the combination of the United States and a 
Britannic Federation, after this latter has been 
formed. Arguments for Britannic federation are 
arguments for Pan-Angle federation. The man 


who has persuaded himself of the soundness of the 
former will be in a position to appreciate the sound- 
ness of the latter. These pages are intended to 
set forth the necessity and inevitableness of Pan- 
Angle federation, by whichever method attained, 
and as such are in thorough accord with all efforts 
towards Britannic federation. Either course is 
possible, if delay does not furnish opportunities for 
our separate destruction in the meantime by some 
rival civilization. 

All over the Britannic world are men working 
for "closer union." "The wisest and most far- 
seeing Imperialists have steadily maintained that 
the ultimate end of the whole movement is Federa- 
tion." 1 They are working now with only the six 
Britannic nations as their acknowledged field. 
Organized and unorganized, they are seeking 
patiently and intelligently for the safety of their 
respective nations, which they know is bound up 
in the safety of the whole people. They know the 
political ideals of their race. They know that 
though the unrepresented maybe spasmodically will- 
ing to waive their rights in times of great common 
danger, they none the less believe that " taxation 
without representation is tyranny." These men 
know also that money gifts by any Pan- Angle 
nation to a navy controlled by another Pan -Angle 
nation is contrary to the political instincts of all 
involved. They know that " mutual funk," though 
it may hold their nations together for a time, is no 
safeguard against the future. They are working to 
create a political entity, able by the determination of 
its representatives to swing the whole of its strength 

1 A. L. Burt, Imperial Architects, Oxford, 1913, p. 125. 



at once against any foe. These men have under- 
taken to persuade the Britannic Pan-Angle nations 
to put aside local prejudices and to support the 
whole of which each is a part. 

Plans for Britannic " closer union " range from a 
scheme for Britannic representation in the British 
Parliament at London, such as Franklin advocated 
before the race had evolved federalism, through 
schemes for an alliance of the six nations with a 
capital outside the British Isles * to a plan for 
definite federation, including a new Britannic 
Parliament to be constituted of the representatives 
from each of the six nations. 2 

Being now in the stage of vague alliance, it may 
be that the Britannic Pan-Angles must accomplish 
definitely the alliance stage as a step on the road 
to federation. If so, those who favour a Britannic 
alliance 3 have the wisdom of the race on their side. 
But the same wisdom prophesies that the negative 
advantages of alliance will have to be changed later 
to the affirmative strength of a common govern- 
ment. Federation has been " the great ideal of the 
nineteenth century," 4 and apparently continues to 

1 Richard J ebb, Colonial Nationalism, London, 1905, p, 336: 
"The imperial city shall lose her pride of place. In another 
seagirt isle, by the margin of the Pacific . . . sleeps a fair city." 
According to Mrs. Henshaw, F.R.G.S., in United Empire, London, 
January 1914, p. 80, Vancouver Island was named by Sir Francis 
Drake, 1579, New Albion. 

2 A resume of projects for Britannic federation is given in 
A. L. Burt, Imperial Architects, Oxford, 1913, pp. 152-195; the 
necessity of, and possible transitional stages on the way towards, 
federation are discussed, ibid., pp. 1 96-225. 

3 Richard Jebb, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, 1905 ; 
and The Britannic Question, London, 1913. 

4 A. L. Burt, Imperial Architects, Oxford, 1913, p. 147. 


gain advocates. Britannic " present ' imperial 
architects ' are building more carefully and labori- 
ously than did their predecessors." 1 

The greater part of the work for federation, 
either Britannic or Pan- Angle, has already been 
done for us. The explorer, the trader, the mission- 
ary, and the soldier have won for us the eminence 
from which we are now able to survey the world 
and form our plans. The statesmen who in our 
many legislative halls have laboured to fit forms of 
government to the needs of the governed have 
tested for us the material for our building and have 
discarded what was ill-suited to our purposes. The 
millions of individuals who have held true to their 
Pan-Angle ideals have bequeathed them to us for 
inspiration. It is for us to continue the work 
begun three centuries and more ago. 

What remains to be done is to follow the path 
of our previous successes and avoid a repetition of 
our failures. These failures each nation can find 
often in the events of its own history without turn- 
ing to the histories of other Pan- Angles ; and these 
successes each nation can find in the histories of 
others, quite as well as in that of its own. Such 
seeking will make for a becoming modesty towards 
each other, and by it we shall lose nothing. We 
are not dealing in this matter with our inferiors or 
our betters. We are dealing with each other, to 
whom we cannot give, and with whom we cannot 
curry, favour. Conciliation among us is not less 

1 Ibid., Introduction by H. E. Egerton, p. vi. 


necessary than compromise ; without conciliation 
in the past we should not have framed successful 
constitutions. To-day, as in the folk-moots of our 
political ancestors, — " No man dictates to the 
assembly : he may persuade, but cannot command." 1 
There is no room for hypocrisy among free whites 
who talk English. In our dealings with each other 
neither force nor intrigue should have place. Our 
history shows that if we adhere to these ideals we 
can succeed in co-operation. 

We must avoid interfering with each other. 
Interference even when actuated by the best of 
motives leads, as Pan- Angles have repeatedly ex- 
perienced, to disastrous frictions and ruptures. 
This knowledge we have repeatedly bought at 
great cost. So well has the lesson been learned, 
that even in cases where interference is constitutional 
and where circumstances seem to justify it, a Pan- 
Angle government first tries persuasion. The 
United States Federal Government may consider 
a Californian alien land act contrary to a United 
States treaty ; the British Parliament may consider 
the Ulster agitation serious enough to justify 
coercion : both know that conciliation and persua- 
sion are the safe and permanent means to employ 
to right whatever the wrong may be. Interference 
augments stubbornness; persuasion hastens co- 

More than this, interference leads to failure. In 
1849, the British Privy Council drafted a bill for 
the federation of the Australian colonies. It was 
not made by those for whose use it was intended. 

1 Arthur Murphy, The Works of Cornelius Tacitus, London, 
1793, vol. iv. p. 17. 


Its clauses did "not show any close grip of the 
subject, or sign that their authors realized how they 
could be worked in practice." 1 Nothing came of 
the plan. The only purpose it served was to 
illustrate the futility of one Pan- Angle nation 
acting for another. In 1819-1820 began the 
Britannic immigrant occupation of South Africa. 2 
In 1875 the British Isles government suggested 
that the various colonies in South Africa should be 
combined. 8 Viewed in the knowledge of to-day 
it almost appears such a step would have been 
advisable. The best intentions must be imputed 
to the outside government. Had this action been 
advocated by the South Africans, some kind of 
joint government might have resulted. Since it 
was not, the plan was merely a source of increased 
hard feeling between colonists of Dutch and British 
descent, and is to be included with other instances 
of British interference which were the major causes 
of the long and bitter Great Boer War. Each of 
these nations, Australia and South Africa, when it 
was ready and in its own way, produced for itself 
a plan of common government. A Britisher in the 
highest administrative office in South Africa wrote 
in 1907 : " It is a modern axiom of British policy 
that any attempt to manage the domestic affairs of 
a white population by a continuous exercise of the 
direct authority of the Imperial Parliament, in 
which the people concerned are not represented, is, 
save under very special circumstances, a certain 

1 H. E. Egerton, Federations and Unions within the British 
Empire, Oxford, 191 1, p. 183. 

2 W. B. Worsfold, The Union oj South Africa, London, 1912, 
p. 104. 3 Ency. Brit., vol. xxv. p. 475. 


path to failure." 1 American experience goes still 
further. There, every community is represented in 
every government having legislative jurisdiction 
over it. Yet it has been proved advisable to leave 
certain spheres of legislation solely to the wishes 
of the community affected. 

For many years the British Isles has been the 
Pan- Angle nation which, from its position, was 
most tempted to interfere with the affairs of the 
others. The lessons its failures set forth may be 
taken to heart by the younger nations as they 
grow in strength. Neither America, nor Canada, 
nor Australia, nor South Africa, nor New Zealand, 
nor Newfoundland can at any time in their future 
afford to make the mistake of trying to compel 
one of the six other nations. An advantage of 
numbers, or position, or wealth, may lie at some 
time with any one of them. On that one, then, will 
rest the obligation of keeping its hands off the 
others. Particularly does this apply to that one 
of us whose very existence is due to its revolt 
against interference, but hardly less to those others 
of us whose more peaceful origins were made 
possible by an already won revolution. 

Federation should be attained through familiar 
governmental forms, not through innovations. 
Burke knew his civilization's aversion to change 
which " alters the substance of the objects them- 
selves, and gets rid of all their essential good as 
well as of all the accidental evil annexed to them," 

1 A Review of the Present Mutual Relations of the British South 
African Colonies, to which is appended a Memorandum on South 
African Railway Unification, " Printed by Authority " [Johannes- 
burg, 1907], p. 5. 


whose results " cannot certainly be known before- 
hand." He knew his civilization's belief in reform 
— " a direct application of a remedy to the grievance 
complained of. So far as that is removed, all is 
sure. It stops there ; and if it fails, the substance 
which underwent the operation, at the very worst, 
is but where it was." 1 In this re-form, the essence 
of our civilization — our language, our individualism, 
our standards of living based on land plenty — should 
be left unchanged. The new growth, federation, 
will "remedy the grievance complained of" — the 
danger of the extinction of our civilization. 

Pending federation, the Pan-Angle nations 
must on no account weaken each other, and so 
the entire race, with war. Much faith is put, in 
these days, in arbitration, but on false presumptions. 
No so-called " international arbitration court " in 
existence has any authority whatsoever. 2 Such a 
body is of value only when it is giving advice to 
contestants who greatly desire to come to a friendly 
agreement, and who, for the sake of peace, are 
predisposed to take the " court's " advice. Even 
then its value is not great, for such contestants 
might very probably, without its aid, have come 
to a peaceable understanding. The Pan-Angle 
nations do most heartily desire peace among them- 
selves. They are then the best calculated to find 
arbitration useful. The question thus arises whether 
some tribunal can be established on Pan-Angle 
soil, for the settlement of Pan- Angle inter-national 

1 Quoted in Woodrow Wilson, Mere Literature, Boston, 1900, 
p. 149. 2 Cf. ante, p. 121. 


disputes. It would be a makeshift and powerless, 
until by the establishment of a common govern- 
ment it ceased to be inter-national, and became a 
potent source of justice under the Pan-Angle 
federation. 1 It is, however, a straw we well might 
grasp until we reach a firmer footing. The greatest 
advantage of an organized body for Pan- Angle 
arbitration is that from it might develop something 
more practicable, as from the Mary land- Virginia 
Conference at Alexandria in 1785 2 and as from 
the South African Railway Rates Conference in 
1908 3 developed respectively the federations of the 
United States and South Africa. 

Other stepping-stones ready for our use are to 
be found in Britannic-American conferences on 
matters of mutual interest. In February 1908 a 
conference on the conservation of the natural 
resources of North America was held at Washing- 
ton, at which three Pan- Angle nations were repre- 
sented by delegates. 4 Some of the subjects suitable 
for such discussion are forests, river flowage for 
power or irrigation purposes, and migrating birds. 
If a conference were held for mutual information 
on sea-fisheries, all our nations might well send 
delegates. A similar opportunity is afforded in 
the urgent need of making uniform and sensible 
the spelling of our language. At a meeting in 
connection with the Conference of Education 

1 The growth of inter-cantonal arbitration in Switzerland, 
leading to present federal court, is alluded to in Woodrow 
Wilson, The State, 1898, rev. ed., Boston, 1911, p. 328. 

2 Ency. Brit., vol. xxvii. p. 685. 

3 Ibid., vol. xxv. p. 482. 

4 Britannica Year Book, London, 1913, p. 664<. 


Associations in London, January 5, 1914, it was 
stated " that an international conference should be 
summoned at which all parts of the British Empire 
and the United States should be represented." 1 

However great the good resulting from such 
conferences in relation to their stated objects, it 
may some day appear insignificant compared to the 
assistance rendered towards producing federation. 

Quicker and cheaper communication is working 
steadily towards better Pan- Angle understanding. 
International postal arrangements date only from 
1874, but two-cent (penny in the British Isles, New 
Zealand, Australia, and South Africa) postage is 
now so general from points within to other points 
within the Pan-Angle world, that by far the 
majority of inter- Pan- Angle letters have the 
advantage of that rate. Land and water tele- 
graphs by wire and wireless are steadily linking 
up points further and further apart, and rates are 
becoming cheaper. The telephone is now a common 
household necessity over much of the Pan- Angle 
world, and bids fair in time to conquer distances 
as effectively as do telegraph lines. Every such 
agency, producing a very real " closer union," is a 
factor in promoting Pan-Angle federation. 

The cheapness and speed of travel are increasing 
at rates to which no bounds can reasonably be set. 
Steamers, on which we so largely depend as inter- 
Pan- Angle carriers, yearly serve more routes, are 
more numerous and faster. We shift easily from one 
country to another as business or inclination takes 
us. Ambassador Page has proposed that newspaper 
men from the British Isles and America serve an 

1 The Times Weekly Edition, London, January 9, 1914. 


apprenticeship on journalistic staffs in each other's 
countries. 1 The imperial "grand tour" of the British 
Isles parliamentary party, recently completed, 2 gave 
British politicians, better than would any number 
of voluminous reports, an opportunity to appreci- 
ate the needs and aspirations of the five other 
Britannic nations. The celebration of the Centen- 
ary of Peace will this year furnish innumerable 
similar opportunities. Every personal acquaintance 
of one Pan- Angle with the country of other Pan- 
Angles makes for the understanding that must 
precede federation. 

The formation of a Pan- Angle federation must 
depend in the end on our voters* who are the source 
of first and final appeal in our political problems. 
It will be achieved when they are self-persuaded 
that it is desirable, that is, when they have been 
educated to see its necessity. Only such means of 
education may properly be used as will open the 
path to self-persuasion. Among these, two readily 
suggest themselves. The first is the educative 
work that can be done by associations of those 
aroused to interest in the matter. The second is 
the educative influence of travel and sojourn of 
Pan- Angles in each other's countries. 

Voluntary associations established by private 
initiative are among us recognized means of 
furthering reform. Through public discussion, 
whether printed or spoken, they have fostered 
many of the great movements for which we all 

1 The Times Weekly Edition, London, December 19, 1913. 
Account of Speech of American Ambassador at dinner of the 
Institute of Journalists, London, December 13, 1913. 

2 United Empire, London, January 1914, p. 13. 


are now grateful. " Discussion is the greatest of 
all reformers. It rationalizes everything it touches. 
It robs principles of all false sanctity and throws 
them back upon their reasonableness. If they 
have no reasonableness, it ruthlessly crushes them 
out of existence and sets up its own conclusions in 
their stead.'' 1 These associations and their beliefs, 
if not supplying a public need, wither and die. 
But if the times call for them, movements are 
started which pass through a regular growth from 
insignificance and obscurity to contempt and 
ridicule, followed by public opposition and finally 
by success. Such have been the histories of the 
freedom of conscience, the abolition of slavery, and 
a host of similar triumphs. Men of like ideals 
associate themselves together, take a name that 
proclaims their tenets, and spend their time and 
energy and money to set forth the truth as they 
see it. Everyone is given a chance to learn, but no 
one is compelled to believe. No purpose can be 
so lofty, no course of action so advantageous, that 
it does not need expounding. The countless peace 
societies and the millions spent in that cause bear 
witness. Meeting places must be hired, literature 
must be printed and posted, advertising in its many 
forms must not be neglected. All this means 
sacrifice of some sort from somebody — obviously 
from those who have the success of the work at 
heart. In every Pan-Angle nation can be found 
plenty of organizations which are doing on a small 
scale in reference to some local interest just what 
some non-local, inter-national organization could 

1 Woodrow Wilson, The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, 
p. 139. 


well do on a large scale for such an ideal as Pan- 
Angle federation. The organization should be on 
an inter-Pan- Angle basis, if for no other reason 
than to make for uniformity in its efforts and to 
prevent it from slipping into local points of view. 
As the demand for Pan- Angle federation grows, 
practical politics will not remain insensible to it. 
Then will be the time to marshal to its aid forces 
such as have finally established by law the present 
nationhood of each of us. 

In this labour of education we must work openly 
in the presence of each other and under the scrutiny 
of the nations of the world. If we were Germans 
or Japanese, an international coup might be accom- 
plished by diplomatic work unknown to the voters, 
and the affair put through with secrecy and 
despatch. It is vain to wish for such a style of 
procedure, and we have no desire, in this case, to 
change from the more laborious and tedious method 
of popular education and individual action. So to 
change would demonstrate that we had lost the 
very essence of our civilization — the initial as well 
as the final control of our own destinies. We must 
work openly, because it is one of our inestimable 
privileges to make up our own minds. 

Not only can individual initiative accomplish 
this work, it can do it better than can any other 
method. Ideas of state interference under the 
guise of public ownership are making headway all 
over the Pan-Angle world. One industry after 
another, for one reason or another, is removed from 
the field of private endeavour, and is run for good 
or ill by governments. It has never been thus 
with our political undertakings. The spectacle of 


a Pan-Angle government calling on all good 
citizens to aid in celebrating a Twenty-first of 
November, or a Twenty-fourth of May, or a Fourth 
of July is so unheard of as to be laughable, 1 and it 
is to be hoped that in the matter of Pan-Angle 
federation the people will be the compelling power 
forcing their respective governments to action. 

Of the promotion of travel and sojourn of Pan- 
Angles in each other's countries we have one 
notable example. Cecil John Rhodes, wishing to 
instil in the minds of Britannic Pan- Angles " the 
advantage to the Colonies as well as to the United 
Kingdom of the retention of the unity of the 
Empire,'' 2 and desiring "to encourage and foster 
an appreciation of the advantages which I implicitly 
believe will result from the union of the English- 
speaking peoples throughout the world and to 
encourage in the students from the United States 
of North America ... an attachment to the 
country from which they have sprung but without 
I hope withdrawing them or their sympathies from 
the land of their adoption or birth," 3 directed the 
trustees of his estate to establish scholarships at the 
University of Oxford. Each year picked men 
from English-speaking lands travel to England, 
enrol themselves in this Pan- Angle university, and 
there measure themselves against representatives 
of all their race. At the end of three years they 
return to their respective countries. The book 

1 The French Government Proclamations posted in Paris (in 
1909) concerning the 14th of July called on all good citizens to 
help the government celebrate the day. 

2 W. T. Stead, The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John 
Rhodes, London, 1902, p. 23. 3 Ibid., pp. 24-29. 


knowledge they have acquired could have been 
furnished by any one of many universities. But 
Rhodes' sagacity has given them infinitely more. 
They have lived and studied and travelled in what 
is truly the Mother Country of us all. They have 
become conscious of their fellow Pan- Angles and 
have made their fellow Pan-Angles conscious of 
them. Their understanding and sympathy is freed 
for all time from narrow prejudices. 

The work so generously begun should be ex- 
tended. Not only in the British Isles but in 
North America, in South Africa, and in Australasia 
young Pan-Angles should be brought in touch 
with the other portions of our race, and should see 
at first hand what problems require solving by us 
throughout the world. Not a Pan- Angle university 
from M c Gill to Dunedin, from Ann Arbor to 
Stellenbosch, but would welcome some exchange of 
students similar to the growing system of exchange 
professors. Not one, if it could offer scholarships 
to the youth of the other nations, but would have 
enlarged the scope of its usefulness and have 
grown from local to inter-national importance. 
Patriotic Pan- Angles by endowing such scholar- 
ships could hasten the accomplishment of the Pan- 
Angle federation, and thus share in ensuring the 
safety of every Pan- Angle nation, and in securing 
our civilization for the benefit of ourselves and for 
the peace of the world. 

Meanwhile no vision of future Pan-Angle safety 
should blind any one of us to his country's present 
needs. In the interim before federation, we must 
so strengthen each of our respective nations as 
best to weather the storm of adversity should it 


burst upon us before co-operation is secured. 
Simultaneously with the recession to home waters 
of the British Isles fleet, the younger Britannic 
nations are taking appropriate steps to ensure 
their separate interests. This is an evidence that 
each recognizes danger. Each assumes that these 
defensive efforts are not induced by the fear of 
other Pan- Angles. This is no place to discuss 
the compulsory military service already established 
in New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa, nor 
to suggest that it would not be needed were 
Pan-Angle federation already an accomplished 
fact. Nor is this a suitable occasion to discuss 
the policies, strengths, or weaknesses of separate 
Britannic or Pan-Angle navies. America must 
be equal to the emergency of defending all Pan- 
Angles who would seek its protection if the 
British Isles fleet were to suffer a serious 
setback. Wisely, America and Canada waste 
no Pan-Angle funds in fortifications on their 
long boundary or in war vessels on the Great 
Lakes. But they should both maintain on salt 
water navies, which they can use for the joint 
interests of Pan-Angles. Canada and America 
may soon need to co-operate with Australasia in 
solving the problems of the Pacific. 1 Pan- Angle 
nations may severally make alliances with foreign 
powers for the purpose of protecting us all. One 
of them has already done so. 2 But peoples who 
are strong enough make no foreign alliances. 

As we work towards federation we must not be 

1 Cf. R. M. Johnston in the New York Times, November 16, 
1913, p. 5 ; and Round Table, London, June 1913, pp. 572-583. 

2 British-Japanese treaty and French understanding. 


discouraged at our slow rate of visible progress. 
For " slow thought is the ballast of a self-governing 
state." 1 The growth of the federal idea may be 
none the less vigorous because its fruitage appears 
long delayed. These pages abound with examples 
of the fact that we are slow to move politically. 
Were it otherwise, the autonomous nations of 
the Britannic world would long since have had 
representation in some common parliament, would 
have established a single final court of appeal, and 
a common citizenship ; an overburdened British 
Parliament would no longer legislate on English 
municipal drainage, affairs of the dependencies, 
and questions of inter-Pan-Angle concern. As 
it is, the five younger Britannic nations, realizing 
tardily that the British navy no longer adequately 
protects them, have not as yet bestirred themselves 
to effect more cohesive and coherent political 
relations with each other, and between themselves 
and the British Isles. America, astride the 
Western Hemisphere, in her own estimation secure 
against invasion, is taken up with internal develop- 
ment, and but seldom, even since the last Pan- 
Angle war with Spain, looks out at the increasing 
pressure beyond her borders. 

We move slowly. Pan -Angle federation is 
still a dream. But no one can foresee how rapidly 
external pressure may turn dreams into practical 
politics. The federation of the Pan- Angles may 
be forced upon us — ready or not. Or we may find 
some day that it is too late to federate. 

Our method of combining, the distribution of 
powers between the existing governments and the 

1 Woodrow Wilson, Mere Literature, Boston, 1900, p. 98. 


new government, it is not here necessary or appro- 
priate to discuss, other than to acknowledge that 
our history confesses that federation is the present 
ideal of government of this civilization. In other 
instances of suggested closer union, "The advo- 
cates of national consolidation have been constantly 
subjected, as everyone familiar with current dis- 
cussion knows, to two diametrically opposite forms 
of criticism. They are vigorously reproached . . . 
for not stating in detail the method by which their 
purposes are to be accomplished ; they are ridiculed 
... as people who aim at binding together by 
means of a ' cut and dried plan ' an Empire 
which has hitherto depended upon slow processes 
of growth for its constitutional development." 1 
Enough that in our previous separate histories 
we have had constitutional conventions to draw 
up both national and state constitutions. Many 
men who have taken part in such conventions are 
now living. What we have acquired a habit of 
doing on a large scale, we can do again on a larger 
scale. Such representatives can construct, for sub- 
mission to our voters, a framework of federal Pan- 
Angle government. 

With the voters of the seven Pan-Angle nations 
rest the decisions of when and how our co-operation 
is to be accomplished. That it is to be accom- 
plished many now earnestly believe. And of it 
many can now say, as did Washington in the 
American Constitutional Convention : " Let us 
raise a standard to which the wise and honest can 
repair." Before that future constitutional conven- 
tion can have been accomplished, men will have 

1 G. R. Parkin, Imperial Federation, London, 1892, p. 296. 



gathered together the wisdom of the race, and will 
have drawn up a constitution better than any now 
in use. Voters from the ends of the earth will 
discuss what our governmental framework should 
be, and, although our statesmen will act the major 
parts, we may agree with Burke : " I have never 
yet seen any plan which has not been mended by 
the observations of those who were much inferior 
in understanding to the person who took the lead 
in the business." 1 

What is desirable in this federation to preserve 
ourselves from the menace of other civilizations? 
How shall we balance our powers to ensure freedom 
to the individual and freedom to local groups to 
follow their individual yearnings with safety to 
them and to us all ? How shall we bind ourselves 
for that all-time, the indefinite future, so that we 
shall be gladly bound, and yet be freemen still? 
" If, . . . in the famous words of Lincoln, we as 
a body in our minds and hearts 'highly resolve' 
to work for the general recognition by society of 
the binding character of international duties and 
rights as they arise within the Anglo-Saxon group, 
we shall not resolve in vain. A mere common 
desire may seem an intangible instrument, and yet, 
intangible as it is, it may be enough to form the 
beginning of what in the end can make the whole 
difference." 2 

1 Quoted in Woodrow Wilson, Mere Literature, Boston, 1900, 
p. 152. 

2 Rt. Hon. Richard Burdon Haldane, Lord High Chancellor 
of Great Britain, before the American Bar Association, Montreal, 
September 1, 1913, Report of Thirty-Sixth Meeting oj the Associa- 
tion, Baltimore, 1913, p. 41 6. 



The English-speaking peoples who govern them- 
selves are faced by the not remote possibility of the 
destruction of one or more of their seven nations, 
should these nations be unable to co-operate. 
The destruction of any one would be a loss to all 
the others. The destruction of one or more of 
these nations might carry in its turn the destruction 
of others — or all. If one of the densely populated 
and wealthy nations were overpowered, the others 
would be exposed to the greater risk of attack. 
If one of the less densely populated and less 
wealthy nations were destroyed, the race would 
be deprived of homes for its growing numbers. 
The Britannic nations and America have identical 
interests in the safety of each and every one of 
these seven nations. The belief is here expressed 
that no co-operation short of unity of government 
will form an effective means of safeguarding the 
Pan-Angle civilization. 

The danger to the Britannic nations was ex- 
pressed in May 1911: "The truth is that the 
safety of the Imperial system cannot be maintained 
much longer by the arrangements which exist at 
present. No one, in the face of the facts brought 



forward in this article, can believe that the need 
for national strength is disappearing. The British 
naval budget and the creation of the Dominion 
navies alone disprove it. Yet it is quite clear that 
Great Britain alone cannot indefinitely guarantee 
the Empire from disruption by external attack. 
The further one looks ahead the more obvious 
does this become. A nation of 45,000,000 souls, 
occupying a small territory and losing much of the 
natural increase in its population by emigration, 
cannot hope to compete in the long run even 
against single powers of the first magnitude — with 
Russia, for instance, with its 150,000,000 inhabit- 
ants, with America with its 90,000,000, with 
Germany with its 65,000,000, increasing by nearly 
a million a year, to say nothing of China with its 
430,000,000 souls. Far less can it hope to main- 
tain the dominant position it has hitherto occupied 
in the world, with a dozen new powers entering 
upon the scene. Each of these powers, of small 
account by itself, is already an important factor 
in the scale which measures the balance of power. 
And as they are steadily increasing in wealth and 
population, it is only a question of time before 
some of them will become first-class powers in 
their turn. What will be the position of the 
Empire then, if it has to depend upon the navy 
of England alone ? Obviously the day must come 
when, if the Empire is to continue, it must be 
defended by the Joint efforts of all its self-govern- 
ing peoples." l 

In March 1913 another Britannic writer states : 
" The urgency of the situation does not diminish. 

1 Round Table, London, May 1911, pp. 251-252. 


Already, without striking a blow, Germany has 
practically detached the British navy from every 
sea except the North Sea — a result which no 
Englishman a few years ago would have believed 
to be possible in any circumstances whatever." 1 

The Britannic nations are not united in any 
single foreign policy. Hence they offer many 
opportunities for fatal discord. "It is simply 
impossible for the Dominions to set up inde- 
pendent foreign policies and independent defensive 
systems of their own without destroying the 
Empire, even if foreign powers refrain from attack. 
Suppose the present tendency carried to its logical 
conclusion. Instead of there being one govern- 
ment responsible for the safety of the Empire, 
there will be five. Each of these governments 
will be free to pursue any policy it likes, and each 
will have military or naval strength with which to 
back its policy. Each of them, therefore, may 
involve itself in war. And if the policy of one 
government, or the use it makes of its navy, does 
lead to war, what is to be the position ? Are the 
other governments to be involved ? The Dominions, 
not unreasonably, do not admit their responsibility 
for the policy of Great Britain, because they have 
no share in framing it. Is Great Britain to be 
responsible for the policy of the Dominions? 
Australia, for instance, is committed to the policy 
of Asiatic exclusion — a policy which may lead to 
international complications of the gravest kind." 2 
Again, " Obviously, the principle of complete 
local autonomy, admirably as it works for the 

1 Richard Jebb, The Britannic Question, London, 1913, p. 258. 

2 Round Table, London, May 1911, pp. 252-253. 


internal politics of the Empire, cannot be applied 
to foreign affairs. The Empire will infallibly dis- 
appear if any one of five governments can involve 
it in war." 1 

The Round Table article does not even consider 
the chance of war between Britannic nations. 
Doubtless the thought is so abhorrent that the 
possibilities which the facts present are often over- 
looked. Yet such possibilities do exist, and are 
added reasons for Britannic unity of government. 

Whatever dangers threaten the Britannic nations, 
threaten also America. In some cases these dangers 
are indirect or seemingly remote, in others, more 
immediately pressing. Injury to any part of the 
race would be an injury to America. If the 
Britannic nations receive any substantial damage, 
America must face the world as the head naval 
power of the English-speaking civilization. It 
would succeed to all the responsibilities and diffi- 
culties of that position, and its ability to discharge 
that duty would have been diminished by whatever 
damage the Britannic nations had sustained. 

War between any of the Britannic nations and 
America would be as fratricidal as that between 
any of the six Britannic nations. But the possi- 
bility of such a war, however abhorrent, is not to 
be ignored. America's population among the 
Pan- Angle nations soon will be approximated 
only by that of Canada. Rivalry between America 
and Canada would weaken the civilization in its 
population and wealth centre — its heart. If such 
rivalry should involve the clash of the six 
Britannic nations against America, the struggle 

1 Round Table, London, May 1911, pp. 253-254. 


would be more stupendous than any the race has 
yet experienced. 

All that is written as argument for closer union 
among the Britannic nations applies with equal 
force to a project intended to check the intra- 
racial struggles and safeguard the inter-racial 
security of our whole Pan-Angle civilization. 
The Pan-Angles have had their civil wars, both 
in and out of England : the English Civil War, 
the American Revolution, and the American Civil 
War. The Pan- Angles have had their foreign 
wars. They have outrun the Spanish, Portuguese, 
Dutch, and French. These struggles warn us to 
co-operate to avoid further civil wars and to meet 
the foreign wars to come. 

The race centre has moved, as Franklin foresaw, 
across the Atlantic. Canada, reaching to the two 
oceans, is the keystone of the Britannic arch. Its 
population will soon exceed that of the British 
Isles, whether compared with the present or any 
future British Isles population now imaginable. 
A proposal to establish the Britannic capital in 
Canada commends itself to some who are anxious 
for Britannic closer union. This, however, con- 
cerns the political unity of only the smaller portion 
of the race. The Pan- Angle house would still be 
divided. The future will be better secured to the 
race if the seven nations, taking counsel together, 
build a common capital on that unfortified boundary 
between the two Atlantic-Pacific nations. 

Bound into one federal body politic, the seven 
Pan- Angle nations would ensure to each of their 
component groups as final a sense of political 
security as any people have ever experienced 


within the knowledge of history. We should 
doubtless prefer to enjoy such a security without 
entering into any political combination. Each 
nation desires to go its own gait, yielding no iota 
of its independence. Since we cannot do that in 
safety, it is better to be bound into a co-operative 
unity with our fellow Pan- Angles, than to run 
any risk of suffering the bondage of an alien 
government. Most of us have already tried federa- 
tion and found it effective. The British Isles 
appears about to adopt it. While it makes for 
strength, it permits and encourages individual 
freedom and local self-government, essentials to 
Pan- Angle existence. 

The reasons for federation are many, and the 
obstacles are not as great as those we have met 
and overcome in previous instances of like nature 
in our local histories. 

Only a few reasons for federation have been here 
given. They are based on some of the reiterative 
similar facts which in our various local histories 
emphasize the same Pan- Angle principles. Many 
other reasons drawn from Pan- Angle experience 
will occur to the reader. He who wishes to see 
these arguments supplemented in the stories of the 
downfall of other civilizations can find much in 
non- Pan- Angle history to verify the theme of this 
book. But he will fail to find any case of the rule 
of one people over areas so extensive and so 
populous ; he will fail to find free men so equal in 
freedom — religious, political, and personal. There 
are to-day over one hundred and forty-one millions 
of white, English-speaking, self-governing people, 
who are living witnesses that government of the 


people, by the people, and for the people, shall not 
perish from the earth. 

For the citizens, and subject to their presentative 
sanction, the practice of representative government 
exists. The citizens do not exist for the sake of 
the government. To enlarge the sphere of the 
individual with due regard to the preservation of 
the group, Pan-Angles have used and proved the 
federal idea of government. 

England gave us the tenets of presentative and 
representative control manifested in unitary govern- 
ments. New England, beginning in the days of 
"The United Collonyes " of 1643, added to our 
English heritage the tenet of the co-existence of 
a federal common government and partner unitary 
governments. England is now merged into the 
nationality of the British Isles, and New England 
is merely a small corner of America. But the ideas 
they gave to us live wherever Pan- Angles talk of 
the safety of our civilization. 

The success of our former attempts at lesser 
" closer unions," is the best evidence of our co- 
operative ability in the face of obstacles. American, 
Canadian, Australian, and South African experi- 
ences show how difficulties are overcome when the 
need is understood. Rhode Island held back — the 
last to enter the new America ; Nova Scotia held 
back — the last willingly to enter the new Canada ; 
Queensland held back — the last to enter the consti- 
tutional convention for the new Australia ; and 
Natal held back — the last to support the new South 
Africa. Obstacles have always been present. They 
will arise in any effort for similar co-operations. 
But the common danger and common need is 


enough to dispel the obstacles in the path of 
Pan- Angle federation. 

Only by the force of public opinion do we 
accomplish our common intentions. We are slow 
to act politically. The refusal seven times repeated 
of the British Government to acknowledge New 
Zealand as within the Britannic world, and the 
long delayed start by America to build an Atlantic- 
Pacific canal are typical of all of us. But when our 
public desires are once formed they find a way to 

While we Pan- Angles wait, our rivals are growing 

If anyone searches here for unfriendly criticism 
or disparagement, or for an ulterior motive in 
advocating such a federation, he will be dis- 
appointed or self-deceived. If he be an American 
who thinks he sees here a suggestion that the 
United States should assert the hidden might of 
her eighty odd millions of resourceful people to 
compel by diplomacy or tariffs such joint action ; 
if he be a Britisher who thinks he sees here another 
pushing American plan of wider world control ; if 
he be from one of the five new Britannic nations 
and guards jealously his own worthy pride of 
nationhood from the numerical domination of 
both the British Isles and America, and fears that 
his own nation's autonomy is covertly attacked — in 
any such case the reader, whoever he be, is wrong. 

These pages are to tell Pan- Angles that their 
efforts will be wasted in any work not based on 
mutual respect and — may the word be used 
between men of a race who hesitate to show it — 
affection ; to tell the Pan- Angle who has not 


before realized it that we are all of the same race, 
hard fighters and firm friends ; and to tell the men 
of each Pan- Angle nation that their system of 
individual representation, with primary and final 
control in the voters of the nation, is the race 
system. To the Pan- Angle reader, wherever he 
be, just around the corner or at the other side of 
the globe (which ought to be the same in this, our 
world), these pages are addressed in hopes of help- 
ing each of us better to understand each other, and 
to remind us how much we need each other's help. 

This attempt to express ourselves in terms of 
ourselves may seem a trite treatise to those familiar 
with our history. The reason for saying trite 
things is lest we forget. 

The federation of the Pan-Angles is, perhaps to 
many of us, the vision that is to become a reality 
as a result of this " Era of English-speaking Good 
Feeling." We have inherited not only lands but 
ideals from the men who fought for them, regard- 
less of whether it was they or we, their children, 
who should inherit and enjoy them. To defend 
these lands, these ideals of personal freedom, and 
this language we speak, we once had unquestioned 
supremacy over the seas of the world. By a 
federation of the English-speaking white people of 
these seven nations, the control of the world and 
the self-control of our own citizens will again be in 
the certain care of the Pan- Angles. 

" We sailed wherever ship can sail, 
We founded many a noble state ; 
Pray God our greatness may not fail 
Through craven fear of being great." 


Aborigines, the, of Pan - Angle 

lands, 27, 135. 
Adams, John, cited, 107. 
Administration, the, 118. 
Administrative control, 94, III. 
Africa. See South Africa. 
Albany Conference, 184, 186, 187, 

I 9 1 -. 
Aliens, assimilation of, 25, 26. 
Alliance stage in Pan-Angle rela- 
tions, 181. 
America. See United States. 
American : 

Characteristics, 51. 
National language, 39, 40. 
Nationhood demonstrated in the 

issue of the Civil War, 168. 
People, the, 23. 

States, combination between, 53, 
179, 180. See also under 
United States. 
American Ambassador, the, quoted, 


American Bar Association, 172, 
226 n. 2 . 

American Civil War, 150, 166-168, 
173; effect of, on the atti- 
tudes of the British Isles and 
the United States, 169-170. 

American colonies, the, 8, 10, 1 1 ; 
commercial friction in, in the 
eighteenth century, 121. 

American colonization, 51 n. l ; 
women's share in, 51 and 

American Revolution, the, 15, 114 
and n., 122, 161, 164, 174, 
180; migrations incident to, 

Americanisms, 29. 

Americans, defined, 84 n. 
Angles, the, 4, 5, 6. 
Anglican, the term, 18. 
Anglo- Japanese treaty, 145, 223. 
Anglo-Saxon : the term considered, 
18; element in United States 
government, the, 37. 
Appeal Court, 90. 
Arbitration courts, 121, 122, 175 n. 2 , 

Arbitration treaty between America 
and the British Isles, 182 n. 2 . 
Asiatic : 

Immigration, 125, 138. 
Indian, the, 138. 
Races, problem of, 27. 
Australia, 16, 27, 79, 158. 

Asiatic immigration, 125, 143- 

146 passim, 158, 229. 
Constitution, the, 98, no and n., 

Federation in, 121, 168, 180. 
Government, 1 12-1 13 and n., 193. 
Upper House, election to, 109. 
Australian, characteristics of the, 52. 

Barbados, suggestion from, for closer 
union between England and 
colonies, 184. 

Bible, English version of, 28. 

Boer War, the, 123, 213. 

Boone, Daniel, 50. 

Botha, General, quoted, 80. 

Britain, early history of, 2 et seq. 

Britannic nations, the, 88 ; an alli- 
ance existent among, 181- 
183, 210; federation of, 208, 
209, 210, 224 ; attitude of, in 
foreign policy, 229-230 ; and 
America, 230. 



Britannica Year Book, 109. 
British-American friendship, 174- 

175 and n. 2 , 182-183. 
British Columbia and Oriental 

immigration, 125, 144-146. 
British Isles : 
Ascendency, 170. 
Colonies and federation, 189. 
attitude to Colonial question in 
the Cobden era and during 
the era of Gladstone, 163. 
Constitution, 96 et seq. 
Defined, 83 n. 

Federal model for, the, 197. 
Government, 62, 95, 111-115 
passim, 193 ; weakness of 
unitary system in, 195, 224 ; 
executive office during the 
American Revolution, 114. 
Naval defence, 157-159, 228; 
Big Fleet policy, 127, 128, 
Parliament. See below. 
Privy Council, Judicial Commit- 
tee, 90, 91, 124. 
British- Japanese treaty, 145, 223. 
British North America Act, 85, 168. 
British Parliament, 95 ; and the 
constitution, 96-98, 102, 103 ; 
development of, 57-58 ; now 
in essence unicameral, 58, 
American representatives in, 

suggested, 184. 
Cabinet, the, 1 15. 
General Election, 112. 
Relations with the Colonial 
Governments, 85 et seq. 
British South African Company, 49. 
Britons, the, 2 ; under Roman ad- 
ministration, 2-3. 
Brown, John, and the abolition of 

slavery, 50. 
Bryce, Lord, 176; on British-Ameri- 
can friendship, quoted, 176- 
177 ; cited, 32 ; quoted, 101. 
Buller, Charles, 162. 
Burke, E., cited, 11, 61 ; quoted, 94, 
214-216, 226. 

Cabot, John and Sebastian, 7 n. 1 . 
Caldecott, H., English Colonization 

and Empire, quoted, 59, 87, 

91, 172 n. 2 . 

Canada, 13,16,23,79,110, 133, 158, 
169, 172 and n. 2 , 180, 191, 
Government, 193, 194. 
Immigration, 24-25 n. 
Loyalist migrations into, during 
the American Revolution, 
Separation, the question of, 162, 

Upper House, election to, 109, 

Canadian Constitution, the, 98, 168. 

Canadian Rebellion (1837), 15. 

Cape Colony, native franchise in, 

Cape Times, quoted, 120 n. l . 

Carnarvon, Lord, cited, 123. 

Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, 
quoted, 87, 175 ; reply to Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier at Colonial 
Conference (1902), 181. 

Chatham, Lord, 134, 174 and n. 

China, 140-142, 143, 228 ; civiliza- 
tion of, as a danger for Pan- 
Angles, 141. 

Choate, Joseph H., quoted, 176, n. 

Churchill, Mr Winston, quoted, 197, 

Civil discord as a danger for Pan- 
Angles, 120. 

Cobden, cited, 163. 

Colonial Conference (1902), the, 79, 
85, 181-182. 

Colonial government, inauguration 
of modern, 162. 

Colonial independence, 170. 

Colonial Office, the, 89. 

Colonial representation favoured 
by Pownall and Franklin, 
184 «., 185, 187-189, 192, 

Colonies and possessions, distinc- 
tion between, not appreciated 
by the rulers of England, 
9-10, 13. 

Colonization, by the Pan-Angles, 


Commerce, competitions of, between 
nations, 121. 

Common law of England and of 
Scotland, 67-68, 96, 97. 

Conference of Education Associa- 
tions, 216-217. 



Congress and the American Con- 
stitution, 102-103. 
Constitutional : 
Government, 95. 
Law, 97-98. 
Constitutions, 60 ; as restrictions on 
the power of the people's 
representatives, 60. 
American, 99 et seq. 
Ancient and modern compared, 

95 »• 2 - 
British, 96 et seq. 
Written, 100, 105. 
Converging tendency, 170, 173, 174. 
Co-operation for protection of lands 

and trade, 46. 
Corfield, Richard C, 49. 
Court of Arbitration, 121, 122, 215. 
Court of Appeal, 90. 
Crown colonies, the, 16 n. 

Danes, the, 4, 5, 6. 
Dangers to the Pan-Angle civiliza- 
tion, 120 et seq., 227. 

Civil discord, 120, 231. 

Frictions, 121 et seq. 

Sense of security as a danger, 

Subject populations as a source 

of, 156. 
Defoe, Daniel, quoted, 6. 
Delegation, 194 n. \ 
Democracy, 63. 
Dependencies, distinguished from 

colonies, 9, 91-93. 
Devolution, 194 and n. l . 
Dewey, Admiral, 54. 
Dilke's Greater Britain, cited, 168. 
Downing Street, 88, 89, 90, 125. 
Dunraven, Lord, on the principles 

of Home Rule, 198. 
Durham, Lord, Governor of Canada, 


East India Company, 162. 

Education, 76-78. 

Egerton, H. E., Federations and 

Unions, quoted, 205 n. 
Election of representatives, the 

right of, 59. 
Emerson, English Traits, quoted, 

35> i9i- 
Emigration from Great Britain and 
Ireland, 22 and n. 

Empire, the term, considered, 
15-16 and nn., 88, 93. 

England, the term, considered, 19. 

England, 5 ; the Norman invasion, 
5-6 ; in the Age of Dis- 
covery, 7 ; the union with 
Scotland, 10. 

England and the American Col- 
onies, 8, 10, 11, 177-179; 
Franklin's plans for closer 
union between, 184 et seq. 

England, modern, area of, 48 <z?z^. 1 

English Civil War and law reform, 

English common law, 67 et seq., 96, 

. 97- 

English, the term, considered, 18- 

English language : the tie between 
Pan-Angles, 31-32, 39, 40; 
characteristics of, 33 ; de- 
velopment of, 28, 30, 33 ; 
standards in, 29; differences 
of dialect and colonization, 
29; local variations of speech, 
29, 30, 31 ; the written lan- 
guage, 31 ; place of, as a 
world language, 35 ; Ameri- 
canisms, 29. 

English - speaking peoples : the 
seven nations, 16 et seq., 79 
et seq., 189; number of, 33 
andn. 1 232 ; the assumption 
of superiority in, 35 et seq. 

European migrations into Britain, 2. 

Executive control, 94, in. 

Federal courts, 102-103. 

Federalism, 200, 224. 

Federated Malay States, the, 13, 
14, 200 n. l . 

Federation, 200 n. l 232 ; evolution 
of, 205. 

Federation of Pan-Angles, con- 
sidered, 93, 129-130, 203, 206 
et seq., 227 et seq. ; methods 
of, 208-209 ; plans for, 210 et 
seq.; arbitration as leading to, 
216; conferencesas stepping- 
stones to, 2 1 6-2 1 7 ; educative 
influences as factors in, 218- 
220, 221-222 ; facilities for 
communication as a factor 
in promoting, 217 ; voluntary 



associations for promotion 
of, 218-220; defensive efforts 
previous to, 222-223. 

Forbes, W. C, quoted, 92. 

Foreign alliances, 223. 

Foreign immigration and the Pan- 
Angle lands, 24, 25. 

France, 131, effect of the Seven 
Years War on, 178 ; oversea 
possessions of, 132-133 ; re- 
garded by British Isles as 
an effective ally, 133; holds 
no true colonies, 133. 

Franklin, Benjamin, on colonial 
representation in the British 
Parliament, 184, n., 185, 
192, 199; scheme of, for 
Pan-Angle union, 1 84-191 
passim ; a hoax by, 187 n. 2 ; 
quoted, 34, 53 ; cited, 12, 61, 

French and British in North 
America, characteristics of, 

French language, the, 34. 

Galloway, Pennsylvanian loyalist, 
cited, 11 ; quoted, 12. 

Germanic tribes, early system of 
government in, 54-55. 

Germany, 131, 138, 142, 143, 229; 
as a rival of the Pan-Angles, 
152-156, 158, 228; rise of, 
154 ; bureaucracy in, 155. 

Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., cited, 

Government, different significations 
of the word in England and 
United States, 118. 

Government, ultimate control of, 
with the voters, 94, 95. 
Non-unitary, 6, 193. 
Unitary, 194. 

inadequacy of, 195. 

Governmental practices, 94 et seq. 

Governments: complementary func- 
tions in, 170; presentative 
and representative, 61, 62, 63. 

Governors, the British, 86, 87, 108- 
109 n.\ the power of veto of, 
86, 87, 89. 

Grant, President, 167, 169, 

Grey, Sir Edward, 152. 

Hague Tribunal, the, 121-122. 

Haldane, Lord, quoted, 226 and n. 2 . 
Hamilton, Alexander, 117. 
Hardinge, Lord, cited, 120 n. \ 
Hawaiian Islands, the, 143, 144. 
Hay-Pauncefoote treaty, 128. 
Hindus, 125 n.\ 
Holland, 131 ; oversea possessions 

of, 1 32 and n. 2 . 
Home Rule, 165 and n. 1 , 198. 
House of Commons, 57, 58, 95, 97, 

104, 108. 
House of Lords, 57 and n. G , 58, 

59, 90, 104, 108. 
Howe, Joseph, 191. 
Howe, Lord, 178 and n. 
Howe, Sir William, 178 n. 
Hudson's Bay Company, 49. 
Hutchinson, quoted, 9. 

Imperial Civil War, the. See 

American Revolution. 
Imperial Defence Committee, 90, 91. 
Imperial Federation, 15-16. 

Joseph Howe's statement, 191. 
Imperial Parliament, 88. 
India, 8, 9, 13, 16 n., 178. 
Individualism of the Pan-Angles, 

40, 47 et seq., 1 54 ; and the 

gift for combining, 52 ; and 

territorial acquisition, 48 ; 

and personal liberty, 50 ; in 

religion, 73-75. 
Initiative, 60. 
International arbitration, 121, 122, 

175 n. 2,215. 
International postal arrangements, 

Ireland and the Irish question, 13, 

164 and n.\ 165, 197, 198; 

union with Great Britain, 192. 

Japan, 139, 142-143 ; rise of, as a 
world power, 142, 147, 149, 
152 ; the increasing popula- 
tion and the search for land, 

Japanese migration and Pan-Angle 
lands, 144-146, 151 ; Ad- 
miral Mahan on, 147 et seq. ; 
the question of assimilation, 

Japanese treaty with Great Britain, 
145, 223. 

Jefferson, Thomas, 107, 126. 



Jenks, E., The Future of British 

Law, quoted, 68, 70. 
Johnson, Dr., quoted, 38. 
Johnston, Sir H. H., cited, 132 if. 1 , 


Jutes, the, 4. 

Land and the standard of living, 

42 et seq.\ co-operation for 

protection of, 46. 
Language of the Pan- Angles, growth 

of, 28. 
Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, quoted, 80, 86, 

Law in the Pan-Angle nations, 67 

et seq. 
Lee, Robert E., 167. 
Legislative control, 94, 108. 
Le Rossignol and Stewart, State 

Socialism in New Zealand, 

quoted, 53 n. 
Leroy-Beaulieu, P., Les Etats-Unis 

au Vinglibne Steele, cited, 

51 n. 
Lincoln, President, 27 n. 1 , 150, 

166-167, 168, 226. 
Local autonomy, 161, 172,200,229. 
Lodge, H. C, One Hundred Years 

of Peace, cited, 123. 
Louisiana, 133. 
Lourenco Marques, 132 n. 1 . 

Magna Carta, 53, 63. 

Mahan, Admiral, 32 ; quoted on 

Japan among the Nations, 

146 et seq. 
Malay Peninsula, Federated States, 

the, 13, 14, 200 n. \ 
Marriage and divorce laws, 71-73 ; 

local laws, 72. 
Maryland - Virginia, Conference 

(1785), 26. 
Massachusetts : settlement of, 8 ; 

the Taunton liberty pole, 10, 

1 1 ; during the Seven Years 

War, 134, 178, 179. 
Mayflower, the, 29, 100. 
Mill, J. S., The Subjection of 

Women, quoted, 73. 
Milner, Lord, quoted, 86 ; on the 

federation of the Empire, 

quoted, 188, 201. 
Modyford, Colonel Thomas, 184. 
Monroe doctrine, the, 125-128, 154. 

Monroe, President, 126, 127. 

Moore, W. H., The Constitution 
of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, cited, 83 n. K 

Natal, 233 
Asiatic Indians in, 123-124. 
Zulu rebellion in, 123. 
National Church, 74. 
Native franchise question in South 

Africa, 66. 
Naval co-operation between the 
Pan-Angle countries, 158— 
159, 223. 
Naval expansion, effect on Great 

Britain, 157-158. 
Naval strength, importance of, to 
the Pan-Angles, 157, 158 ; 
Colonial efforts for, 158, 182. 
Negro problem, 27. 

Slavery and the War of Secession, 

150, 166. 
Suffrage, 66-67. 
Nelson, 54. 

New England, the town meeting in, 
59-61 ; union of the Colonies 
in, 203-205, 233. 
Newfoundland, 7, 16, 81, 161. 

Constitution of, 99, no. 
New Guinea, 48. 

New Zealand, 13, 16, 48, 61, 81-82, 
143-146 passim, 158, 234. 
Constitution of, 99, no. 
Government of, 193, 194. 
House of Representatives, method 
of election to the Upper 
House, 60, 109, no. 
Resolutions against Judicial Com- 
mittee of the Privy Council, 
State Socialism in, 53 and n. 
Norman Conquest, the, 5-6, 56. 
Norsemen, the, 4. 

North America : the struggle for, 
178, 179 ; the centre of Pan- 
Angle civilization, 191. 
Nova Scotia, 233. 

Oliver, F. S., Alexander Hamilton, 

quoted, 86, 88, 89, 115 n. 
Otis, of Massachusetts, cited, 11. 

Page, Ambassador, cited, 2 1 7, 2 1 8 n. 
Panama Canal tolls, 125, 128. 




Pan-Angle, Pan-Angles : 
Alliances of, with former com- 
petitors, 133. 
Characteristics of, 47. 

gift for combining, 52. 
Civilization, character of, 41. 
Clamour for local autonomy, 200. 
Communities, tendency to separa- 
tion latent in, 164-165. 
Converging tendency among, 

173 et seq. 
Defined, 17-18, 28. 
Equality of citizenship in, II, 13. 
Federation of, considered, 93, 
129-130, 203, 206 et seq.) 
227 et seq. 
Governments, 108, 193. 
History, commencement of, 7. 
Language of, 28. 
Law among the, 67 et seq. 
Nations : 
area of, 81 n. 1 . 

attitude to Japanese immigra- 
tion, 144 et seq. 
dependencies of, 91-93. 
friendship and alliance among, 

mutual criticism between, 

naval co-operation between, 

population of, 81 n. 1 . 
similarity in forms of govern- 
ment, 94. 
Origin of, 1 et seq ., 6. 
People, the, 22 et seq. 
Pioneers, methods of, 48. 
Standard of living, 40, 41, 42, 44. 
Struggle for world domination, 


Struggles with other civilizations, 

43,44, 130 et seq. 
Territories : 

acquisition of by, 43, 44. 
area of, 48 and n. l . 
Women, 51 and n. 2 . 
Papua, 9. 
Parliament, British. See under 

Patriotism and federation, 206-208. 
Peel, Sir Robert, 112. 
Penington, Isaac, 57 n. 4 . 
People, the, similarity of, in the Pan- 
Angle nations, 21, 23. 

Perry, Admiral, 142. 
Philippines, the, 9, 143. 
Pitt, William. See Chatham. 
Political combinations preservative 

of individualism, 54. 
Political good feeling, 177. 
Political status of the six nations, 

84 et seq. 
Pollock and Maitland, History of 

English Law, cited, 63. 
Popular election, 112. 
Population of the Pan - Angle 

nations, 81 n. 1 . 
Portugal, 131, 153. 

Oversea possessions of, 132 and 

Possessions as distinguished from 

colonies, 9. 
Pownall,C. A. W, Thomas Pownall, 

134, 152. 
Pownall, Governor Thomas, views 

of, on colonial representa- 
tion, 187-188, 189 ; cited) 12, 

61, 187, 190; quoted, 45, 51, 

52, 178, 179. 
Presentative element in British 

government, the, 58. 
Presentative government in the 

Pan-Angle nations, 55, 56, 

61 ; tendency towards an 

increase in, 62, 
Privy Council, Judicial Committee 

of, 90-91, 124. 

Queensland, 233. 

Quoted passages, meaning of 
terms in, 19 n. K 

Recall, 60, 62. 

Referendum, 60, 61. 

Reform Bill (1832), 50, 112. 

Religion and individualism, 73-75. 

Representation : difficulties attend- 
ant upon, 60 ; not in itself 
enough for Pan-Angles, 200. 

Representative government, de- 
velopment of, 54, 56-58 ; 
transplantation of, to the 
colonies, 58, 59. 

Representative, a, not necessarily 
chosen by the people he 
represents, 59 ; chosen by 
elections and referenda, 95. 

Rhode Island, 233. 



Rhodes, Cecil J., 149, 172 ; interest 
in the Irish question, 202 
and n. 2 ; views of, as to 
federation, 202, 203 ; quoted, 
on English-speakingreunion, 
190 ; the Rhodes' Scholar- 
ships, 221, 222. 

Roman administration of Britain, 

Roman Empire population, 17 andn. 

Roosevelt, President, 171 andn. 2 . 

Royal Colonial Institute, 168 andn. 

Rushworth, quoted, 40. 

Russia, 138-139, 142 ; growth of, 
significance for Pan-Angle 
civilization, 139, 142, 228 ; 
checked by Japan, 139. 

Saxons, the, 4, 5, 6. 

Scotland, union with England, 10. 

Scots, the, Goldwin Smith quoted 
on, 36. 

Sea power, importance of, to the 
Pan- Angles, 157, 158. 

Seeley, J. R., Expansion of Eng- 
land, cited and quoted, 88, 
92, 134, 160, 168. 

Self-government, 8, 9, 120, 172, 
201 ; effect of failure to dis- 
tinguish between self-govern- 
ing and non-self-governing 
areas, 13-16 ; and the right 
of the British Government, 
85 andn., 89 et seq. ; effect 
of improper check to, 161 ; 
principles of, violated in the 
British system, 196. 

Sentiment and government, 183. 

Separation, the tendency to, 160 
et seq., 173. 

Seven English - speaking nations, 
the, 16 et seq., 79 et seq., 189. 

Seven Years War, 134, 178. 

Shakespeare, cited, 28, 29. 

Shelburne, Lord, 174. 

Shirley, Governor, 185, 199. 

Silburn, P. A., The Governance of 
Empire, quoted, 204, n. 

Slavery, the abolition of, 50, 84, 
150, 166. 

Smith, Goldwin, quoted, 36, 150; 
cited, 164. 

South Africa, 13, 16, 23, 80, 121, 
172, 180. 

South Africa : 

Asiatic Indians in, 120 and n., 

123-124, 158. 
British Government and the in- 
ternal affairs of, 123, 213. 
Chinese indentured labour in, 123. 
Constitution of, 99, no. 
Emancipation of slaves in, 84. 
Government, 193. 
Law in, 69. 

Natives and the franchise in, 
South African Provinces, conver- 
gences of, 168. 
South African Railway Rates Con- 
ference (1908), 216. 
South African War, 172, 174, 182. 
Spain and her possessions, 131. 
Spreading : the tendency to, in Pan- 
Angle history, 160-161, 172. 
State Church, the, 74. 
Stead, W. T., cited, 190. 
Suffrage, the, 63, et seq. 
Local differences in, 64-65. 
Local option, 65. 
Negro, 66-67. 
Sex disqualification, the, 64. 
Switzerland, Inter-cantonal, arbitra- 
tion in, 216. 

Taft, W. H., Popular Government, 

cited, 60 n. 3 ; quoted, 65. 
Taunton liberty pole, the, 10, n. 
Taxation and representation, 12, 13, 

Tendencies, 160 et seq. 

Revealed in Pan-Angle history, 

Teutonic : invasion of Britain, 4 ; 

system of government, 113- 

114, 116, 117. 
Texas, 49 n. \ 82. 
Thayer, J. B.John Marshall, quoted, 

102, 103. 
Times, The, quoted, 120 n. 1 . 
Transvaal, 138. 

Indian question, 125. 
Transvaal Leader, cited, 132 n. l . 
Trusts or combinations, 52. 

Unconstitutional : different mean- 
ings of the word in Great 
Britain and in United States, 



United Empire, 168 n. 2 . 
United States, the, i, 9, 16, 45, 83 
n. 2 , 178, 179, 180, 228. See 
also under American. 

Administration, the. See Govern- 

Centralization, the demand for, 
in, 170. 

Colonies, federal government of, 

Conference of Governors in, 171 
and n. 2 , 172. 

Conservation in, 171. 

Electoral College, 106, in and 
n., 112. 

Executive, the, 116. 

Federal Constitution of, 99-103 
passim, 106, 107, 109 and n. 

Federal Government of, 90, 1 1 1- 
118 passim, 170-172, 189, 
193, 200-201. 

Immigration, 22, 23, 24 n. \ 

Law in, similar to the law of 
England, 70 ; appointment 
of the judiciary, 114. 

President, the, 62, 101, 114, 116, 
117; election of, 11 1; and 
administrative subordinates, 

Secession movement in, 165 ; 
sacrifices to preserve the 
Union, 168, 173 ; the War 
of Secession, 150, 166-168, 
172, 174. 

Senators, indirect election of, 60. 

State governments in, 65, 114. 

States rights, the demand for, 

United States : 

Upper House, election to, 109, 

United States and British Isles, 
effect of federation on sources 
of disagreement between, 
\7.^ etseq. ; treaties between, 

United States and the Britannic 
nations, 182, 230-231. 

Vancouver Island, 210 n. 
Virginia, settlement of, 8. 

The House of Assembly in, 9, 59. 
Voltaire, treatise on Toleration, 
cited, 34. 

Washington, George, cited, 107 ; 
quoted, 225. 

Webster, Noah, 34. 

William the Conqueror, 5, 55. 

Willson, Beckles, The Great Com- 
pany, cited, 49 n. 2 . 

Willson, Governor (of Kentucky), 
171 n. 2 . 

Wilson, Woodrow, Mere Literature, 
quoted, 95, 166-168 ; The 
State, quoted, 107, 114 »., 
118 n. 

Witenagamot, the, 55, 57, 61. 

Women's share in American coloni- 
zation, 5 1 and n. 2 . 

Worsfold, W. B., The Union of 
South Africa, quoted, 67, 

Yellow races, the, 140 et seq. 



THE PANANGLES: a consideration op the federation op the seven English -speaking nations! 

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Sifton, Praed i C London.S I 

D Kennedy, Sinclair 

UUG The Pan-Angles